

DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 232 274

EA 015 824

AUTHOR Radecki, Henry; Evans, Susan
TITLE The Teachers' Strike Study. Sudbury, Ontario, 1980.
INSTITUTION Ontario Inst. for Studies in Education, Toronto.
SPONS AGENCY Ontario Dept. of Education, Toronto.; Ontario Ministry of Colleges and Universities, Toronto.
REPORT NO ISBN-0-7743-8065-9
PUB DATE 82
NOTE 201p.
AVAILABLE FROM Ontario Government Bookstore, 880 Bay Street, Toronto, Ontario, Canada M7A 1L2 (\$5.00).
PUB TYPE Reports - Research/Technical (143)

EDRS PRICE MF01/PC09 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS *Administrator Role; Board of Education Role; Collective Bargaining; Economic Factors; *Influences; Labor Relations; *Parent Attitudes; *School Attitudes; Secondary Education; Student Teacher Ratio; Teacher Administrator Relationship; *Teacher Attitudes; Teacher Role; Teacher Salaries; *Teacher Strikes; Teaching Conditions; Unions

IDENTIFIERS *Ontario (Sudbury)

ABSTRACT

Focusing on the 1980 strike of public secondary school teachers in Sudbury, Ontario, this study examined attitudes of those involved; ascertained feelings toward the school system that may have emerged since the strike; and examined events, influences, and developments leading to the strike and prolonging the strike. The field study represented face-to-face interviews with 82 parents; questionnaires from 44 teachers; and 91 interviews with trustees, board of education officers, principals, vice principals, and community leaders. The field research data were augmented by a broad variety of documentation bearing on the strike. Findings suggested that financial considerations were the cause of the strike for the board, while economic concerns and job security were the major issues for the teachers. The factors precluding a settlement were the lack of pressure from parents for an end to the strike, the rigid position on each side of the bargaining table, and the unwise use of mass media as a public information forum. A number of other findings emerged concerning results of the strike, most of them negative. (Author/JM)

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Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Kadecki, Henry, 1927-
Teachers' strike study

Bibliography: p.
ISBN 0-7743-8065-9

I. Sudbury (Ont.)--Teachers' strike, 1980. I. Evans,
Susan, 1946- II. Ontario. Ministry of Education.

III. Title.

LB2844.47C32S92

331.89'28137311'097133
C83-093012-4

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Publications Sales
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Abstract

The Teachers' Strike Study deals with the 1980 strike of public secondary school teachers in Sudbury, Ontario. The strike affected over 13 000 students and over 700 teachers. The 56 school days lost made it the longest such sanction in the history of education in Ontario.

The study's major concerns were to examine attitudes of teachers, principals, trustees, Sudbury Board of Education officers, parents, and the community at large, at various stages of this event; to ascertain feelings towards the school system that may have emerged since the strike; to examine various events, influences, and developments leading to the strike and prolonging the strike.

The report comprises eight chapters dealing with methodology, the overall background of Sudbury, issues related to the strike, prestrike events, the period of strike, immediate poststrike developments, the long-term effects of the strike, and a summary and conclusions.

The field study represented face-to-face interviews with 82 selected parents of students affected by the strike; self-response questionnaires from 44 volunteers among secondary school teachers; and 91 interviews (of which 61 were tape-recorded) with trustees, Sudbury Board of Education officers, principals, vice-principals, and others defined as community leaders. The field research data were augmented by a broad variety of documentation bearing on the 1980 strike. The report includes data from computer analysis of selected variables, a detailed examination of existing documentation, and other relevant information. The analysis of selected issues is based on all these sources of information.

In general, the causes of the strike were complex and embedded in the historical and cumulative nature of teacher/board relations. More specifically for 1979, financial considerations were the key factor for the board, while economic concerns and job security were the major issues for the teachers. The resolution of these differences was severely hampered by the absence of proper communication and the lack of perception of the depth of resolve on each side of the dispute.

Despite the presence of a series of mediators, the strike ended only after a perceived threat of legislation and binding arbitration. The factors precluding a settlement were the lack of pressure from parents for an end to the strike and the rigid position on each side of the bargaining table. An important contributing factor was the unwise use of mass media as a public-information forum.

The teachers were dissatisfied and bitter with the settlement; strong residues of anti-board feelings remained in 1981. Because of the strike, relations between teachers and principals/vice-principals were affected negatively. The study discovered some cynicism towards teachers from parents but, in general, parents were satisfied with their schools. There was no consensus as to whether the educational system was "back to normal" in 1981. The report considered that because of the strike, the teachers became more militant, and defined themselves more as workers than as professionals. But in a staunchly pro-union town, the striking teachers received almost no support or sympathy.

The study failed to discover what was meant by jeopardy for the students, or to establish any clear definitions of quality education. The authors argued that local negotiations are seldom concerned with the specific educational needs of the immediate community. They are now depersonalized confrontations, likely to engender problems that could be avoided by a province-wide system of negotiations. The overall negative effects of teachers' strikes were noted, but no viable alternatives are envisaged.

Acknowledgments

Many people contributed to this report. We are especially thankful to the members of the Advisory Committee, who provided the Teachers' Strike Study (TSS) with an important initial response to the study questionnaires; and to the volunteers, who participated in time-consuming pretesting of the questionnaires/interview schedules. We regret that we cannot name a number of individuals who provided the TSS with extensive documentation and verbal information related to the 1980 strike. We are indebted to Sudbury-district parents for taking part in our study, to those teachers who answered the questionnaires, and to the study participants who agreed to the taped interviews, often lasting over two hours. The information gathered from all these respondents makes up the bulk of this report, and we are very grateful to all TSS participants.

We thank Mr. George W. Thomson, Director, Sudbury Board of Education, for his help in providing the TSS with many necessary and often invaluable documents. Mr. P. J. A. Evans, Head, Midnorthern Centre, Ontario Institute for Studies in Education, provided many valuable suggestions on the relevant literature. His editorial comments on the first two or three chapters of this report are greatly appreciated. Mr. Edward M. Aim, Director, Research Services, Education Relations Commission, was helpful in providing the TSS with some documentation, and the advice and help given by Mr. Robert E. Saunders, Education Officer, Regional Services Secretariat, Ministry of Education, were especially valuable. Special thanks are extended to Mr. Robin Hale, Director, Planning and Research Department, Sudbury Regional Police, for compiling needed statistics at the request of the TSS.

Last but not least, we thank Mrs. Elaine Pidgeon, who struggled with hand-written scribbles, typed, and retyped this report. Chris Radecki performed the tedious task of proofreading the various versions of the typescript. The authors alone are responsible for any shortcomings in this report.

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1 Introduction

Preamble

Like the police officers and the fire fighters in Ontario, public school teachers were not expected to strike prior to 1975. In 1975, Bill 100 changed this for the teachers, but the majority of contract negotiations were settled by other means. Since 1975, a number of strikes did take place in Ontario.* Much useful information is now available on the effects of teachers' strikes on students, but less is known about the antecedents and dynamics of such strikes in Ontario, and their broader consequences. The only major study addressing these matters that the authors are aware of is Kervin's The 1975 Metro Toronto Teacher-Board Negotiations and Strike, 1977. Also, little systematic information is available on the involvement and reaction to such strikes from the parents of the students, and from the teachers themselves.

The Teachers' Strike Study (to be called TSS henceforth) was designed to research a wide range of conditions, situations, and issues related to the public secondary school teachers' strike in Sudbury, Ontario, in 1980. By various means, information was collected from a broad representation of respondents in order to gain a better understanding of the dynamics of negotiations for a settlement, and of other factors bearing on the conditions leading to the longest teachers' strike in the history of public education in Ontario. The intent of the TSS was to gather whatever concrete data were available about the history of the strike and to elicit attitudinal responses from the study participants. In this way, the TSS was able to expand on documented information about what did happen with information concerning what the respondents thought had happened--perceptions and attitudes being in themselves major causal factors of the strike, its length, and its consequences.

It should be noted at the outset that the study and the information presented in this report are subject to limitations, because of deliberate exclusion of specific areas, biases which could not be avoided, or other reasons. Thus, students enrolled in the public secondary schools at the time of the strike were not directly a part of the present study. The research focused on one school board, weakening the generalizability of the findings to other locations where such strikes took place. Lack of complete documentation and the nature of the collected information posed additional limitations to the overall results. Because the TSS was dependent upon those affected by the strike volunteering to provide documentation--which is of a private and sensitive nature--it can hardly claim that what it gathered is representative or complete. Nevertheless, the TSS did receive a substantial amount from all of the groups involved--trustees, board of education officers, principals, teachers, and parents--and is confident that the contributions of these people have compensated significantly for some other limitations of this research.

One of the major problems, applicable to any field research, bears on the type of questions asked the study respondents; that is, on how amenable the responses are to

* There were 28 strikes or lockouts prior to 1975 and 18 from then to May 1980. Some were subjected to research (e.g., Brison, 1979).

standardized coding procedures and later analysis. In the case of the TSS, all respondents were given a great many choices in dealing with questions, many of which probed their attitudes and opinions on specific issues. The respondents were also encouraged to elaborate on or qualify their responses, thus making interpretation of these more complex.

Another factor in considering the validity and reliability of the findings about this event stems from the matter of selective memory of events which took place 12 months ago, or earlier, and the subjectiveness of the respondents' presentation of the requested information. To counterbalance these and other such problems, certain steps were taken to assure the highest possible degree of accuracy of the findings. These will be discussed later in this introductory chapter.

While the weaknesses are readily acknowledged, the value of the study, in the opinion of the authors, should also be identified. The TSS produced masses of information not previously available in such detail and scope. The individual accounts provided by those directly involved in the strike often reveal the intricacies of negotiations and steps leading to the resolution of such disputes. The information and opinions offered by community leaders are important in expanding awareness of strike developments and effects. The most systematically gathered data are from parents of students affected by the strike. In this case, many valuable insights into parent/school-system relationships were obtained by the TSS.

We believe that this report offers an important contribution to a better understanding of collective bargaining and teachers' strikes within the public school system of secondary education in Ontario. Insights gained from this study can be used constructively to improve relationships among people within the public educational system and between those within the public educational system and the general public.

Terms of Reference

The TSS was to examine the 1980 secondary school teachers' strike in Sudbury in order to permit a better understanding of the dynamics of a strike in the public sector, and to learn about certain developments, situations, and attitudes of individuals, groups, and the larger community to the matters of education and strikes. More specifically, the tasks undertaken by the TSS were as follows:

1. to examine attitudes of teachers, principals, vice-principals, trustees, board of education officers, parents, and the community;
2. to ascertain the atmosphere towards education, the board of education, and teachers' strikes in general after the strike;
3. to identify changes in the governance of education: what happened to the role of appointed and elected officials as evolved during and after the strike;
4. to determine the extent of the emergence of coalitions and their effect on the board of education;

5. to define the role of the Sudbury District Roman Catholic Separate School Board during the strike;
6. to examine internal and external influences in events leading to the strike, factors prolonging the strike, and factors leading to termination of the strike.

The TSS did consider all of the areas listed above but the bulk of the information deals with matters raised in points 1, 2, and 6. No seemingly lasting coalition of any kind was discovered by the TSS. The role of the Sudbury District Roman Catholic School Board during the strike can be termed as a "hands off" position. With some minor changes, the governance of education remains unchanged at the time of writing this report. The report will show, however, that attitudes of people both within and without the system about this governance have changed somewhat in the aftermath of the strike.

Research Design: Preparatory Stages

To determine the chances of co-operation in the proposed study, we established exploratory contacts in October 1980 with the Director of Education, Sudbury Board of Education (SBE); with the president of District 31, Ontario Secondary School Teachers' Federation (OSSTF); and with the president of Region 4, l'Association des enseignants franco-ontariens (AEFO).

Full co-operation was promised and received from the SBE and from the Director of Education.

In the case of the OSSTF,* the initial reaction was negative. Two additional meetings were held with the officers of the OSSTF in February and April 1981. At both meetings the TSS made oral submissions explaining the nature of the study, the importance of learning about the teachers' perceptions of the strike, its causes and consequences, and, more generally, about the problems within the system and the value of Bill 100. The TSS also provided the executive with draft copies of the teachers' questionnaires for their critical evaluation and assured them (as with all other respondents) of total confidentiality for the information requested from them. No commitment of co-operation in any form was gained as a result of these meetings. The major objection, voiced by one member of the OSSTF executive, was that while the proposed study seemed to be useful, no controls could be exercised by the teachers over what use the Ontario Ministry of Education, the mass media, or others might make of it. The TSS did not receive any formal indication of the OSSTF's position regarding the research. After the April meeting, the TSS learned informally that, because of a division within the OSSTF executive, its official position would be to permit its members to respond if they wished; and that some of the executive were nevertheless actively engaged in discouraging teachers from participating.

After an initial and inconclusive discussion with the president of the AEFO, this contact was not re-established, despite various attempts on the part of the TSS to do so.

* Unless clearly indicated otherwise, all references to the OSSTF, the AEFO, and the teachers are to those of the Sudbury area.

A number of existing studies on teachers' strikes were examined to determine if any such research could serve as a partial model for the TSS, but little of direct relevance was found, and the preliminary research tools--self-response questionnaires and interview schedules--were designed and applied before the background knowledge about specific issues and conditions in Sudbury could be fully determined. This drawback was ameliorated, in part, by the creation of an Advisory Committee to help with the formation of the questionnaires and interview schedules. The Advisory Committee was made up of volunteers, representing the SBE, teachers, principals, trustees, and parents, whose task was to consider and advise on the nature of the questions, on the specific issues to be raised for each category of respondents, and on the wording of the questionnaires. The Advisory Committee met three times and was very helpful in identifying certain problems, noting certain gaps in the proposed inquiry, and generally evaluating the research tools.

The TSS Samples

The 1980 teachers' strike in Sudbury reflected the involvement of specific categories of people. Three were identified and chosen for in-depth research by the TSS: the secondary school teachers, the parents whose children were directly affected by the strike, and the "others." Included in the "others" category were SBE officers, trustees, principals, vice-principals, and community leaders or representatives from various sectors of public life.

A selection of secondary school teachers was drawn from a complete 1979-80 list. The list consisted of 1098 names and included supply and special education teachers, and the names of those who retired or resigned by 1981. Every second name was selected and 549 self-response questionnaires were sent to the last known private address of each person.

The selection of subjects from the various subcategories of "others" was based in part on the logical choice of individuals who were involved, more or less directly, in the teachers' strike (e.g., the higher functionaries in other educational systems); in part on media reports of involvement within some organized attempt to affect the strike (e.g., spokesmen for the parents' groups); and in part on the prominent role of some individuals within the community (in business, finance, churches, labour unions). No specific number of respondents was predetermined for the "others" subcategories; more stress was placed on the representation and on the depth of the interviews.

The sample of parents with students in the SBE public secondary schools was drawn from the lists of students enrolled in the 1979-80 academic year. These lists were provided by each school at the request of Mr. George W. Thomson, Director of Education. All lists were checked to remove duplications, that is, families with more than one child in the public secondary schools in the 1979-80 academic year. The final total was 11 242 families.* Because of the large number, a representative sample of 1 per cent was systematically selected from the total (see Appendix 1, Table A1). The exact number of

* This was for 16 Sudbury-area secondary schools. It was not possible to acquire the list for Copper Cliff High School, which closed in September 1980. It is likely that the number of parents involved--under 100--would not affect the overall findings of this research.

parents was drawn from each school on a pro rata basis, and 113 names were selected as respondents. A further sample of 44 parents was selected by the same method to serve as a substitution pool of subjects for those found ineligible or unavailable to the researchers from the first sample. Names from the second sample were to be considered for substitution when specific families were defined as genuinely ineligible. No substitutions were made for outright refusals. The final number of parents included was 82.

The category of parents constitutes the only systematically selected sample, and their responses represent a more valid and reliable bank of data than that derived from the other two categories of TSS respondents. The information below is a sociodemographic sketch of the TSS families included for later references to the statistical details on various questions related to the teachers' strike.

The interviews were held with mothers alone in 79.3 per cent of the cases, with fathers alone in 12.2 per cent, and with both parents present and participating in 8.5 per cent. Of the 82 families, 32.9 per cent defined their ethnic background as Anglo-Celtic, 35.4 per cent as French, and 31.8 per cent claimed various ethnic backgrounds. The age of the respondents was as follows:

Table 1.1: Age, Parent Respondents

Age	Respondent	Spouse
	%	
Between 20 and 29	-	-
Between 30 and 39	17.1	6.1
Between 40 and 49	50.0	46.3
Between 50 and 59	24.4	26.8
60 +	8.5	7.3
Don't Know/No Answer	-	13.4

N = 82

The largest segment of the parents, 64.6 per cent, were Roman Catholic, 19.5 per cent belonged to various Protestant churches, 13.4 per cent were members of other denominations, and 2.4 per cent had no religious affiliation. Of the total, 12.2 per cent did not provide information on the family's gross annual income. The largest segment of the families, 36.6 per cent, had an income of between \$20 000 and \$29 999; 20.8 per cent earned between \$10 000 and \$19 999; 17.1 per cent earned over \$30 000; and 13.4 per cent had an income of under \$10 000. The education profile of the parents was as follows:

Table 1.2: Formal Education, Parent Respondents

Education	Respondent	Spouse
	%	
Grade 8 or less	28.1	19.5
High School	53.7	50.0
Special Education/Higher Education	15.9	15.9
Other	2.4	1.2
Don't Know/No Answer	-	3.4

N = 82

The largest segment of the families, 46.4 per cent, had three or four children, 37.8 per cent had five or more, and only 15.9 per cent had one or two. In 1981, 56.1 per cent of the families had one child attending public secondary school, 37.8 per cent had two school attenders, and 6.1 per cent had three or more children enrolled.

The selected families were long-time residents in Sudbury and area, although they had changed their address often. Only 11 per cent of the parents had lived in Sudbury for 10 years or less; 20.7 per cent had resided there between 11 and 19 years, while 68.3 per cent had lived in the area for 20 years or longer. At the same time, only 20.7 per cent had resided at their current address for 20 years or longer, 31.7 per cent had lived at the same address for 11 to 19 years, and 47.6 per cent had lived at their present address for 10 years or less.

With regard to membership in trade unions or other such associations, 31.7 per cent of the respondents and 51.2 per cent of the spouses were active members at the time of the interview or were past members. Asked if they were ever affected by a strike or a work-to-rule situation, 17.1 per cent of the respondents and 39.1 per cent of the spouses responded affirmatively. Of those who experienced strikes, 53.3 per cent of the respondents and 77.4 per cent of the spouses were involved in work stoppages lasting 13 weeks or longer.

The TSS Team

The authors of this report were also the Principal Investigator (PI) and the Senior Research Associate (SRA), respectively. The nine field and office workers were recruited primarily through the local office of Employment and Immigration Canada. Among the desirable qualifications for the candidates were fluency in both official Canadian languages (English and French), typing ability, own means of transportation, and some experience in research methods or in field research similar to the TSS. Only two of the young people recruited for the project had some relevant experience. Office training in field research methods and techniques and incoding were provided for all personnel by the PI and the SRA. All the workers were provided with an outline of the developments leading to the strike, the strike period itself, and brief portraits of the major actors involved in this dispute. A part of the practical training was carried out during the pretesting of the questionnaires and the interview schedules with volunteers from all three categories of respondents. This training seemed to be adequate, for no major problems emerged during the actual field research.

The TSS Research Tools

The nature of the TSS dictated that the research tools could not be identical, yet should contain similar or analogous areas of inquiry for all categories of TSS respondents. Further, all the questionnaires and the interview schedules had to be available in the two official Canadian languages to reflect the linguistic division of the public secondary schools in Sudbury and area.* The translations were carried out by the whole TSS team, with the help of a faculty member from the School of Translators at Laurentian University.

* In 1981, five of the public secondary schools taught in the French language.

Self-response questionnaires comprising 193 questions in four sections were designed for the teachers. In addition to the sociodemographic section, questions focused on the teachers' evaluation of the role played by the media, the government, and others before, during, and after the strike; teachers' past and current relationships with others in the educational system; their perception of issues leading to the strike, and other such matters. A majority of the non-sociodemographic questions had provision for extended comments or clarifications. In the pretests, it was determined that the time necessary to answer this questionnaire would be between 60 and 90 minutes.

The parents' questionnaires were to be applied by field workers in face-to-face interviews. This questionnaire comprised 187 questions in three sections. A majority of questions included probes for additional information. The parents' questionnaires were similar in the range of issues raised to those submitted to the teachers but with an emphasis on parental views on these matters. The pretests showed that, on average, it would take 90 minutes to deal with all the questions.

Interview schedules were designed to serve as guidelines for the taped interviews carried out with the "others" respondents. These schedules were used also for selective transcription of the relevant information from the tapes. In the pretests, it became apparent that it would not be possible, or meaningful, to apply one common format to the various subcategories within the "others" group. Here, the "core" interview schedule comprising 188 questions was supplemented by three introductory sets of questions, to reflect more closely specific individual backgrounds of the respondents. In the core interview schedule, inquiries focused on how the respondents were affected by the strike, on what they believed to be the causes and consequences of the strike, on the roles and attitudes of those involved, and on what they thought about Bill 100 and about the public secondary system in general. The taped interviews ranged in duration from 30 minutes to over three hours. Fewer than six subjects in these subcategories refused to have their statements taped; in those cases, the information was taken in writing by the interviewers.

A number of volunteers from each larger category of the TSS respondents were asked to pretest the questionnaires/interview schedules. A total of 22 such pretests were carried out, 10 with parents, six each with teachers and "others." Because the volunteers were, on the whole, knowledgeable about educational matters, and nearly all of them were directly involved in some strike-related activities, their input resulted in modification of some existing questions, introduction of new ones, and elimination of a few others. Very importantly, the pretesting sessions served as training for the field workers, who gained the necessary first-hand experience in interview techniques.

Separate code books were created for each of the three larger segments of the TSS. Because of the nature of data that are heavily dependent on extended and elaborate answers and further complicated by frequent qualifications, coding of all meanings contained in the answers was not always possible. The in-depth format of taped interviews carried out with the "others" posed especially serious problems in coding and transferring the information onto a computer program. In this case, about 30 interviews were not coded but transcribed at length and selected information was used to illustrate various discussions in this report. In the case of parents' and teachers' questionnaires, the

extended answers were extracted and compiled separately to avoid the loss of full meaning and detail. Again, this information is used for illustration throughout the report.

Response Rates/Completed Interviews

A total of 549 self-response questionnaires, containing a prepaid return envelope, were sent out to the Sudbury-area teachers by the end of May 1981, and 128 were returned by 31 July 1981. Of those, only 44, or 8 per cent, were usable responses, representing teachers from 12 different Sudbury and area schools. Others were returned blank, or contained meaningless responses.

A factor deterring teachers' responses may have been the length of the questionnaire and the questions themselves, which demanded thought and attention. Some of the teachers who did respond at length claimed that they had spent several hours on this task. It is more likely that a major deterrent was the stance taken by the OSSTF executive. Even before the questionnaires were sent, some members were unwilling to co-operate on the project and had been privately advising teachers not to do so. Once the questionnaires were mailed, the TSS further learned, again informally, that the OSSTF executive had changed its official neutral position to a negative one because the questionnaires were numbered--a procedure deemed necessary in this research to ensure that the schools and the geographical areas were represented--and had now instructed its members not to respond to the questionnaires. Once the OSSTF had changed its position, the TSS received a letter from the AEFO (but not from the OSSTF) outlining the reasons for refusal to participate in the study.

While the response rate for the teachers was very low it is not certain if a greater number of responses would have made the information gained from the self-response questionnaires more valid and reliable.* To meet this possible drawback, if only in part, selected information provided by the teachers was cross-checked with that given by the "others." In addition, teachers' statements were compared, when applicable, with those made by individuals defined as "key spokesmen" because of their considerable involvement in the OSSTF throughout the period under consideration, and with private notes kept by several people during the strike, which were made available to the TSS.

Three of the original sample of 113 families were defined as ineligible, as their children did not attend public secondary schools; they expressed puzzlement as to why their names should be on the list. Another 10 families had moved to other towns or cities and were beyond the resources of the TSS. Thirteen other names were used as substitutes for these ineligible respondents.

The two field workers assigned to interview the parents encountered a major problem in finding one or both parents at home. Some families had both spouses working, while others were taking their summer holidays. In fact, 12 families remained on the "active list" since no face-to-face contact was established despite repeated attempts. Nineteen of the selected respondents refused to be interviewed and 82 interviews were

* Koenig et al., 1977, argue that the data from mailed responses do not differ significantly, regardless of the rate of return.

carried out for a completion rate of 72.5 per cent. The high rate of completion was partly because of the commitment of the two interviewers willing to work evenings and weekends.

Within the category of "others," interviews were attempted with the following subgroups:

1. Trustees. Those who served in the years 1978-80, but did not seek another term of office, and all those who ran in the 1980 municipal elections, winners and losers. Of the 22 trustees in office, 15 agreed to the interview. Of the 24 individuals who ran for a seat and lost, only nine participated in the TSS research.
2. Principals/Vice-Principals. Of the 32 individuals in these categories, only eight participated in the TSS research. Four were principals and four vice-principals, representing six different public secondary schools. The low rate of participation from this group is interesting; some of the principals/vice-principals named a directive from the OSSTF/AEFO ordering them not to answer TSS questions; other principals/vice-principals postponed the agreed-upon interviews indefinitely or gave other excuses for non-participation. It may be possible that the principals/vice-principals did not want to aggravate the already brittle relationships between themselves and the OSSTF/AEFO executive, strained because of their stand on sharing their earnings with the strikers. By participating in the TSS, the principals/vice-principals would have been flouting the OSSTF/AEFO directives on this matter. Nevertheless, because they are quite extensive, the comments made by the 25 per cent who did respond are extremely valuable for understanding the principals' perception of the strike and the Sudbury system of secondary education.
3. SBE Officials. Twelve officers took part in the TSS research. Only one was reluctant to take part in a taped interview but provided many helpful insights in a more informal discussion with the SRA.
4. Individuals. Thirteen individuals from various other educational institutions or education-related concerns took part in the TSS. They acted as spokesmen for other schools, colleges, and Laurentian University, or dealt with education-related problems.
5. Community Leaders. The remaining group was made up of 34 individuals from the fields of local, provincial, and federal politics, law, commerce, security, business, manufacturing, religion, and labour unions. Another 17 individuals in these subcategories either declined to be interviewed or would not set a date for an interview. While the respondents here represented a very broad range of interests and concerns, their information is generally less comprehensive, providing specific knowledge about such matters as shoplifting or delinquency during the 1980 teachers' strike, the reaction of some labour organizations to the strike, and other such information.

A total of 91 individuals from the category of "others" participated in the TSS research and, together with the 44 teachers and 82 parents, make up the 217 TSS respondents. The responses from the 217 TSS participants represent the original data bank. This data bank was augmented by important details received through informal interviews carried out privately by the SRA with a number of people within the system (including a number of teachers). Finally, it should be noted that the varying responses to this study itself, by all the individuals and groups approached, were also noted because these, too, provided valuable data about attitudes concerning the Sudbury system and the relationships of people within it.

Without question, the majority of interviews revealed that people on all sides of this dispute were, after one year, still struggling with highly charged emotions and a personal sense of frustration over strike-related events and issues. The PI, the SRA, and the field workers tried to remain sensitive to this, while attempting to meet the more objective demands of the research. For this reason, it was found that the individual concerns of respondents often led to many hours of interview time. The bulk of the infor-

mation received through the questionnaires and interviews is presented in the chapters that follow.

Other Documentation

In addition to the data collected directly through the questionnaires/taped interviews, the TSS was able to collect considerable other relevant material. This information consists of the local media reports, editorials, letters to the editor, transcripts of radio broadcasts, internal communication and negotiation bulletins of the OSSTF, minutes of meetings, various correspondence and written communications from the SBE negotiation materials, and other such primary documentation.

To counterbalance the real and potential biases of the data, and to check the accuracy of important information, the authors relied in part on computerized data analysis, in part on a careful and objective evaluation of the results of the research, and in part on the existing and available documents listed above. As an example, the teachers' information bulletins claimed widespread support for the striking teachers from the local trade unions. To corroborate this claim, various local mass media references were consulted and interviews were held with prominent Sudbury-area labour leaders, where this matter was discussed at some length. Whenever possible, similar strategies were used to ascertain the accuracy of information received by the TSS from other sources.

We wish to emphasize that, at all times during the actual stages of research and later write-up, a conscientious effort was exerted to avoid labelling one or the other side in the dispute as victims or as villains. Every attempt was made to deal with the important and controversial questions in the most impartial manner. A major consideration in carrying out this task was to provide as accurate and objective a portrayal of these events as was possible given the human and material resources available to the TSS.

In consulting the background information in preparation for the report, the authors reviewed hundreds of pieces of primary and secondary documents having some bearing on the 1980 teachers' strike. To refer to these sources in each instance would considerably clutter the presentation and detract from the discussion. The most important documents are listed in the Bibliography and are available for further consultation to any serious researcher or to the reviewers of this report.

The Structure of the Report

The report contains six chapters in addition to the introductory section and the summary and conclusions. The presentation and the discussion are organized by the chronological portrayal of events leading to the 1980 strike, the actual strike period, and the post-strike developments; and the division of the discussion into descriptive and analytical sections.

Chapter 2 offers a broad historical overview of Sudbury as a community, with considerations for selected characteristics of its population and its public image. Attention is given to the establishment of the public secondary schools, the emergence of the present board of education, the formation of the branches of the teachers' federations, and some references to the earlier contract negotiations and settlements. Brief references

are made to the financial aspects of the public secondary schools, such as local taxes and provincial support. The concluding discussion of this chapter is concerned with the general perception that the residents of Sudbury and area may have of the educational system as a whole. Such historical information provides the context for the strike and helps to explain, in part, why a strike did occur in this community, and why the groups affected differed in their perception of reality regarding the strike.

Chapter 3 examines the issues emphasized by the two sides at the bargaining table in 1979. The following matters are discussed in detail: remuneration, staffing of schools, workload, and employee protection. A section is devoted to comparison of views on the issues as voiced by respondents from the "others" category.

Chapter 4 concerns the prestrike period. Specific sections describe the background, beginning with the 1978 settlement. A detailed overview includes a chronological portrayal of events prior to 31 December 1979. Specific attention is given to actual and perceived causes of the strike as seen by various categories of TSS respondents. One section is an in-depth analysis of the major events for this period.

Chapter 5 deals with the strike period itself. One section briefly considers developments in January 1980. Another section offers a chronological overview of the major developments during the strike. Strike-related roles of some groups are considered in detail and the whole is examined, analysed, and summarized.

Chapter 6 considers the immediate poststrike period to July 1980. The reaction of the various groupings involved directly in the strike is considered first. A chronological portrayal of the poststrike events is followed by an analysis of the more specific and immediate developments.

Chapter 7 examines the consequences of the strike from the perspective of time. The discussion considers relationships among, and attitudes towards, various groupings or categories of individuals by others within the public educational system, as expressed one year after the end of the strike. Questions on the teachers' right to strike and other issues are raised insofar as they were discussed by the respondents. The value of the respondents' opinions on these matters lies in the fact that they are held by people who themselves have experienced a long teachers' strike. No attempt is made by the authors to resolve these controversial matters. Rather, an attempt is made to show, in part at least, why in Sudbury they remain controversial.

Chapter 8 reviews and summarizes the material presented in the report. Here, the authors offer their own conclusions on a number of findings and raise a number of questions for further study and discussion. No specific recommendations are made, for this was not the purpose of the research.

2 Background

Introduction

It is not the intention of this report to dwell in any depth on the history of Sudbury as a community, or the background and specifics of the two mining and smelting companies and the two major unions representing the hourly paid workers for INCO and Falconbridge. At the same time, some details are necessary in order to understand better the total environment within which the 1980 secondary school teachers' strike took place. This background discussion considers briefly the origins of Sudbury, the dominant economic position of the mining and smelting industries for area employment, the organization of labour, and certain human and other characteristics. Other sections touch on the development of the educational system, including some references to boards of education, teachers' organizations, and other known past developments related to schools and education. We will return to these matters when claiming that specific developments and relationships of the strike emerged and persisted because the strike took place in Sudbury and not elsewhere.

The Beginnings of Sudbury

The voyageurs and traders passed through this area and missionaries visited the many lumber camps that dotted the thick forests well before the Canadian Pacific Railroad Camp marked the beginning of Sudbury as a permanent settlement in 1883. The CPR and lumber were the main industries of the village, which became an incorporated town in 1893. The ores, bearing copper and nickel deposits, which were to become the main resources and dominate the economy of the Sudbury Basin for many decades, were discovered already in 1846 and in 1848, but mining and smelting operations began only after 1884.

The mining and the roastbed smelting not only exhausted the nearby forests for the lumber needed for the mines and for the open smelting pits, but the sulphuric acid also killed all the vegetation in the vicinity, blackening the exposed rock in later years. Sudbury became known as the "nickel capital" of the world but this image was largely negative, stemming partly from the many smokestacks and a landscape devoid of greenery.

The stark environment, the air often filled with smoke and pollutants, was accepted resignedly in the past by the residents of Sudbury, Copper Cliff, Coniston, Falconbridge, and other nearby communities as the price of having relatively dependent means of livelihood. Since the erection of the "Big Stack" in 1970, the industrial pollution in Sudbury is minimal, and the effects of acid rain have been lessened and almost totally shifted to more distant places. While the landscape still bears scars of past damage, additional hectares are resodded and replanted each year, and the blackened bare spaces are visibly shrinking. Although the persistent negative image of Sudbury is becoming less true, it still continues in the minds of "Southerners."

The Mining and Smelting Industries

The emergence of the International Nickel Company (INCO since 1976) as the dominant mining and smelting enterprise provided another of Sudbury's images--that of a one-industry town,

dominated by the paternalistic, international giants INCO and Falconbridge. INCO is the largest mining company in Canada and, despite increasing competition from abroad, continues to be the largest producer of nickel in the world. The Falconbridge Nickel Company was established in 1928. Although this international corporation never became comparable in size with INCO, its presence contributed also to mining and smelting becoming the mainstays of the Sudbury Basin population for many decades.

INCO was formed in 1902 through the purchase of two active mining companies in the area: the Canadian Copper Company of Cleveland, Ohio, and the Orford Copper Company of New Jersey. Other smaller companies were absorbed and, by 1907, Sudbury replaced New Caledonia as the foremost producer of nickel in the world. Despite new ventures in Indonesia, Guatemala, and elsewhere, Sudbury's nickel ore deposits remain the major wealth of INCO today, as they are for Falconbridge as well.

The production of nickel (and other metals mined and smelted there) was susceptible to world demands, and demand fluctuated considerably, affecting the number of workers in any one year. By 1908, over 1000 men were employed in the local mining and smelting operations. The nickel required for naval armament and World War I put heavy demands on INCO and, together with the expansion of building, resulted in many new workers and their families settling in the area. During the first two decades of this century, Sudbury could be described as a "frontier boom-town" with rapidly growing human, material, and financial resources.

By 1919, the world market for nickel was in a severe slump; most area mines were closed and thousands of workers were dismissed or laid off. Many single people and whole families left in search of work elsewhere. The mining and smelting operations slowly resumed their previous levels of productivity in the late 1920s, largely in response to needs for nickel in the expanding automobile industry, only to be drastically curtailed by the Great Depression. In the years 1930-35, thousands of workers were severely affected once again and the community had few alternatives to offer to the unemployed. The economic recovery began slowly in the mid-1930s, as Europe began to rearm on the road to World War 2. The world conflict resulted in drastically increased production of nickel, and the postwar slack was taken up by the growing use of stainless steel. Over 20 000 workers were involved directly in the mining and smelting operations of the two companies in some postwar years. As in other parts of Canada, Sudbury experienced its own postwar "baby boom" as well. The world market for nickel did not abate, but fluctuations in demand remain, since INCO and Falconbridge are now competing with such state-supported producers as Cuba and the USSR.

The 1971 Census of Canada data show that over one-quarter of the area's labour force was employed in mining, but the previous and overwhelming dependence for work with INCO or Falconbridge is no longer true. (See table 2.1.)

The occupational distribution includes various categories of skills and includes significant numbers of professional people such as business, industry, and government executives, engineers, medical practitioners, nurses, managers, teachers, and others. At the same time, the image of Sudbury as a one-industry town with blue-collar workforce persists; this image is shared, in part at least, by many of the long-time residents here. The image of Sudbury as a working man's town was clearly evident in the symbolic and

Table 2.1: Occupations, Sudbury Regional Area, 1971

	Males	Females	Total	%
Agriculture	110	60	170	0.4
Forestry	80	5	85	
Fishing and Trapping	-	-	-	-
Mines	14 350	410	14 760	25.9
Manufacturing	8 050	610	8 660	14.7
Construction	5 655	285	5 940	10.0
Transportation, Communication, and Utilities	3 125	695	3 820	6.4
Trade	4 685	3 430	8 115	13.8
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	695	990	1 680	2.8
Service	4 495	8 085	12 570	21.3
Public Administration	1 795	735	2 530	4.3
Other	550	310	860	1.4
	<u>43 590</u>	<u>15 625</u>	<u>59 215</u>	<u>100.0</u>

Source: 1971 Census of Canada, Industries Catalogue 94-742, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, May 1975.

concrete support shown during the years 1978-79 to the striking, hourly paid INCO workers. Similar support was shown to the relatively short strike by the hospital workers in 1981. Here, the striking CUPE picketers were joined by sign-carrying supporters from Local 6500 USWA, and Local 598 Mine Mill, the two largest labour organizations in Sudbury. No such visible support was given to the striking teachers in 1980.

The Unions

From the earliest years, the workers were well aware that the nature of mining was fraught with daily threats of cave-ins, accidents, and death. The sweltering and poisonous working conditions in smelters posed other dangers to health and life. Concerns were voiced at the outset of mining and smelting operations there that such conditions be improved and made safer, and that the risks and heavy labour be more amply rewarded. To gain their demands and to demonstrate their serious intentions in this respect, the workers resorted to strikes. The first such strike was against the Canadian Copper Company, by miners demanding a 15 per cent increase in wages. According to the Sudbury Journal of 20 July 1899, "The majority of the men in the Company's employ will go on strike in sympathy with the miners"; but the strikers did not attain their demands at that time.

There were many other disputes and strikes but few achieved any breakthroughs for the workers; management remained in total control in the mining and smelting industries, refusing to recognize any outside attempt to organize their workers until 1944. It was simple to fire the troublemakers, since two or more applicants were anxious to fill any vacancy. While labour/management relationships here had their share of bitter confrontations, mass labour rallies, and unsuccessful attempts at unionization, the Sudbury Basin was not especially characterized by violence as were other places at other times. The image of Sudbury as a community subjected to protracted and bitter strikes between the powerful unions and giant corporations emerged only in the post-World War 2 years, and was accentuated by one or two earlier strikes at INCO.

The first venture to organize the miners and the smelter workers of the Sudbury Basin was made by the U.S. Western Federation of Miners in 1905. A local branch of this union was formed but could not survive. Other attempts to unionize the workers were made in the 1910s, the 1920s, and the 1930s and it was in 1936 that Local 239 of Mine Mill was first formed in Sudbury. But, because of strong opposition from the companies, it ceased its activities two years later. Another effort, in 1942, was more successful and Local 239 of Mine Mill grew in strength despite strenuous and, at times, violent opposition to the organizers from INCO. Following the passage of the Trade Unions Act of 1943, Local 239 Mine Mill was certified as the bargaining unit for both INCO and Falconbridge and was officially recognized by these companies in 1944.

In some years during the 1950s, Local 598 Mine Mill had over 15 000 members, representing miners and smelter workers at INCO and Falconbridge. Since 1945, negotiations with the companies were frequently protracted and bitter, culminating at times in work stoppages or brief strikes. The first major conflict was in 1958. It is said that because of the pressure from wives to return to work, the INCO workers on strike "for 86 days of belt tightening" gave up without any of their major demands being met. Partially as a result of this strike and for other reasons, the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) received permission from the Ontario Labour Relations Board to form another local and represent the unions and smelter workers in Sudbury and area. There were bitter battles between the two unions, known as the "Steel Raids," and the result was the establishment of Local 6500 USWA. Since 1962 this local represents the hourly paid INCO workers while Local 598 Mine Mill continues to represent the miners and the smelter workers at Falconbridge. As a footnote, it may be added that for many years now relationships between the two locals have been amicable.

The numerically strongest Local 6500 USWA continued to set the pace for labour relations in Sudbury by tough bargaining positions culminating in a strike in 1969, considered to be a "union victory and a revenge for 1958." For a time, labour/management relationships were more harmonious and the negotiations for new contracts, which take place every three years (since 1962), were settled peacefully in 1972 and in 1975. By 1976, the world market for nickel weakened once again; INCO continued production and stockpiling but there were no changes in the market and layoffs of over 2000 INCO workers and a smaller number of Falconbridge employees were announced in 1977. At the time of renewal of contract in 1978, INCO was not prepared to offer any increase in wages or benefits. This was totally unacceptable to the members of Local 6500 USWA, and resulted in the longest strike in Canadian history, in terms of work hours lost.

This strike was led by a young president of Local 6500 USWA, Mr. Dave Patterson, a self-admitted labour militant. Yet, the militancy of the 1978-79 strike was largely limited to the bargaining table. There were demonstrations on the picket lines in Copper Cliff, and effigies of INCO's top bosses were set afire, but there was no violence against people or property during the 261 days of this work stoppage. The strike was disciplined and restrained. Overwhelmingly, the larger community sympathized or supported the strikers in a variety of ways. The image of INCO was at a very low ebb. The strike was also continuously in the public view and elicited sympathetic and concretely supportive responses from a broad spectrum of organized labour in Canada and abroad. The agreement, signed in June 1979, was hailed by the president of Local 6500 USWA as an unprecedented

victory for INCO's hourly paid workers in terms of wages, benefits, and improved working conditions.

It is probable that the 1969 and the 1978-79 strikes crystallized the image of Sudbury as a place where powerful unions, with the support or sympathy of the larger community, periodically take on giant corporations like INCO and emerge victorious. Peaceful settlements or negotiations without strike action are not newsworthy and are not publicized. The image of Sudbury as a community subject to industrial strife and bitter confrontations between workers and managers/owners is only true inasmuch as it is the result of conditions where the industry is dominated by one or two giant corporations. In other words, labour relations in Sudbury are no different than in other communities with similar conditions. Hamilton, and the Stelco strike of 1981, is but one example. There is also proof that workers in Sudbury are not prone to take strike action without exhausting other possibilities in reaching a settlement. Studies on the effects of the 1978-79 strike at INCO have shown that an overwhelming majority of the workers' wives would not like to see another strike for a very long time.

For many, the definition of Sudbury as a strike-happy town seems to be a cliché. The TSS found that many of the respondents, particularly from the "others" category, saw this image as part of the explanation for the longest teachers' strike in Ontario's history occurring here. Still, the image of Sudbury as a militant union town, ready to strike "at the drop of a hat," is questionable and, at best, an exaggeration created by the mass media searching for hyperbole in labour/industrial relations. Labour/management disputes in Sudbury have not been sharply different from other industrial cities. The past experiences, including real economic hardships, inured some to the vagaries of their family's financial health, dependent on nickel. This did not mean that strikes were preferable to even "a half-decent settlement," as expressed by many of the area's families after the 1978-79 strike at INCO. It is unlikely that most Sudburians are blasé about strikes as inevitable outcomes of labour/management negotiations. At best, strikes are seen as a necessary evil, to be suffered if there is no other alternative.

Was the 1980 teachers' strike seen in this light? More importantly, were the branches of the OSSTF/AEFO seen as union locals? During the strike, teachers made several efforts through the mass media, and through direct contacts with leaders of the largest unions in the city, to gain support for their fight against "management." An image of the striking teachers as fully deserving employees struggling to gain justice from an unwise, obstinate, exploiting employer was projected. An analogy was drawn between the striking teachers and the INCO workers for INCO from Local 6500 USWA. An illustration of these views is from the Federation Update:

Like steelworkers and Copper Cliff citizens, they have the determination which is so much a part of the make-up of the Sudbury citizen. (Vol.7, no. 22, 11 February 1980).

Sudbury Today

No one as yet has attempted to determine fully the views that the outside world has about Sudbury as a community. The two prevailing stereotyped images--a polluted, bleak environment, characterized by militant unions in regular confrontations with management--would suggest a less than desirable place to raise a family. In fact, in the 1960s and the

early 1970s, when teaching skills were at a premium, teachers accepting positions in Sudbury demanded and received additional economic incentives. Prior to 1975, Sudbury-area teachers were among the highest paid in the province.

If these bleak images of Sudbury had some truth in them, the last decade or so ushered in startling changes to visitors who heard only of its negative reputation. Sudbury is a modern metropolis, encompassing 2378 square kilometres, with hundreds of lakes within its boundary. It is characterized by modern shopping malls, high-rise apartment buildings, and futuristic civic, provincial government, and financial buildings.

The economy of the region, heavily dependent on primary industries, attracted both native-born workers--especially from the province of Quebec--and immigrants from all the world. The makeup of Sudbury's population on the basis of ethnicity is almost a microcosm of Canadian society at large. According to the 1971 Census of Canada, the numerically largest group was French (37.4 per cent) followed by people of Anglo-Celtic origin (36.6 per cent), Italian (6.6 per cent), Ukrainian (3.6 per cent), German (3.2 per cent), and Polish (1.9 per cent). In addition, there are significant numbers of Finns, Croats and Serbs, Hungarians, and people from the Netherlands, India, Pakistan, China, and elsewhere living here.

The majority of non-French and non-British people are first-generation immigrants or their children. Overwhelmingly, the immigrants came in the immediate post-World War 2 years, but newcomers continue to trickle into this area. In 1980, at least 300 Vietnamese, referred to as the Boat People, settled in Sudbury and the nearby towns. Many of the ethnic groups retain a clear sense of their distinct culture through the retention of their language and the establishment of their own organizations, clubs, and services. It is very likely that the immigrants also view and define the role of education and the position of teachers (especially the secondary school teachers) somewhat differently from the native-born population. Certainly, some community leaders indicated that people from ethnic minorities had often voiced clearly divergent views on education from Anglo-Celtic background people. For example, one politician made the following comment:

Public attitude especially from many ethnic groups was not positive, as the strike went on. Many teachers were shocked by the vehemence of opposition to their strike by people who were also workers.

According to the bi-decennial statistics provided by Census of Canada for 1976, the population of the Regional Municipality of Sudbury was 157 030, and the broad age distribution was as follows: 28.5 per cent were 14 years or under, 66 per cent were 15 to 64, and 5.5 per cent were 65 or older. There were 38 745 families recorded that year; 35 095 were "complete" (i.e., both parents/mates were present) and 3650 were single-parent families.

The relatively small proportion of single-parent families, as compared with the overall figures for Ontario, would suggest that fewer problems could be expected with youngsters in the areas of juvenile delinquency, vandalism, and other school-related difficulties. While the complete data on these matters are not readily available, the figures for juvenile delinquency collected by the Sudbury Regional Police show lower rates for this area in the years 1977-79 than for the province of Ontario as a whole. Also, vandalism and other school-related difficulties are not seemingly a major problem for the area secondary schools, according to SBE informants.

2.2. The number of children per family in the Sudbury area in 1976 is shown in table

Table 2.2: Number of Children in Families, Sudbury Regional Area, 1976

Number of Children	Families	%
0	9 385	24.2
1	9 020	23.3
2	9 995	25.5
3-4	8 630	22.3
5+	1 715	4.4
	<u>38 745</u>	<u>99.7</u>

Source: 1976 Census of Canada, Population and Housing Characteristics, Catalogue 95-824, Ottawa, Statistics Canada, Dec. 1978.

A major question, closely related to the future of education in this school district, is declining enrolment. In this respect, two trends have been partly documented, both of which indicate that teacher concerns over shrinking school population are well justified. As elsewhere in Canada, the last decade or so in Sudbury shows a consistent pattern of lower birth rates for women in the 15 to 49 years of age category, and a corresponding drop in the real number of births. Table 2.3 provides details for selected years.

Table 2.3: Total Births and Fertility Rates, Selected Years
(Regional Municipality of Sudbury)

	1974	1977	1978	1979
Total Births	3 001	2 858	2 552	2451
Number of Women Aged 15-49	42 756	42 236	44 861	44 523
Fertility Rates	2.1973	1.9235	1.7420	1.7226
Total Population	165 710	168 797	164 665	161 455

Source: Henry Radecki, One Year Later: The 1978-79 Strike at INCO, 1981, Table 54, p. 136.

It may be noted that the actual number of births does not correspond to the changes in the numbers given for a total population. The total natural increases for the years 1977 to 1979 were 7861; yet, in the corresponding years, the population of the area decreased by 7324. Here, another factor becomes obvious--despite some new immigration to the area and the natural increases, the size of the population is shrinking through out-migration.

Reports in the local media suggest that immigrants, either directed to Sudbury by the Immigration Department or coming there on their own, soon decide to leave since job opportunities are limited. Of the aforementioned Vietnamese, only about 100 of the original 300 remained in Sudbury by December 1981. In addition, other people are leaving Sudbury and area in significant numbers, as can be seen by the figures in table 2.4.

The major and persisting problem facing the economy of this area, clearly affecting its population base, is the insufficiently diversified labour market and especially the weakly developed secondary or manufacturing industry. While Sudbury continues to grow in

Table 2.4: Average Annual Out-Migration: 1977-78 and 1978-79

Age Cohorts	Males		Females		Total	
	1978	1979	1978	1979	1978	1979
1 - 14	675	896	636	615	1311	1511
15 - 25	1154	1327	813	916	1967	2243
26 - 64	1012	570	782	363	1794	933
65 - 70	346	35	294	9	640	46
Total	3187	2828	2525	1903	5712	4733

Source: Henry Radecki, One Year Later: The 1978-79 Strike at INCO, 1981, Table 55, p. 137.

importance as the major service centre for northeastern Ontario, employment opportunities remain limited and often involve clerical, sales, or other service-to-the-public jobs. The jobs in mining and smelting are becoming more attractive but few openings are available since the large-scale layoffs in 1977. Further, the volatile and unpredictable nature of employment dependent on the world market for nickel does not suit some. In summary, Sudbury and area provide only a few opportunities for jobs in a relatively limited range of occupations, and the out-migration adds to the population shrinkage stemming from the lower birth rates.

While these and other problems remain, Sudbury continues to expand in the cultural and recreational areas, although it does not offer the same multiplicity of theatres, galleries, museums, bookshops, and other specialized services that many other Ontario cities do. A smaller version of the Ontario Science Centre is presently being dug out from the rock bordering beautiful Ramsey Lake, and readied for completion to mark the centennial of Sudbury. A theatre centre is also being erected, scheduled for completion by 1982. This centre will also provide a home for the existing Sudbury Symphony orchestra. Residents of Sudbury already have a small arts centre, a museum, and a number of galleries and smaller theatres.

Sudbury is not isolated physically; in addition to buses, VIA Rail still serves the community daily, as do Air Canada and some smaller airlines. The community has its own daily newspaper and two weeklies. There are two local television stations and the cable service brings in all the major channels from the South. Radio stations, both AM and FM, broadcast in both official languages. Sudbury has three hospitals, with equipment unparalleled north of Toronto. There are Cambrian College and Laurentian University. Educational needs are met by a complex of secondary schools and private colleges teaching in both official languages.

Sudbury is an economically viable community but has limited work opportunities for its younger population. It is a closely knit, perhaps parochial, community but its members are almost forced to leave in search of work elsewhere. It is now an important service centre for the region and this role will likely increase in importance but will not result in substantial population increases. It is probable that the population will decrease further because of inadequate work opportunities.

The shrinking population and the lack of job opportunities hold two implications for the educational system here. First, the schools are being affected severely by declining enrolment. It is projected that the approximately 13 250 student population enrolled in secondary schools in 1980 will decline to about 8900 by the year 1990. Second,

secondary school teachers not only have little chance for promotion to positions of responsibility within the educational system but also, if threatened with redundancy, have few, if any, opportunities of finding other employment in this geographical area.

Area Schools

The establishment and growth of the educational system in Sudbury most likely reflected the nature of the community and changes taking place over time. It was argued earlier that the type of economy, heavily dependent on the extraction and treatment of primary resources, created some untypical conditions in the past. At the same time, little can be said with any authority as to whether these conditions were related to the emphasis or attention given by the residents to the educational needs for their children. It is doubtful if it would be possible to determine with any accuracy where the matters of education in Sudbury and area differed substantially from other communities of comparable size. The speculation that Sudbury, as a blue-collar and rough town, is not likely to be overly concerned with matters of higher education is of doubtful validity.

That formal education was considered important is attested by the presence of a one-room log school house, "opened for business" on 2 April 1884, when Sudbury was still a CPR camp. With the growth of the village other schools followed, and the first high school was erected in 1889 and expanded the following year. By 1896, the student body consisted of 28 senior, 49 intermediate, and 43 junior pupils. In 1900, this "public school" offered four forms with a total enrolment of 184 students. This school closed in 1905 but its place was taken over by the Central Public School between 1905 and 1926.* The source used for this information found that the average enrolment was 450 students from 1914 to 1926 (Prusila, 1981).

The special needs for skills and knowledge in the mining and smelting industries were responsible for the establishment of Sudbury Mining and Technical School in 1921. Continuously expanded, this school had an enrolment of 150 students in 1927 and 1130 in 1971 when it was merged with Sudbury High School. The last started as Sudbury High in 1907 with 27 pupils and had 670 enrolled in 1971. Only two other secondary schools were established in the region prior to World War 2: Copper Cliff High School in 1921, and Capreol Secondary School in 1922.

There is little readily available information on the Sudbury educational system in the past. It can be argued that the needs for postelementary education were satisfied by the four or five secondary schools present at the time. It should be remembered that, until more recently, work in mines and smelters did not require specialized education for most workers and, overwhelmingly, the necessary skills and trades were learned on the job. Also, occupational opportunities where postelementary education could be applied were limited in Sudbury and area. Further, such education required additional financial outlay and some families could not afford this expense while others did not see any merit in having their children learn more than the basics. Like blue-collar workers elsewhere, Sudbury residents did not see higher education as a means of upward mobility. Here, the sons followed their fathers' footsteps as miners or smelter workers while the daughters

* According to one informant, the Central Public School was still open in 1946.

were expected to marry and raise a family. Thus, elementary education would be considered fully adequate.

As far as could be determined, between 1926 and 1954 there were only four post-elementary public schools in the area: Sudbury Mining and Technical School, Sudbury High, Copper Cliff High, and Capreol Secondary. As in other parts of Ontario, the secondary school system "mushroomed" in the post-World War 2 years, and in the 20 years between 1954 and 1973, 14 public secondary schools were built in this region. In part, this was a reflection of the needs for more specialized and higher knowledge in industry, business, and finance; in part, by a growing realization among parents that education could mean improved earnings and a more rewarding life for their children; in part, by the sheer number of children, the "crop" of the post-World War 2 babies, who were expected now to attend school till the age of 16. The chronology of postwar construction of public secondary schools in Sudbury and area is shown in table 2.5.

Table 2.5: Post-World War 2 Secondary School Construction, Sudbury and Area

<u>School</u>	<u>Year</u>
Chelmsford Valley D.C.S.	1954
E.S. Franco-Jeunesse*	1955
Lively D.S.S.	1956
Levack D.H.S.	1957
Lockerby C.S.	1958
Garson-Falconbridge S.S.	1962
Lasalle S.S.	1962
Lo-Ellen Park S.S.	1962
Confederation S.S.	1968
French River D.S.S.	1968
E.S. Hanmer	1970
E.S. Macdonald-Cartier	1970
E.S. Rayside	1972
Nickel District S.S.*	1973

*E.S. Franco-Jeunesse was called Nickel District S.S. until 1973.

Source: Sudbury Board of Education

The year 1973 marked the height of expansion of public secondary school facilities, with 17 smaller and larger schools teaching in both French and English. In addition, four private high schools have been teaching in both languages for some time: the French College Sacré Coeur and College Notre Dame; the English St. Charles College and Marymount College.

As stated above, Sudbury's public educational system is presently the largest in Northern Ontario and it is also one of five areas in Ontario most severely affected by declining enrolment. The first victim of this trend was Copper Cliff High School, closed in September 1980. There is public concern that three more secondary schools, all with fewer than 300 students, may meet a similar fate in the near future unless the population base changes significantly. The dimension of the changes in public school population is underscored by a few selected figures: enrolment in the elementary schools was 15 551 for 1971; it decreased to 11 525 for 1977; and it is expected to decline to 9639 by 1985. Enrolment in secondary schools was 15 313 in 1975; it decreased to 13 245 by 1980; and it is expected that only 8966 students will be enrolled in public secondary schools in 1991.

The school building boom in Sudbury is a thing of the past, and so are the plentiful funds for building and expansion of physical facilities, sports complexes, and such. The 1960s and the early 1970s were the years of high hopes for the future of education, with new ideas and enthusiastic concern for learning: learning in "proper" facilities with the "best" possible staff. The years that followed saw many changes in Sudbury, as elsewhere, most often the result of outside developments and general economic conditions. The province-wide reorganization of the public educational system, the declining birth rate, and the introduction of Bill 100 are among other important changes. The teachers were already being affected by these changes by 1974-75 and will continue to be subject to the effects in the foreseeable future.

Teachers

In Schools in Jeopardy (1979), Hennessy deals with the earlier conditions facing teachers in Ontario and elsewhere, and traces the establishment of the OSSTF and the AEFO. The fragmentary information received from a few informants suggests that past conditions for secondary school teachers in Sudbury differed little from Hennessy's outline for Ontario as a whole. The major difference was likely limited to the post-World War 2 boom period in education, when the newly built schools in Sudbury and area had to be staffed, and local board trustees needed to scramble to get teachers.

It is generally recognized that teachers were not well paid in the past, and female teachers even less so. Teachers had few rights, little protection, and no personal contracts but adhered to a "gentlemen's agreement," which expected them to do their very best on the basis of predetermined conditions. At the same time, the teachers' bargaining committees, which emerged at one time or another, were most often recognized on a voluntary basis by local boards. Still, even the miners and the smelter workers had no union representation until 1943, while the OSSTF* was formed in 1919, and the teachers did have protection as members of this federation even before Bill 100. The AEFO was established in 1939, but began to represent the French-language secondary school teachers only in 1968. The teachers' associations were clearly organizations reflecting the perceptions the teachers had of themselves at that time. Most likely, secondary school teachers would have rejected anything but a federation, seeing themselves as professionals, best able to negotiate their working conditions independently.

Vacancies for teaching positions in Sudbury and area secondary schools were advertised in the Toronto Globe (later the Globe and Mail) and, prior to 1969, principals served most often as recruiting agents for the local school boards. Only partial information was accessible to the TSS on the number of secondary school teachers who worked in Sudbury and district before 1969. Probably most secondary school teachers were recruited from the Ontario College of Education in Toronto. There were no standard or uniform pay scales, and nearby communities, like Copper Cliff, paid their teachers comparatively more than Sudbury. There was little consideration for merit and the informal agreements between boards and teachers often focused on giving recognition to teachers with special training or skills. A more systematic form of negotiations began only after the amalgamation of the

* OSSTF was termed by Hennessy as the most militant affiliate of the Ontario Teachers' Federation, formed in 1944.

local boards with the SBE in 1969. At this time, and in the later years, the SBE public secondary school system had the enrolment and staff shown in table 2.6.

Table 2.6: SBE Public Secondary Schools: Pupils/Teachers, 1969 to 1979

Year	Pupils	Teachers
1969	12 818	776
1970	13 983	839
1971	14 743	866
1972	15 214	893
1973	15 246	911
1974	15 290	858
1975	15 314	898
1976	15 040	889
1977	14 992	868
1978	14 718	849
1979	14 031	793

Source: OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 50.

With regard to remuneration, staff data for 1978-79 based on 868 teachers show that 68.5, or 7.9 per cent, were in Category 1; 155, or 17.9 per cent, in Category 2; 124.5, or 14.4 per cent, in Category 3, and 517, or 59.8 per cent, in Category 4. Only 44, or 5.1 per cent, of teachers were at the minimum scale of remuneration, while 323, or 37.4 per cent, were at the maximum scale (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 19).

A partial portrayal of SBE secondary school teachers for 1979-80 is drawn from the 44 responses received by the TSS. According to the answers provided by the teachers, 95.5 per cent of them taught only in Sudbury and district; 81.8 per cent were qualified to teach in more than one subject; and 86 per cent had university degrees, including 7 per cent with Master's degrees. Of the 44 respondents, 36.4 per cent had fewer than 11 years of teaching experience, while 56.8 per cent had more (6.8 per cent did not respond).

Only 11.4 per cent of the TSS teacher respondents were under 30 years of age; a majority, 75 per cent, were 30 to 49, 11.4 per cent were between 50 and 59, and only 2.3 per cent were 60 or older. Of the total, 86.4 per cent of the teacher respondents were married, 9.1 per cent were single, and the remaining 4.6 per cent were separated, divorced, or widowed. Nearly one-third, or 31.8 per cent, had one or two dependents, 38.6 per cent had three or more, and 29.5 per cent had no dependents. Of the spouses, 31.8 per cent were also teachers or were employed in education-related jobs. It may be added that 38.6 per cent of the spouses worked during the time their spouses were on strike.

A majority of teacher respondents, 84.1 per cent, were home owners, and only 15.9 per cent rented their accommodation. The ethnic background of teachers was: Anglo-Celtic, 52.3 per cent; French, 18.2 per cent; "Canadian," 4.5 per cent; other, 22.7 per cent (2.3 per cent did not answer this question).

This and the other information based on teachers' responses can only be considered tentatively since the sample is not representative. Nonetheless, together with the other evidence available to the TSS, these data allow us to claim that SBE secondary school teachers are extremely well qualified, with many years of teaching experience and many

teaching skills. As home owners and people with children, they consider themselves full members of this community. In fact, 59.1 per cent of the respondents included themselves within the definition of "natives of Northern Ontario." Their ages indicate that there will be relatively few retirements in the next few years, a fact that has important implications for the job security of the junior, younger teachers, given the predictions of declining enrolment in the near future.

While past monetary rewards were not high, secondary school teachers have enjoyed a position of high status and prestige. Especially in a community like Sudbury, teachers were counted among the small middle- and upper-class group comprising clergy, financiers, business leaders, and other professionals. It is interesting to note that in the French language and some others, secondary school teachers are given the title of professor, a position greatly respected in Europe and elsewhere.

The perception of the role of teachers in general and secondary school teachers in particular varied over time and across ethnocultural groups in Canada. The attitudes towards teachers and formal education among such groups as the Mennonites, the Hutterites, or the native peoples of Canada are among the more obvious examples. It can be shown that the acceptance of postelementary education as desirable in itself, or needed to attain certain jobs, became prevalent only after World War 2. Earlier, secondary school teachers were expected to provide a good all-round education within the framework of values and norms considered to be most desirable by the family and the community. By and large, there were no disagreements between the schools and the community on the goals of education and the ways of achieving them. In addition to the academic subjects, schools and teachers reinforced the societal values of obedience and respect for authority, hard work and punctuality, conformity to the prevailing standards, and such.

The job may have been very regimented, with clear rules set out by boards of education and principals. Nonetheless, the authority of the teacher over students was unchallenged and supported by parents. This is not to advocate the merits of past conditions but, undoubtedly, most teachers found the strict discipline, set curriculum, and relative predictability of students' behaviour a help in carrying out their duties and responsibilities. It is unlikely that the use of tobacco, alcohol, and other drugs, so well documented now by the Addiction Research Foundation of Ontario studies, were major problems in secondary schools prior to 1960. It is not certain if students were less alienated than in the last decade or two, but one indicator of this malaise, widespread drug use, was not the problem that it is now. In general, there were fewer "problems" related to teaching in the past than at present.

Since the early 1960s, the world of schools and teaching saw many, often drastic, changes. The teachers' roles are now greatly expanded and more demanding while the teaching environment has become extremely complex. These changes are not limited to this area or even to the larger society but are more global in nature.

Briefly, the post-World War 2 expansion of industries created a constantly growing need for better educated workers to meet the growing sophistication of industrial technology. This produced a "bandwagon" effect which saw even the most menial jobs requiring grade 10 education, or more. The rewards offered by industry resulted in higher education becoming a stepladder to a better life. If not the actual means, secondary

education became the necessary prerequisite in attaining this desirable end. In turn, teachers also had to become more expert in their fields of knowledge to meet the higher expectations of society. Now, secondary school teachers require a university degree to qualify as job applicants in Ontario.

A second and perhaps more significant change--greatly increasing responsibilities for the teachers--stems from the loss of functions previously performed by the family. As the formal education gap between parents and children increased sharply, the small nuclear, mobile family was no longer able to guide the children's education. To many parents with grade 8 education, the new maths, physics, or other sciences were incomprehensible; teachers had to accept more responsibility for the students' performance. But this was only one additional responsibility. The family as a socializing institution has lost or given up responsibility for providing instruction in politics and community involvement, moral and sexual knowledge, sports and recreation, and general normative values stressed by the community. More and more, parents came to expect schools and teachers, especially in secondary school, to provide such instruction. Teachers were seen not merely as educators and upholders of the major societal values--social engineers perhaps--but as experts in specialized areas of knowledge: sex education teachers, coaches of sports teams, and baby-sitters. The challenge for teachers is great but onerous. Their best efforts are not necessarily recognized or appreciated and many teachers feel inadequately rewarded for the tasks expected of them.

A universal secondary education for children in Ontario is a clearly established fact and necessity; its usefulness is not doubted by most parents. At the same time, to be fully useful, the schools require proper staffing. It is a moot question how much any job or occupation is worth in dollars and cents, and it is not within our area of concern to make judgments on the earnings of secondary school teachers in Sudbury or elsewhere. The fact remains that the SBE secondary school teachers felt that they had not been adequately paid during the last few years for the job that they were doing, and had not been given the degree of security necessary to do their work well. These, and many other demands for a change, were submitted to the SBE, which was publicly committed to budgetary restraints because of the economic situation in Sudbury in 1979.

The SBE and Its Budgets

There is little information readily available to a researcher concerned with the history of education. If at all available, it lies buried in the local municipal offices and it was beyond the resources of the TSS to dig this out. The result is that details about teaching conditions, local school boards, and negotiations prior to 1969 are all incomplete, and what is presented here is fragmentary.

The SBE was formed from a number of local school boards in 1969. At that time, there were 14 secondary schools involved, and a further four have been built since. Among the first measures of efficiency, the SBE annexed or closed 15 elementary schools, reduced the number of principals by 13, supervisory officials by three, business officials by three, and resource personnel by 10. A majority of the elected or appointed local board trustees lost their position; the creation of the SBE limited the number of trustees to 20 and 10 of them represented the Roman Catholic ratepayers of the area.

The local boards of education functioned independently under the broad rules of the Ministry of Education. The trustee associations were also decentralized. In 1949 seven such bodies formed an umbrella organization, and in 1953 the Ontario School Trustees' Council was incorporated (Downie, 1978). Even then, co-operation between school boards in the area, like Sudbury and the nearby communities, was not automatically assured.

As elsewhere in Ontario, the SBE trustees are now elected for a two-year term of office and are generally chosen by a very small proportion of citizens who bother to vote in municipal elections. Preelection all-candidates meetings are consistently characterized by sparse audiences. In the past, parents trusted their local school board to take care of educational matters and teachers to take care of professional matters of teaching and teaching-related obligations. Today, trustees are often elected on the premise that they have some related experience for this office, that they will give their utmost to educational matters, and that they will try to keep down the educational portion of residential taxes. Thus, they are watchdogs over the costs of education but also expected to ensure that the quality of education is fully maintained. Not an enviable task!

The 1969 amalgamation of over 1400 local school boards in Ontario into 126 larger bodies led to the inevitable loss of the more personal and less formal relationships between teachers and trustees. By 1973, the SBE, encompassing 17 secondary schools with over 900 staff, had to become more complex in the organizational structure and related processes; more bureaucratic. Relationships between teachers and trustees/board officials became more formalized and fragmented. The frequent face-to-face contacts, common in the past, were no longer possible.

It is not clear if the parents were involved to any degree with the secondary school teachers and with the running of the schools in the past, but the mushrooming of postsecondary education in the 1950s and 1960s resulted in hundreds of new teachers coming to this area in a very short time. The recruitment of teachers was left to the "experts" and, subsequently, an overwhelming majority of parents came to depend on boards of education to represent them in this matter. It is questionable if many could elucidate what they expected from the newly established schools and their staff at that time. The formulation or reformulation of educational policies and curricula, budgetary matters, and negotiations with teachers all became fully the responsibility of the elected or appointed members of the board. Parental non-involvement is shown by the fact that, until very recently, SBE debates and negotiations with teachers were conducted in camera; few details were offered to the public on contract discussions or on SBE decisions. After the amalgamation in 1969, the SBE represented a more concentrated source of power in decision-making in educational matters, acceptable to most of the parents, but not to the teachers.

Until 1975, the authority of local school boards was largely unchallenged. In turn, the position of teachers was constrained. Striking was not a viable option; bargaining was expected to be genteel, befitting dedicated professionals. Prior to the 1950s, jobs were scarce and ways and means to challenge the existing power relationships were few. In general, the climate was not conducive to teacher militancy at that time. This began to change slowly in the 1950s, and challenging the authority of the boards intensified from 1969 to 1975. Teachers demanded not only improved working conditions, but also a share in decisions on education in general. The resulting conflicts and confrontations remain to the present time. (See Downie, 1978, and Hennessy, 1979).

The structure of the SBE, and the decision-making processes which emerged since 1969, do not likely vary significantly from those found in other boards of education of comparable size in Ontario. The officers of the SBE are probably as well qualified and the trustees as intelligent and concerned with educational matters as their counterparts elsewhere. Their experience in contract negotiations is not enhanced by the fact that they are Sudburians; the negotiations and settlements at INCO, for example, were of doubtful use as learning cases in negotiations with the teachers' federations. They are responsible for apportioning a multimillion-dollar budget annually, and here the nature of the community and its economy are important considerations in how these funds are spent.

The stabilization of the population base beginning in 1975-76, and the precarious job situation prevailing in Sudbury since 1977, have dictated that the budget for educational needs not increase greatly from year to year. The decline of the area work force, bearing on the local taxation base, was most severe from 1975 to 1979, when nearly 5000 jobs were lost at INCO and Falconbridge alone. A major concern facing the SBE at that time, which remains important today, is the reconciliation of declining enrolment with the annual increases in tax rates for education. The cost of education has increased sharply, especially in teachers' salaries and fringe benefits, as shown in table 2.7. Teachers' salaries and fringe benefits increased from 57.2 per cent of the total expenditure for education in 1975 to 63 per cent in 1979.

Table 2.7: SBE Expenditures for Teachers' Salaries and Fringe Benefits

Year	Total Cost \$	Cost per pupil \$	Cost per pupil in 1970 dollars
1970	10 046 782	759	759
1973	13 633 347	897	774
1975	17 745 463	1161	815
1977	22 604 061	1496	904
1979	25 765 331	1766	926

Source: SBE, Report to the Fact Finder, 1979, p. 14.

The problem of educational costs for Sudbury and area public secondary schools is compounded by the weak taxation base, heavily dependent on local mining and smelting industries. As a compensation, area school boards of education depended heavily on provincial equalization grants. These grants covered over 61 per cent of the local expenditure for education costs; but in 1971, spending ceilings were imposed on all Ontario boards and the province began to reduce its level of support in 1974. The level of financial aid for ordinary expenditure was tied to the number of enrolled students. While certain locations, including Sudbury, were defined as special cases meriting extra funds, declining enrolment resulted in substantial decreases in money for education previously provided by the province. In addition, the local expenditure grew at a greater rate than the increase in provincial funds. By 1979, the province met 58.67 per cent of the total educational costs of the SBE budget of \$61 906 922. Thus, lower rates of provincial support put pressure on the local taxpayers. (See table 2.8.)

As an illustration, the local taxes for educational purposes were increased in 1978 by nearly 8 per cent to meet the loss of \$1.25 million in provincial grants, reduced because of declining enrolment. The educational portion of taxes, based on the average

Table 2.8: City of Sudbury Annual Mill Rate Increases for Education and
Municipal Mill Rate Increases for the Corresponding Years

Year	Mill Rate Increases for Education	Mill Rate Increases Municipal
1974	9.12%	5.46%
1975	7.93%	15.87%
1976	15.24%	10.34%
1977	14.97%	10.18%
1978	7.74%	4.45%
1979	11.34%	0.98%

Source: Tax Bill Information, City of Sudbury.

\$20 000 residential property assessment, increased from \$386 in 1978 to \$429 in 1979 and, in 1978, Sudbury had the fifth highest ratio of property taxes to their market value in the province. According to the Tax Bill Information, City of Sudbury, local taxes for school purposes rose from 43.3 per cent of the total tax bill for 1980 to 44.9 per cent in 1981, despite the continuously declining enrolment, reduction in the number of staff, and closure of four public elementary schools in 1979 and one public secondary school in 1980.

The decreases in educational funding from the province allowed the SBE to argue against the teachers' demands for higher salaries and fringe benefits. The teachers did not accept this as a justifiable argument. District 31, OSSTF, submitted a brief to the Ontario government in June 1978, requesting that financial assistance be returned to the 60 per cent level, but without success. In early 1979, the Northern Ontario Public School Trustees' Association formally protested the cuts in the provincial grants, asking for compensation to meet decreasing enrolment and special considerations for Northern Ontario schools. There is no indication that this resulted in a change of position for the Ontario government.

Prior to the 1980 strike, the SBE was faced with problems which, while not unique, were accentuated by the magnitude of the secondary school educational system--involving nearly 1000 staff--and financial difficulties related to a shrinking work force, a decreasing population base, and a declining enrolment. The major concerns to 1973 were to erect needed facilities and to staff them with qualified personnel. Since that time, extraneous factors demanded new approaches and novel solutions to problems facing the educational system in Sudbury and district, concerns which have been the key issues in the SBE-OSSTF/AEFO negotiations the last few years.

Bargaining and Other Relations

Collective bargaining prior to 1975 (when Bill 100 was introduced, legalizing teachers' strikes in disputes considered unsolvable) is considered in some detail by Thomas, 1976, Downie, 1978, and Hennessy, 1979. These researchers agree that, in general, peace and relations based on gentlemen's agreements prevailed on educational fronts prior to 1969, and that from 1969 to 1975 the situation changed to what Downie termed a "combatative" stance by teachers. According to Hennessy, the image of teachers as submissive, dedicated professionals changed drastically. By 1975, relations between teachers and boards became poisoned in some places and those between teachers and parents soured in others.

of strike action, the OSSTF devised means to achieve certain ends. Among these were the work-to-rule methods used especially in the early 1970s, "study sessions," one-day work stoppages, rotating strikes, and "pink listing,"* combined with threats of mass resignation against school boards defined as especially guilty of transgression against teachers. Downie claims that pink listing and a threat of mass resignation was first used by the secondary school teachers in Sudbury in 1950.** (Later, the SBE secondary school teachers were the only group in the province to work to rule in support of the striking Toronto teachers in 1975.) The public schools sector was not the only one affected; in November 1974, the separate school teachers demonstrated their militancy by resigning in many boards across the province, including Sudbury.

It is also possible that the first teachers' strike took place in Sudbury. According to the Sudbury Star (30 January 1980), 20 supply teachers employed by the Sudbury Public School Board in 1952 withdrew their services, demanding extra pay. These illustrations suggest that teachers here tended to be more militant than teachers elsewhere. But our informants' recollections suggest that relations between teachers and local boards were characterized by intimacy and general harmony, and that this changed only with the 1969 amalgamation.

During the rapid expansion of education in the 1950s and the 1960s, teachers began to make salary gains across the province. In Sudbury and area these gains were most pronounced in the years 1965 to 1975, but stabilized after. Teachers' salaries in general were among the gainers in the inflationary spiral of the last two decades. From an average of \$4044 in 1959, they jumped to \$20 210 by 1979, an increase of 394 per cent. Few other occupations could match these gains (Today Magazine, 26 April 1980, p. 9).

Previously high monetary settlements for the SBE teachers put them among the top earners in Ontario, but this began to change in 1975. Teachers' gains were 25 per cent in 1974-75, decreasing to 13 per cent in 1975-76, despite protracted negotiations, the introduction of Bill 100 on 3 June 1975, a strike vote by 83 per cent of the teachers, and the eventual SBE agreement to teachers' higher demands. The increases in the monetary areas were rolled back by the Anti-Inflation Board (AIB), which was established following the introduction of wage and price controls in October 1975.

The 1976-77 agreement was reached clearly under the guidelines of the AIB and amounted to an average 9.8 per cent increase in salaries and benefits. Again, the 1977-78 contract fell under AIB guidelines and the teachers received an average 7.7 per cent increase in salaries and benefits. When the wage and price controls were removed, another factor overshadowed the 1978-79 negotiations. In 1977, over 1000 workers were laid off from INCO and Falconbridge and there was a six-week shut down of INCO operations in July and August 1978, preceding the 37-week strike beginning in September 1978. Under these

* "Pink listing" of a school board indicates that a teacher should not seek or accept a position there on the penalty of being disaffiliated, or losing the protection of the OSSTF.

** According to Mr. P. J. A. Evans, who taught in Sudbury at the time, the secondary school teachers did resign in November 1950 and returned to classes the first school day in January 1951.

circumstances, the SBE had persuasive arguments that educational costs had to be kept down. As a result, teachers received an 8.5 per cent average increase in salaries and benefits for the 1978-79 contract.

By that time, teachers were concerned that their salary increases were not keeping pace with the rate of inflation and, because of AIB rollbacks and the lower settlements of the last few years, they were no longer among the better paid teachers in Ontario. In a very detailed document, presented by the teachers to the Fact Finder in 1979, figures do show that the SBE teachers were no longer near the top of the list. At the same time, these statistics also show that fewer than six boards in Ontario paid their teachers significantly higher or lower than the average. In general, an overwhelming majority of teachers received salaries that varied less than \$500 annually across the appropriate categories of pay. Perhaps being "top dog" in remuneration is important in itself.

Teachers' remuneration has been the major issue for the SBE and teachers during the last decade or so, but other matters emerged as important since. For the SBE, declining enrolment and the loss of financial support from the province posed a question of teacher redundancy. It is a general rule that parents want the best of both worlds--schools open and staffed by fully qualified teachers and, at the same time, their mill rate kept down. The matter of staffing becomes complicated when enrolment declines sharply yet taxes for education increase significantly. Between 1974 and 1979, enrolment for public secondary schools in Sudbury declined by 8.36 per cent, while the teaching staff was reduced by only 3.56 per cent during this period. The concern and sentiment of many ratepayers were voiced by an editorial in the Sudbury Star (15 February 1980) that "the taxpayer has a right to expect fewer teachers in an educational system with steadily declining enrolment." As the representatives of the taxpayers, the trustees were expected to be aware of these views. For the teachers, declining enrolment clearly affected the security of their occupation in a market with a surfeit of well-qualified candidates for secondary school vacancies. In Sudbury, the possibility of teacher dismissal or layoff was raised in each of the last three negotiations and job security has now become an extremely important issue for teachers.

The 1969 amalgamation undoubtedly left a legacy of more impersonal and gradually adversarial relations between the SBE and the OSSTF/AEFO. Until 1975, this was ameliorated by settlements which tended to meet most, if not all, of the teachers' demands, since at that time teachers were a scarce commodity and their expectations, limited largely to salary increases, did not infringe on the authority of the SBE. In the opinion of a past SBE chairman, with the introduction of Bill 100 "adversary positions between the teachers and the school boards are inevitable." This opinion was shared by the teachers who, in their submission to the Fact Finder in 1979, noted that because of new rules in Bill 100 the 1974-75 negotiations in Sudbury were extremely lengthy and involved and "despite the best efforts of both parties, have conditioned attitudes and left a legacy of watchful awareness on both sides." The teachers claim that, since that time, the rate of grievances by teachers against the SBE has been higher than in other parts of Ontario, and the more difficult negotiations required the presence of mediators in the last three of four contract disputes prior to 1979. Obviously, relations between the SBE and the teachers are now based more on adversary than on collegial positions, more characteristic of union/management than professional/board relationships.

In addition, other concerns such as the number of teaching periods, the pupil/teacher ratio, and a voice in what is taught, how it is taught, and the teaching environment have become important issues for the SBE teachers. Teachers claim they have little input into decisions related to education. But the SBE claims that for some years their policy has been a system-wide school development program responsible to the Curriculum Development Council, which is heavily weighted with teaching and consultant staff. Recommendations of the council have never been turned down by the SBE in recent years. Also, any proposed new policy must be sent to all schools as a Notice of Motion so that principals and teachers may evaluate it and suggest changes before it is adopted as a policy. The OSSTF/AEFO also have input into the SBE Policy, Education, and Finance Committees. This is but one example of hotly disputed issues at contract negotiations that are defined differently by each side.

There are references to personality clashes, ineptitude in negotiation skills, browbeating, and unilateral decisions made by "cliques" or "entrenched leaders." The negotiations are further complicated by the presence of mediators and outside "experts" for both sides. All the factors discussed, and other matters raised in the next chapter, contributed to conditions culminating in the longest strike in the history of education in Ontario.*

This chapter dealt at some length with the nature of Sudbury, including its human composition, its economy, and some other characteristics. The purpose of this detailed discussion was to suggest that it is logical to search for explanations to such questions as: Why was there so little publicly organized effort to influence both sides to settle? Why did the teachers receive so little material and moral support? Was there a real understanding of the role of the secondary schools and their teachers in Sudbury?

Bearing in mind the nature of the community, we can also ask if the whole enterprise of secondary school education is carried out in isolation from the general public, and if this public is really concerned with what happens to their children in grades 9 to 13. Equally important is the question of how the teachers themselves perceive this community and their role in it. These, and other related questions, will be raised again in later discussions.

It may be reiterated that the background information has a direct, if not always obvious, bearing on the strike and its length. The portrayal is admittedly broad and lacking in detail; the available information is fragmentary at best and the authors were severely handicapped by gaps in knowledge in many areas. At the same time, we believe that the foregoing is sufficient to set the stage for the next two chapters: consideration of the issues, and developments leading to the 1979 unsuccessful negotiations, culminating in the 1980 strike.

* It is true that the Renfrew County dispute was longer, beginning with work-to-rule sanctions implemented by the teachers on 30 January 1978, later followed by the actual strike and the closure of the schools by the board. In all, education there was affected for 73 teaching days, while the actual strike lasted 43 teaching days, as compared with the 57 days lost by the strike in Sudbury.

3 Issues

Introduction

On 24 January 1979, the OSSTF/AEFO, District 31, filed with the Education Relations Commission a notice of intent to negotiate a new contract with the SBE. On 19 December 1979, 77.4 per cent of the 94 per cent secondary school teachers who voted gave a mandate to their bargaining team to call a strike, if necessary, in order to achieve the goals of that team. Finally, on 6 February 1980, the OSSTF/AEFO called what became the longest teacher strike in Ontario.

According to the OSSTF count, 19 meetings were held with the SBE in the year of negotiations which preceded the strike. Obviously, the two sides had ample opportunity to resolve their differences, yet apparently achieved very little, despite the fact that the two sides had had the assistance of a Fact Finder, and a mediator (on three separate occasions), prior to the strike. What happened to bring about the strike and why are major questions which this study has addressed. To answer them, the authors first examined the issues on the table for possible sources of conflict and misunderstanding. These were of a sort whose resolution would require more than a compromise in dollars and cents. To study the issues they took two approaches. First, they reviewed available documentation and personal notes about the negotiations (including the three collective agreements between the Sudbury board and teachers immediately prior to these)--documentation covering almost completely the negotiations between July 1979 and May 1980 (see Primary Negotiations Documents). Second, they did a comparison study of the comments about the issues made by the respondents in the field studies--in particular, of those respondents who were closely associated with the negotiations. An understanding of these issues will help to explain why negotiations broke down, and other questions which the TSS has pursued: the dynamics of the strike and the role various groups played; its consequences, such as changes or lack of them in the Sudbury secondary system; the attitudes of the people employed by, or responsible for the system; and the opinions of the community about the board, its teachers, and the value of the education the children are receiving.

The issues on the table in 1979 and the positions of the SBE and the teachers about these issues are described in two parts. The first part describes what each of the major issues were at the beginning of negotiations, the extent to which they were defined, why they were deemed important, and what were the stated points of view and attitudes of the two sides about them. The issues are collected together under four headings (which do not necessarily correspond with the headings in the collective agreements):

1. Remuneration (salary, benefits, leaves)
2. Staffing of schools (pupil/teacher ratio, positions of responsibility, redundancy procedures)
3. Workload
4. Employee protections (just cause, SBE policy, teacher evaluation, summer and night school).

The authors have grouped the issues in this way to facilitate discussion. This is not to imply that the proper view of these issues is indicated by the grouping--for example, that teachers' proposals about evaluation were designed solely to protect teachers. Further, not all the issues negotiated that year are discussed. There were roughly

50 to 60 articles put on the table (discussed in the next chapter). Some, important in themselves, were settled easily. All of the issues (some 12 to 14) which were unresolved before the strike are included.

The second part is a more general and comparative description of the respondents' views about the issues. This complements and completes the first by establishing, through the field studies, the differences in perception and attitude about them, and the extent to which they were inherently a source of difficulty for negotiations.

Throughout (as in following chapters), there is a welding of information derived from documentation, the media, personal notes, informal discussions with people who were unwilling to participate in the field studies, and formal interviews. However, the central emphasis is on these issues as they were and are perceived by people who were involved--most of whom are long-time members of the secondary school system as staff or trustees and/or long-time residents of Sudbury, aware of its character and community history. Thus, the reader must bear in mind that the purpose here is to describe as fairly as possible the positions of the two sides, not to judge whether they were justified or well defended, or whether the arguments were sincerely held or were propaganda for the cause. For example, points of view about the teachers' cost-of-living proposal and the fact that the calculations of the two teams did not agree are described, without being concerned about whether their calculations were correct. A similar point can be made about their use of statistics. Of course, where errors or misuse of statistics did occur, or where arguments were not justified or well defended, negotiations would have suffered; but, acceptable or not, they were used to defend the rationale of the two parties. These are examined in order to reveal the perspectives; if they were not sincerely held, they were nevertheless what others were told, and this affected the roles which others played in the negotiations, management of the strike, or reaction to it.

Description and Analysis of Issues

In many respects the issues in 1979 were not new to Sudbury negotiations, or to others in the province, between teachers and school boards. They were part of an ongoing debate about salaries, inflation and cutbacks, pupil/teacher ratios, job protection, staff/board relations, and grievance rights and procedures. Indeed, the teachers enjoyed capitalizing on the "irony" of past negotiations as a morale booster--when, for example, the present Director of Education in Sudbury was negotiating 25 years ago with the same chairman of the board about salary and cost-of-living clauses (Communications Bulletin, no. 12).

The authors have studied negotiations only over a five- to six-year period. After reading the materials collected and listening to the teachers and trustees associated with the secondary schools, they conclude that attitudes and atmosphere condition, and are conditioned by, this continuum. Controversy swells at negotiation time and recedes in between though it is always present in the many committees, meetings, and person-to-person encounters which occur in the running of the system. It is common now, for instance, for "federation observers" to be present at committee meetings concerned with program changes and curriculum development.

This, and the fact that most of the people debating these issues have been part of the Sudbury system for a number of years, were probably negative influences on the 1979

negotiations, even though early intentions may have been to bring about a fair settlement speedily. One of the respondents recognized this problem and summed up the situation this way:

It was the same people facing the same people, the same items stripped out of the contract, and the same problems not being resolved satisfactorily. To the extent that they [the trustees] didn't buy the argument last time, they won't this time--they've "heard it all before." For example, some trustees see staffing proposals simply as "featherbedding." We don't buy that because we don't believe it.

Rather than our looking for the uniqueness of the issues in 1979 as an explanation of why the strike occurred in that year, it would seem more productive to emphasize their sameness. The strike was about issues existing years before the strike and it is expected that they will continue to exist in some form for future negotiations. In one sense, then, the issues in their particular form in 1979 were the reason for the strike but in another sense they were, perhaps, not a cause but more the occasion for a strike about more fundamental matters which the issues themselves represented or concealed. A summary of the major issues and some fundamental differences described in this section is in Appendix 2, chart 1.

Remuneration: Salary

It is usually taken for granted that most contract disputes centre upon remuneration as a central issue. Many of the respondents--particularly the community leaders (noneducation) in the third field study--saw money as the top concern in the teacher strike. Of the parents, 79.5 per cent believe that money and working conditions (including job security) were the issues over which the teachers were striking, and money received by far the most emphasis. In contrast to the public, teachers (including a negotiator to whom the authors spoke personally) insisted strongly that they would not strike "just for money." Further, from teachers' responses received by the TSS, it would appear that the money offer by the SBE, while an important factor, was only one among a number of reasons why they went on strike. Yet trustees seemed to focus on salary for many months as the major obstacle to achieving an agreement. Because, in 1979, teachers' salaries were 63 per cent of the SBE's total budget, this is understandable. It may also have to do with the fact that the teachers took an unyielding stance on their original salary position until well into the strike, and that the monetary gap between the two sides was created primarily by their positions on salary. How much the salary offer had to do with the strike, nevertheless, is debatable not only because of the existence of other important issues but because, as a number of respondents suggested, the strike would have occurred no matter what the issues were. After a year of research the authors do not know the answer to this. The most probable answer is that for some of the negotiators, the monetary issues were more important, and that it was one of a number of issues on which the teachers based their case for strike. Also, if the teachers were anticipating difficulty in settling some other issues, it would have been expected of them to maintain a strong stand on salary so that the money issue would add weight to their overall case. In any case, it is important to understand the contrasting views of the board and the teachers underlying their salary positions both because they reveal a fundamental difference in attitude about "fairness," and because they explain, in part, why the negotiations were protracted.

Secondary school teachers are paid according to a grid system. Four separate pay categories are identified in order to recognize and reward the extent of a teacher's qualifications. Within each of these categories 10 to 12 pay levels corresponding to years of experience are also distinguished in order to reward a teacher's developing excellence and value to the system. Allowances, primarily for positions of responsibility and administration, are also paid to the appropriate staff over and above the grid ceiling. Increases in salary are usually described in terms of a percentage increase in total cost to the board, either including or excluding the expected increment, because the dollar increase will not always be the same at each level on the grid. Teachers usually look at the increase of salary at the maximum level of category 4 (maximum 4). In describing the salary negotiations, we use these kinds of references and give the percentage figures excluding increment. The basic salary scale for the SBE teachers before the strike is shown in table 3.1.

Table 3.1: Basic Salary Scale:
Sudbury Secondary School Teachers' Salary Grid

Years of Experience	Group 1 \$	Group 2 \$	Group 3 \$	Group 4 \$
0	13 000	13 400	14 800	15 500
1	13 860	14 300	15 845	16 575
2	14 720	15 200	16 890	17 650
3	15 580	16 100	17 935	18 725
4	16 440	17 000	18 980	19 800
5	17 300	17 900	20 025	20 875
6	18 160	18 800	21 070	21 950
7	19 020	19 700	22 115	23 025
8	19 880	20 600	23 160	24 100
9	20 740	21 500	24 205	25 175
10	21 600	22 400	25 250	26 250
11		23 300	26 295	27 325
12				28 400
<u>Increments</u>	860/10	900/11	1045/11	1075/12

Source: Collective Agreement, 1978-1979

The two contracts prior to the 1979 negotiations show relatively similar increases in remuneration, despite the fact that the 1977-78 contract was still under AIB review, while the 1978-79 contract was not. Increases at the maximum 4 level were 7 per cent and 6 per cent respectively, and the administrative allowances for principals and vice-principals were increased by \$1800 each year. There were no other changes in remuneration except for several minor cutbacks.

The original 1979 teachers' requests concerning salaries and allowances reflected a desire to protect the standard of income achieved earlier in the 1970s, and maintained fairly well (according to the teachers) until the most recent settlement. The teachers wished, in other words, to prevent the continuing increases in the cost of living from eroding the actual buying power of their income, believing that the "Sudbury secondary school teachers scale is now \$1300 to \$1600 behind where it should have been in June 1979" (Communications Bulletin, no. 11). They also wished to prevent a growing trend in the previous contracts--cutbacks in areas of remuneration which had been difficult gains in earlier negotiations. In presenting information about certain cutbacks proposed by the SBE, the teachers referred to them as "contract-stripping," a phrase designed to elicit

staff and local labour support against these cutbacks. Accordingly, the teachers proposed that both salaries and allowances be increased, not in the usual way--that is, through a set of adjustments applied directly to the grid and allowances--but by tying increments in both, in a one-to-one relationship, to the monthly increases in the cost of living, whatever they might be. Calculations of salary increases would be added to the 1978-79 grid or "folded in" to establish a new base grid each month.

The teachers regarded the consumer price index (CPI) published by Statistics Canada as a valid indication of the actual increase to them in the cost of living and used this index to formulate a "Cost of Living Escalator" (COLE) clause which would create a monthly increase in teacher salaries in anticipation of the estimated increase in the CPI:

$$\text{Adjusted Annual Salary} = \frac{\text{Basic Annual Salary}}{\text{CPI for June 1979}} \times \frac{\text{CPI for the Month}}{\text{CPI for June 1979}}$$

The teachers, in their report to the Fact Finder, showed that, in the 1978-79 contracts, 20 per cent of Ontario boards had some sort of a COLE provision and two had an adjustment to the salary grid based on the cost of living.

With regard to the allowances, however, the teachers argued that the value of these, relative to the grid itself, had fallen far behind. They requested that the allowances be increased initially by 10 per cent and that they, too, then be given a continuing adjustment similar to the one to be applied to the grid.

According to these teachers (whose figures were lower than the SBE's statistics) the effect of the COLE clause on the maximum 4 salary level would be to raise it gradually from \$28 400 to \$30 956 for an annual salary of \$29 999. This represented an increase of 5.63 per cent (see Appendix 2, Chart 2, which illustrates the positions of the two sides in terms of the maximum 4 salary through the negotiations). In the second year (1980-1981), the teachers estimated that the maximum 4 salary level would be raised from \$30 956 to \$33 736 for an annual salary of \$32 699. This would amount to an increase of 9 per cent over their proposed first-year increase.

The SBE prepared a two-year offer in the usual manner. For the first year, the SBE proposed an increase in salaries of \$902 106, which represented an overall increase of 5 per cent (without increment) and an increase at maximum 4 also of 5 per cent. For the second year, the SBE proposed an increase of another 5 per cent, which would cost \$969 020. With these offers the maximum 4 salary level would become \$29 800 and \$31 204 respectively. As in other years the SBE also offered to increase the administrative allowances of principals and vice-principals by \$1800.

Two factors determine for the trustees the outside limits to any salary offer. First, they must estimate what can and will be the size of the "funding pie." Second, they must decide how this amount can best be distributed so that the most good can be derived for the secondary system as a whole--taking into account implications like deterioration of buildings, lack of up-to-date equipment and libraries, possible teacher strikes. In other words, teachers' salaries are in competition with a number of exigencies of the system, all of which are affected by changes often beyond the control of the board.

The SBE, in its Rationale to the Fact Finder about its salary proposal to the teachers (pp. 2-4), specified these two factors for the 1979 budget in concrete terms.

Regarding the first, the SBE pointed out that in relation to the total budget, provincial grants had decreased. In 1974, the government had funded 75 per cent of the budget; in 1979, it funded only 66 per cent. The SBE claimed that this was partly because it was receiving the second lowest assessment per pupil of any board in Ontario of comparable size. Thus, increasing responsibility for the budget had fallen on local taxpayers, who were now paying \$12 million for secondary education as compared with \$6 million in 1974.

And, the SBE argued, further increases in taxes were not acceptable, given local conditions: taxes on a typical home in Sudbury were already among the highest compared with other major Ontario centres, while the value of homes was declining; municipal debt was the second highest of the regional municipalities in Ontario; total employment in Sudbury was dropping and there had been a 23 per cent decrease in the number of employees on staff at INCO and Falconbridge over the past three years.

With regard to the second factor, the SBE outlined the direction of budget changes from 1970 onward. With inflation taken into account, plant maintenance now received 35 per cent less of the budget; operation of buildings, 21 per cent less; business administration, 20 per cent less. Meanwhile, given the present offer, teachers' salaries would have increased from the 1975 level of 57.2 per cent of the budget to 63 per cent. How such statistics ought to be interpreted is not relevant to this report. Rather, it is the perspective inherent in the SBE interpretation which is important to understand. To the SBE, these statistics indicated that the balance in allocation of funds was swinging too far in favour of salaries to the detriment of other areas needing attention, at a time when any major increase in funding seemed impossible.

How far apart, then, were the teachers and the SBE at the outset regarding salaries? Comparison of the original positions shows that the difference between the SBE and the teachers for the first year was very small (see table 3.2). At maximum 4 only \$200 separated them, and there was about \$400 000 difference in total salary costs. The teachers used these figures to argue that they were not asking to catch up on the losses to inflation in the past but now wanted a guarantee that they would not fall behind any further (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, 1979). However, application of the COLE in the second year resulted in a large gap between the cost of the two. Approximately \$1 million in the total cost and \$1500 at maximum 4 salary level separated the two positions (teachers' figures).

Table 3.2: Monetary Difference between Teacher and SBE Positions on Salary and Benefits

	1979/80		1980/81**	
Teachers	\$1 359 075	(\$1 401 157)*	\$1 995 364	(\$3 098 750)*
Board	911 576		995 122	
Difference	\$ 447 499	(\$ 490 581)*	\$1 000 242	(\$2 103 628)*

Note: In costing the positions of the two sides, the major factors to be included are salaries, allowances, and benefits. Although the number of salaries to be paid (staffing), which is also to be negotiated, will obviously affect costing as well, this is not included in these figures, taken from estimates each side prepared for the Fact Finder.

* Board's estimate of teachers' position (later recalculated downward)

** Increase over the 1979/80 estimate

In the authors' opinion, that the dispute regarding salary amounted to a large dollar figure was only of secondary importance. Of primary significance was that in introducing the COLE clause, teachers turned negotiations from simple offer/demand bargaining into a complex debate about principles, a dispute that could not be resolved through dollars-and-cents bargaining. Before a salary figure could be arrived at, the two sides must agree on how a fair salary should be determined and what "fair" meant. But the two kinds of rationale described above showed that this would not be easy. On the one hand, teachers argued on what might be called a "rights" principle of fairness--the maintenance of "wins" in earlier contracts, and a standard of living and status relative to other professions, not always enjoyed by teachers in the past. Not to do so would be to lose the value of collective bargaining. As one teacher said, "Negotiations exist to assist teachers in obtaining and maintaining their rights." On the other hand, the SBE was working from a more prudential perspective: fairness really meant "fair distribution," assuming that the SBE had little control over how much there was to be distributed or the changing needs of the system. All the same, public statements by some member of the SBE agreed that teachers ought to be given a measure of protection against inflation through an increase in salary. Establishment of salaries in the past was not for them an establishment of a fixed standard, or a precedent. A continually changing practical context sometimes should imply increases and sometimes decreases in both salary and allowances.

In sum, the teachers, by requesting the COLE clause, were bargaining for salaries in a way which was, apart from its costs, both fundamentally different in rationale and far-reaching in consequences. The SBE expressed this in terms of its effect on future bargaining:

A COLE clause builds a cost into future contracts which neither the Board nor the Federations will get credit for. Even if the Board could afford to maintain a COLE, staff would expect other gains as well in subsequent years. [SBE, Rationale to the Fact Finder, p. 2]

The built-in cost would really be a built-in principle and a new springboard for future negotiations.

Different perspectives about what constitutes a fair salary inevitably led to a haphazard debate about the validity of the perspectives themselves. The SBE was squeezed between decreasing government grants and increasing local cost. The chairman of the Finance Committee for the SBE, for instance, commented to the Sudbury Star (17 February 1979) that "the government has effectively continued its policy of passing on the tax burden to the local ratepayers." Declining enrolment aggravates the situation because "it causes declining per capita grant revenue totals which costs do not decrease proportionally. The revenue from the province decreases and we are stuck with the extra costs." Teachers, however, claimed in effect that fair distribution, while important, was beside the point; there were more basic questions which the SBE was not facing. In particular, they objected to the SBE's assumption about the size of the funding pie. They believed that the board ought to challenge more effectively the cutbacks in government funding.

Also, the evaluation which they made of the tax base in Sudbury was quite different from the one presented by the SBE: "In essence, the Board, one of the wealthiest

urban areas in Ontario, is asking its teachers to accept a salary settlement which is substandard" (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 31). In a similar vein they stated the following:

This community does have the resources to fund a quality educational system equal to if not superior to any in this province. The fault in the method of assessment needs correction, and the Board certainly cannot reasonably expect that the teachers of this area should accept this artificial burden that should never have been permitted to exist in the first place. The Board, in fact, has a positive duty and responsibility to correct this inequality. The Board's present cries of poverty are viewed sceptically by the teachers. [OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 5]

To substantiate this view, the teachers pointed out that Sudbury ranked very high in terms of per capita disposable income. They also presented a chart indicating that the public school mill rate had increased much more slowly than the CPI since 1971. Thus, the SBE had not increased taxes in a gradual and realistic fashion but had proudly maintained a "hold the line" philosophy, staying close to the ceilings imposed by the Ministry of Education. As a result the SBE was now caught in a situation where, if it did make a fair salary settlement, it would have to increase taxes considerably--through its own fault. At stake, the teachers claimed, was not only the economic welfare of the staff but also the educational system itself:

It is this tax record that has caused the educational spending to fall behind that of other Boards, putting the Board in the undesirable position where a considerable amount of tax catch-up is necessary if the educational system is not to be disadvantaged. [OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 31]

While the teachers were objecting to what they perceived as the SBE's narrowness, the SBE rejected the concept of COLE, especially as it was tied to the CPI, because, they argued, the CPI is not a fair indication of the effect of inflation on teachers' standard of living.

The CPI measures changes, through time, in the purchasing power of the consumer dollar, spent by an average Canadian urban family for such common requirements as food, shelter, clothing, transportation, recreation, etc. We believe that the average salary paid to secondary school teachers is above the income earned by the average wage earner in Canada. Therefore, using the increase in the CPI as the basis for a wage adjustment for teachers' salaries is not justified, i.e. assuming the salary of the average wage earner in Canada is \$13 000, a wage adjustment based on the increase in the CPI of 8.4 per cent would amount to \$1092 whereas an adjustment based on the average salary of secondary school teacher (of \$24 223) would yield \$2035. [SBE, Rationale to the Fact Finder, p. 2 (emphases in the original)]

Further, it seemed unfair to the SBE that, when nonteaching wage settlements in Sudbury had not kept pace with the CPI, Sudbury would be taxed on this basis for teacher salaries.

Another issue of fairness arose during the 1979 negotiations concerning the indirect effect declining enrolment could have on a particular teacher's pay category. The agreements of previous years stated that in order for a teacher to be paid in a given category he/she must "teach in the discipline(s) for which the certification [qualifying him/her for this category] has been granted." With the shrinking of programs, it might be that a particular teacher with seniority protection could end up teaching in an area where he/she was perhaps competent but not certified as an area of specialization. The

federations argued that, in such circumstances, because the teacher was already being penalized in a professional sense for something beyond anyone's control, he/she ought not to be also penalized financially by dropping to a lower pay category.

The SBE, concerned both about the quality of programs and paying more than the returns for the system warranted, held the opposite view. It proposed that the clause be made more specific by requiring teachers to teach at least half time in their area(s) of specialization in order to qualify for the respective pay category. Such a requirement would encourage principals to assign teachers to positions for which they had a specialization and encourage teachers to accept a position in another school as an alternative to receiving a cut in salary. In this way, program excellence would be further protected because teachers would be more actively interested in teaching in their areas of specialty.

Difficulty in dealing at the bargaining table with conflicts in principle of the sort described above can probably account for the kinds of attitudes held by each side and expressed in the interviews. Teachers believed that the SBE's position was essentially a political one. The SBE believed that the teachers (at least those responsible for negotiations) were either unrealistic about the limits of funding or simply out to see what they could get.

Benefit and Leave Plans

The Sudbury secondary school collective agreements provide for various benefit plans. Prior to 1979, these included the Ontario Health Insurance Plan (OHIP) and the Blue Cross Semi-Private Plan, both paid 100 per cent by the SBE. Also included were life insurance plans, Blue Cross Extended Health Care, drug and dental plans, 75 per cent paid by the board and 25 per cent by the staff. There were long-term disability plans and an optional life insurance plan, which were administered by the SBE but paid 100 per cent by the staff.

These agreements also contained clauses (which the authors include as benefits) that outlined a number of leave plans available to teachers. These included a cumulative sick-leave plan (required by The Education Act, 1974), whereby Sudbury employees with less than 25 years seniority might accumulate 200 days of sick leave, at the rate of 20 days per year; those with more than 25 years, 350 days. Attached to this sick-leave plan was a "retirement allowance" clause permitting most teachers to collect unused sick leave as a sum of money at retirement according to a set formula. There were also other leave plans for maternity and adoption (without pay or benefits), for professional purposes (without loss of pay), and for educational purposes. There was also a sabbatical leave plan offering three outstanding teachers per year an opportunity for professional enrichment at two-thirds of their annual salary.

In the two contracts previous to 1979, a few changes had been made to benefit and leave plans, but most were minor. For instance, in 1977-78, increased optional life insurance was added and adoption leave was extended from six to 26 weeks. In 1978-79, leaves for professional purposes no longer included leave for federation duties. Instead, a new clause was added, permitting the federation(s) to purchase release time for "10 person days per year" and "the leave of absence of one person per year" for local federation duties. Of greater significance was a new section, permitting the equivalent of 10 teachers to take a leave of absence without salary or benefits and to return afterwards

to the same school without loss of seniority. Such use of leave plans would help to alleviate the effects of declining enrolment on teacher jobs.

Early in the 1979 negotiations, the SBE proposed that it provide the group benefit plans under Tri-Care Services Ltd.* The increased cost of the benefit package would amount to approximately \$24 000 in each year (SBE, Report to the Fact Finder: Exhibits, p. 60). The proposed changes to the benefit plan were acceptable to the teachers but they requested that the SBE assume 100 per cent of the cost of all the benefit plans. The SBE objected because it believed that employees ought to share the cost of their fringe benefits.

The teachers also proposed a number of other changes to the benefit and leave plans, including:

- a) Sick Leave. "Employees may accumulate up to a maximum of 400 days sick leave at the rate of 25 days per year," and that "any teacher with a lengthy illness during his/her last five years of service can have his/her sick leave credits reinstated to a maximum of 200 days prior to retirement."
- b) Personal Leave. Teachers be permitted to take the five half-days per school year without the required approval of the principal.
- c) Sabbatical Leave. The stated purpose of sabbatical leaves be broadened to reflect actual practice; that the salary paid during this leave be increased from two-thirds to three-quarters, and that the employee be permitted to augment this with sick leave, up to 100 per cent of his/her salary; and that a new plan called "Sabbatical Leave with Salary Holdback" be included which would permit teachers to take such a leave by making arrangements in advance with the SBE to withhold part of his/her salary as savings, which would then be paid as salary during this time. [SBE, Items Outstanding]

A number of other extensions to the different leave plans were also proposed by the teachers. Some would simply provide additional privileges; others, such as the newly suggested sabbatical leave plan, were obviously an attempt by the teachers to alleviate the pressure on jobs because of declining enrolment.

All of these requests represented to the SBE a certain price tag, in terms of lost teacher days or added administrative costs. Collectively, the cost of the requests was significant; in the SBE's view, to increase paid leaves during a time of economic restraint was not acceptable. The SBE did agree in principle with the teachers that some ways to lessen the problem of jobs should be examined and written into the collective agreement--ways which the SBE would take responsibility for administering but which would cost the taxpayer very little. However, the SBE wished to implement some cutbacks in the new agreement, which would help trim the budget without being noticeably detrimental to the system. In particular, there were two areas, destined to create much controversy, which the SBE identified as such: *W*

- a) Sabbatical Leave. In the SBE's view, the value of this plan to the system was not sufficient to justify its cost. Since the teachers taking such leaves would be among the best paid, though the replacement teachers among the least well paid, the cost to the SBE for each sabbatical leave would be in the range of about \$10 000. The SBE proposed originally that such leaves be cut from three to one and that the teachers' new proposal for salary leaves be implemented as a replacement.

* A health insurance group which, the SBE believed, would give the staff better coverage for the cost.

b) Retirement Allowance. In contrast with the effect of the teachers' request that the cumulative sick leave be extended on this allowance, the SBE proposed to rename this allowance as "retirement gratuity," and to "grandfather"* it as of 31 August 1979. Here was an example where changing circumstances justified, in the SBE's view, a cutback in the contract. Originally the retirement allowance had been given to supplement the teachers' pension plan, which had been very poor. The SBE felt this was no longer needed because the teachers now had one of the best pension plans in the province. Meanwhile this allowance was representing a costly and unfunded (by the province) liability. As one of the trustees commented, "This was negotiated out of the elementary contract two years ago. The new teachers don't really care about it. I'm concerned that teachers are doing themselves out of jobs" [because of the increasing cost of this allowance]. Another trustee estimated that "this unfunded liability" amounted to \$10 million.

c) Postgraduate Allowance. The SBE also wished to cut this because the "maximum teacher qualifications don't require postgraduate degrees." [SBE, Rationale to the Fact Finder, p. 5]

The teachers' objections to the removal of these provisions from the contract were similar to those behind their wanting to tie salary to the cost of living; a contract standard had been fought for and won in the past, and should neither be given up nor applicable to only some of the participating OSSTF/AEFO members. Further, the teachers saw both the sabbatical leave plan and the retirement gratuity plan as a "standard part" of Ontario teachers' contracts, the latter being transportable from board to board. The teachers argued that erosion had taken place in the sabbatical plan since the time of its inception, when there were provisions allowing for four or perhaps more sabbatical leaves. There were such plans in place in other boards which were more generous than the one they had.

In addition, some teachers believed that this plan provided an incentive and a morale booster for Sudbury staff and should not be abandoned. One of the teachers made the following comment:

This is the most honoured, respected kind of leave a teacher can aspire to--leave with full pay. You have to fulfill conditions before and after ... but the Board doesn't make good use of those who do go. For example, there was a startling case where a Master Teacher of History, who went on sabbatical, was declared redundant while he was away.

In other words, such a cutback would be detrimental to the system, not because such a plan was not valuable in itself, but because the SBE was not using it properly. Again, this particular issue reflected the teachers' more general feeling that the SBE tended to hide behind "money shuffling" without raising some of the more critical questions. Similarly, the argument that this allowance was not funded by the province did not impress the teachers. They thought that the SBE should go after such funding rather than place the cost burden as a loss on teachers, even if it were only on those still to come on staff after August 1979.

Salary Savings Sharing Plan

In the 1979 negotiations, the teachers proposed a new type of plan of benefit both to teachers and the SBE. This plan, which could take one of several possible forms, was

* To "grandfather" a clause is to retain it for teachers hired before a specific date, but exclude from its benefits teachers hired after the date.

conceived to take advantage of the grid system of salaries, and the fact that a teacher with no experience was paid about half as much as an experienced teacher with the same qualifications. The teachers pointed out that if a teacher at the top of his/her salary category left teaching and was replaced by a teacher who had not yet reached maximum, the SBE would save money, until the replacement reached maximum, equivalent to the difference between the two. They then proposed that the SBE pay a lump sum, equivalent to one-half of the salary saved, to the retiring teacher as an incentive to teachers to take early retirement. If teachers did retire early, this would not only save the SBE money but also tend to create jobs for young teachers. However, the SBE rejected this proposal, stating simply that it saw no need for it. The authors believe that the SBE saw this proposal as originating with the provincial OSSTF and, as such, not requiring serious consideration in negotiations with the local team.

Staffing of Schools

a) Pupil/Teacher Ratios. In the several years previous to the 1979 negotiations, there were few changes in the pupil/teacher ratios (PTR). The decreases made were in the general program, and probably generated about 10 teaching positions (or possibly the equivalent of one teacher per school). In other words, 10 teaching positions were maintained which otherwise would have disappeared because of declining enrolment (see table 3.3).

The authors do not know if the positions taken by the two sides regarding PTR in September 1979, and presented to the Fact Finder, were their original bargaining positions or not. From personal notes given to the authors, as well as from responses received in the field study, it appears that there was a greater gap between their positions in the fall than there had been informally during their meetings in July 1979. Nevertheless, the authors will present the full positions as they were defended for the Fact Finder as the original ones.

Table 3.3 shows that the teachers' requests regarding PTR were substantial (relative to changes in other years) and would generate (given a fixed enrolment) 52.2 teaching positions over the two years. The system PTR would be equivalent to the best in the province. The teachers included a change in the number of vice-principal and librarian positions. Teachers requested that the principal/vice-principal ratio be calculated separately from the librarian ratio and that there be at least one librarian per school and two vice-principals in each school offering complete basic and modified programs.

The SBE's proposal was to increase the PTR in the regular program in both years, resulting in a reduction of 19.11 positions (given a fixed enrolment), at a cost of about \$25 000 per teacher position. The board estimated that its proposal would save approximately \$0.5 million, while the teacher proposal would cost about \$1.3 million more than if the schools were staffed according to the 1978-79 ratios (SBE, Report to the Fact Finder: Exhibits, p. 27).

Table 3.3: Pupil/Teacher Ratios

	Previous Years				Proposals in 1979				Effect on Positions			
	1976 - 1980				1980-81		1981-82		1980-81		1981-82	
	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	Tea.	Board	Tea.	Board	Tea.	Board	Tea.	Board
Regular 600+	20.82		20.60	20.35	20.0	20.65	19.80	20.96	+10.73	-9.92	+5.63	-9.19
Regular -600	20.0			19.82	19.5	20.50	19.20	20.90				
Basic	15.0				12.0		12.0		+22.0			
Modified	8.5				8.0		8.0		+ 2.28			
Hard-of-Hearing	6.0											
Principals & Vice-Principals					<u>Teachers' Proposal</u>							
		1200+	4		P. & V.P.	1200+	3		+ 5.0			
						600-1199	2					
		600-1199	3			- 600	1					
Librarians		- 600	2		One Librarian per school				+ 6.60			
System PTR*	16.93	17.29	17.35	17.58*	15.98	117.07	115.88	117.26	1			
Median Class Size: Reg.	26.63	27.12	26.41						Total	+46.6	-9.9	+5.6 -9.2
									Positions Affected			
Median Class Size: Basic & Modified	12.52	13.58	14.06									

Note: The allotment of staff to each school is determined in terms of pupil/teacher ratios, which vary according to type of program and position of staff member. Calculation of the system PTR is done by dividing the total enrolment by the total number of staff.

* Teacher figures (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, Table 5). The SBE's figure for 1979-80 was 16.81.

To a certain extent, the monetary difference between these two positions reflected a typical union/management difference: the federation's raison d'être obviously included job protection for its members, while the SBE's responsibility included getting the best return for its money. Negotiation meant simply a closing of the \$1.8 million gap through argument and compromise. Thus, each side appealed to various kinds of statistics about previous agreements, provincial norms, and agreements in other OSSTF districts. To complicate matters, the two sides presented figures that were either different or not comparable; consequently, they were able to draw different conclusions. For example, the teachers were able to conclude that the system PTR had worsened over the previous 10 years while the SBE demonstrated that it had remained more or less the same, or improved slightly (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 51; SBE, Report to the Fact Finder: Exhibits, p. 28).

Another difference was how various factors should be weighed in determining a fair compromise about salary. For the SBE, because the collective agreement should be

qualified by economic restraint and staff availability, the PTR of other boards in the province carried less weight--a position somewhere in the middle would be fair enough. Whereas the teachers' presentation to the Fact Finder indicated that some "progress" in lowering the PTR was akin to the "progress" represented by increased salaries--to be expected from negotiation year to negotiation year. They objected to the Fact Finder that,

The negotiations for staffing in Sudbury have followed a see-saw pattern. The other end of the teeter-totter from staff allotment has been salary. Whenever teachers here have made any progress in monetary matters (i.e. kept up to the rapidly rising cost of living), they have lost when it came to staffing. In essence, there has been no improvement in staffing since 1976. The present contract gives 20.35 as the denominator in the formula which determines staffing in large schools for the school year 1979-80. This is the same figure we had in 1976. [OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 44; emphasis in the original]

While this paragraph reflects the teachers' view of fairness (and its lack in preceding negotiations), it was written within a broader framework pointing to a difference in principle and perspective between the two sides, which also explains the gap on staffing. The teachers begin the section on the staffing formula with the following:

The question of staffing can be an extremely emotional one. It means teachers' jobs. It means children's futures. It is certainly obvious that staffing is the major area of concern for us. [OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 44]

The question of staffing is a highly emotional topic, not simply because it relates to the two issues mentioned, but because it relates to both together. Thus, motives on either side for favouring or rejecting an increase in PTR are open to speculation about the "real" reason. Arguments on either side are easily reducible to self-interest. Thus, with tension and mistrust between the two, the debate about staffing, as the teachers so mildly state, "can be an extremely emotional one."

It is impossible to establish whether the teachers' negotiation team (presuming the members thought alike) was motivated by either teachers' jobs, children's futures, both, or neither. Nor is it possible to know whether the SBE's team was more concerned about quality of education or tax dollars. Nevertheless, three points need to be emphasized. First, teachers stated early in the dispute that they regarded staffing as the major issue. According to the interviews, it never registered as such with many of the trustees; certainly, as analysis of negotiations shows, it was not negotiated as such until after the strike began (one year after negotiations began). Second, teachers believed that there should be contract progress in both salary and staffing, rather than a trade-off, one or the other. While industry has recently emphasized job protection through reduction in salaries (some trustees felt that teachers were jeopardizing job security by pushing for higher salaries, and maintenance of the retirement gratuity), teachers apparently believed such a compromise was inapplicable, despite economic pressures. Third, and perhaps most important, teachers and the SBE held opposite opinions about the effect of a lower PTR on the quality of education in the system. The teachers' major concern was to decrease the PTR for the basic and modified programs where, they claimed, 117 classes contained more students than the number recommended by the Ministry of Education guidelines. But the system PTR itself was an issue as well. The very existence of these special programs requiring a lower PTR had, according to the teachers, resulted in an overloading of academic classes to the detriment of the "well-adjusted, motivated student"

who "deprived of the personal contact that a smaller class provides ... is overwhelmed by the sheer physical presence of his many classmates [and] feels almost anonymous" (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 45). Finally, the teachers argued, the fact of declining enrolment was also, in conjunction with a fixed PTR, affecting both class size and the number of school programs which could be offered. In sum, the teachers believed that, in order to maintain the same quality of program with declining enrolment, the system PTR must be decreased.

Underlying the teachers' viewpoint was the conviction that class size does affect the quality of education. Not only does the student lose because of less personal contact with the teacher, but the teacher, also, is less able to teach well in a large class. Several teachers the authors talked with informally spoke about their own "magic number" class, which brought out the best in them as teachers--too large a class made them feel out of touch, less able to communicate ideas and generate interest. One teacher added that too few students similarly affected the quality of his teaching.

The SBE stated flatly to the Fact Finder, "There is no evidence to suggest the reduction in PTR will improve the quality of education." Some trustees conceded that class size, after a certain point, would affect the quality of education but that this point was not relevant to the debate over whether the PTR ought to be adjusted to the teachers' request, since the present PTR was similar to the rest of the province and was satisfactory. Such a reduction would cost taxpayers an additional \$1.3 million, while the returns to the system in quality would be negligible. Thus, trustees did not take teachers' quality of education argument seriously and tended to see the staffing issue as simply one of job protection. Before, and during the strike, the SBE administration spent much time calculating the projected enrolment and, given attrition, how many real jobs were at risk. Indeed, in reaction to the teachers' adamant stand on staffing, the chairman of the negotiation team commented just before the strike, "We have never yet had to let go a teacher on permanent contract for redundancy" (personal notes). The SBE position on job protection was entirely sympathetic but it valued the flexibility of informal protection, something which, despite the record, teachers did not trust particularly because future protection by attrition was not going to be enough.

Trustees were sympathetic about the gradual loss of teaching jobs, and were willing to assist teachers in finding means to soften this situation, but they were not willing to do so at such enormous cost. Teachers believed that trustees were "absentee landlords," managing classrooms about which they had little comprehension:

They have a different perception than we do. They think you can trade for one or the other or that if they offer enough money the teachers will settle. Ultimately, I suppose, if they did, they would, but they tend to offer the going rate and do not believe us when we say that the extra staff for the programs they wish to offer is necessary ... we detect that the class size in these programs is increasing, creeping upward ... you can counter, as the Board does, that we have as many big ones as small ones, but while you can get the behaviour modification you are looking for in the small ones you sure can't in the big ones; it's not fair to talk about averages because it doesn't work that way ... if teachers say this is what is needed to get your objectives, believe us too because we are in the classrooms and know what it is like. [TSS interview data]

In other words, teachers viewed PTR and salaries as two separate matters--how many teachers were needed to run a good system, and what they should be paid to provide

this service. They believed the SBE equated the two within a monetary perspective, willing to put money budgeted on salaries or jobs, whichever they thought would get a settlement, and either one at the cost of the other.

In interviewing the respondents about the issue of staffing, the authors felt that what remained entirely unexamined was the quality of education itself. The teacher quoted above was implying that "behaviour modification" was certainly an important element in providing a good education for some of the students at least. Teachers' comments about the better motivated students (implying, perhaps, that the less motivated needed to be stimulated), who begin to feel anonymous in large classes, suggest that good education includes, and perhaps depends upon, personal growth through interaction with the teacher. The TSS interview schedules raised questions with respondents about goals of education and the authors discovered, even without an adequate representation of teachers, that there is little consensus about what quality of education means, or ought to mean. It would seem pointless then to debate whether PTR affects quality until it becomes clearer what in fact PTR is supposed to affect and whether these elements are properly considered to be part of a quality education.

b) Positions of Responsibility. The existence of different positions of responsibility depend, like teachers' jobs in general, on pupil enrolment, but more directly on the number of periods taught as a result of that enrolment. Thus, in the 1976-77 contract, it was stated that a major headship in any subject area would be assigned in a school where 120 periods per week of that subject were being taught. An assistant head would be appointed at 140 periods and a second assistant at 175 periods. In the next two contracts, cutbacks were made also in the number of positions available by increases in the ratios. In 1977-78, appointment of an assistant head would occur at 145 periods.

In the 1979-80 negotiations, there were three issues on the table which affected the positions of responsibility. The first issue was the teachers' request for a new clause stating that all positions of responsibility be filled unless no person qualified for the position applied. The SBE objected to this wording, preferring the stipulation that the position be filled "unless no teacher, who, in the opinion of the Board, is competent for the position, applies" (Items Outstanding, p. 7). Both the SBE and the teachers seemed to agree that if positions of responsibility exist, they ought to be filled. What appears to underlie the difference in wording is tension between the two over the SBE's autonomy in determining what constitutes competency, and what is necessary for the Sudbury system.

The second issue concerned the method of determining those positions. The SBE proposed that in calculating the number of periods which would count towards positions of responsibility "where more than one credit is taught in a teaching period, only one period [would] be recognized in the calculation" (Items Outstanding, p. 8). In most cases, the SBE argued, really only one course of study is being taught. The teachers disagreed, objecting that the same amount of course preparation and evaluation is required by a department head whether the two credit "sections" are taught separately or placed together in one classroom. They regarded the SBE's proposal as an unfair cutting back of the possible number of positions available (about 14) and the cost of maintaining a variety of subjects, while getting from the existing heads as much work as before. The difference

here, then, between the two positions seemed to be about what, in fact, was happening in the classrooms with two credit sections--a matter for objective investigation.

The third issue concerned the ratios determining the appointment of assistant heads. The teachers proposed that a second assistant head be appointed at 175 (as in 1976-77) rather than 201 periods, while the SBE proposed that the first assistant be appointed at 180 rather than 145 periods. The teachers argued that cutbacks should not be tolerated in this area for several reasons: teachers need the motivation for promotion that such positions provide because there is no longer much opportunity for promotion otherwise. Also, there is increased need for such assistance because teachers are now more often required to teach outside their area of expertise, and because in one subject there are diverse areas of learning about which no single person (i.e., a single department head) can be expected to be fully knowledgeable. The trustees, however, saw staff as being more experienced and qualified than formerly and thus the need for such assistance less pressing. Further, they regarded such appointments--important in the past as a means of attracting good teachers to the system or holding them there--as no longer necessary. Again, there seemed to be differences of opinion stated but not substantiated on either side by any systematic study of the system. Without more serious discussion about these needs, the opinion of either is open to reductionist criticism.

c) Redundancy Procedures. In the two collective agreements previous to 1979, some new clauses were added, dealing with procedures for transfer and redundancies, and reflecting the increasing pressure of declining enrolment on teaching positions. Besides describing procedures, the 1977-78 contract required the SBE to prepare a seniority list indicating the order in which teachers were to be declared redundant, if this was necessary. However, the contract also stipulated that designation of redundant staff would occur according to the seniority list "providing the viability of a program within the school is not jeopardized," and provided a definition of the term "viability" to ensure, at least from the SBE's viewpoint, that educational needs were best served while the staff complement was being reduced. In 1978-79, further additions were made, such as a "recall list" for those who had been declared redundant. Nevertheless, a number of issues remained unresolved, both about the procedures themselves and, more particularly, about the seniority and viability criteria for declaring teachers redundant. The 1978-79 contract contained a letter of intent, which stated that a joint committee be formed to study the problem of redeployment of teachers affected by declining enrolment and closing of schools. Anxiety was not simply based on a hypothesis: closure of the first secondary school in the area was scheduled for the following year.

Both sides, then, entered the 1979-80 negotiations agreeing that a new article was necessary which would better define procedures to be followed in transferring teachers and in declaring them redundant. However, on a number of details about these procedures (which will not be described here), there was no agreement. In general, the teachers were anxious to protect jobs and salaries as much as possible, while the SBE wished to cut back costs and to consider any such changes in the light of needs of the whole system. Thus, the teachers proposed, for example, that principals and vice-principals affected by a school closing continue to be paid as such, whether or not there were positions immediately available for them. The SBE wished to determine annually the appointments of principals and vice-principals to specific schools on the basis of "relative competency and seniority" with the SBE (in that order); and to place surplus principals and vice-principals in

vice-principal and department head positions, thereby "bumping" people in these positions, and to reduce their salaries accordingly and gradually over a two-year period. The teachers believed this would be deleterious to the morale of the entire staff because many more than those directly affected by a school closure could possibly be bumped by this kind of domino approach. Further, they objected that clear judgments about the "relative competence" of staff members would be difficult to make. One respondent stated:

... the problem with redundancy being applied according to the viability of program rather than straight seniority is that it is far more likely to be arbitrary and it could be dependent on the personal views of the particular people involved. We need guarantees for due process--whatever it is--then there will be protection from personality conflicts. ... Those who espouse [viability] make a tacit generalization that the youngest teachers are the best and the oldest the worst ... like the mentality, when the students do well you congratulate them; when they do poorly, it's the teacher's fault.

A more fundamental difference between the SBE and teachers existed regarding criteria for determining teacher surplus. Teachers believed that decisions ought to be based on seniority alone; the SBE (wishing to protect the viability of programs in the system) believed that teachers with less seniority but with needed expertise in a subject area should be retained. Teachers with more seniority but less competency in an area vital to the system's particular needs should be declared surplus. Also, this would be cheaper for the SBE. Several trustees expressed great indignation over "union" attempts to infringe on their right to manage the educational system to best serve student interest. This issue generated an emotional debate second only to the one concerning PTR. Each side criticized the other for sacrificing fairness (quality of education by teachers, and concern for staff by the SBE) to pragmatic interests.

The SBE also proposed that teachers who were hired after September 1 not be included on the seniority list for purposes of determining the list for transfer or redundancy. The teachers objected that all teachers on a full-time basis should be treated the same. It seemed to them that the SBE's motive for such a proposal was to make the redundancy list appear shorter than it really was.

Workload

Previous to the 1979 negotiations, the collective agreements contained no clauses specifying teacher workload. The SBE preferred a more flexible arrangement whereby workload was, in general, determined by the SBE policy but altered, if necessary, by the school principal. Thus, most teachers, according to the SBE's policy, taught six credit courses per year (the equivalent of 75 per cent of the school day) but occasionally seven, if it seemed that the school as a whole could offer a better program or that extremely large classes could be avoided. Nevertheless, appended to the 1977-78 collective agreement were two letters of intent relevant to workload. The first directed principals to assign lunch-time supervision duties equitably and, if possible, to lessen such duties for the teachers involved in a significant amount of extracurricular time. The second letter directed principals to use supply rather than full-time teachers to replace teachers absent for a full day or more. These additions suggest that the teachers' federation and/or the SBE were trying to control, by means of the collective agreement, some aspects of principals' administration in the school--perhaps as a necessary alternative to the use of the educational hierarchy within the system.

In 1979, however, the teachers sought to advance these minor specifications further by having teaching load--in the regular program, six credit courses--defined in the contract (as they said had already been done by over half the other boards in the province). Where such a workload might be exceeded or, for example, when a teacher replaced an absent colleague, he/she should be paid one-sixth of a day's pay for each additional class taught. Also, teachers should have a reduction in supervisory duties to permit them to do the extra marking and give students extra assistance, as required. The teachers also wished to limit the number of pupil/period contacts (PPC) per teacher per year (e.g., a teacher with six credit courses in the regular program should have no more than 180 PPCs). For other levels of instruction, lower PPCs were proposed.

Obviously, a workload article raises the debate about PTRs once again, and the underlying issues about quality of education and job protection. The teachers argued to the Fact Finder that 10 per cent (84) of the teachers in the Sudbury system were teaching seven rather than six credit courses per year, a situation producing two undesirable results: it decreased required staff by 14 when teacher jobs were already in short supply; it increased stress for the 84 teachers affected, reduced their effectiveness, and created an impersonal atmosphere in the seven classrooms of each of those 84 teachers.

To put such clauses concerning workload into a contract would, in the view of the SBE, greatly reduce the principal's flexibility in maintaining a quality program with the available staff resources. Even if the teachers were to make some gains in PTR in this contract and, as a consequence, the size of some classes was reduced, nevertheless, in a given school, it still might be more advantageous to the overall program for the principal to occasionally assign an extra credit course to a teacher. Further, if program standards were to be maintained, the workload article would likely increase staffing, with cost to the SBE beyond that already resulting from a lower PTR.

While this was not stated in the teachers' Report to the Fact Finder, the authors were also told by a teacher negotiator that the loss of the principal's power to assign an extra class to a teacher was necessary because sometimes this was being abused:

Part of the problem is that the flexibility also depends on the expertise of the timetabler; one of the problems was that the number of pupils being taught, and periods, increased in some schools above the average for the system, pointing the finger clearly at certain individuals, hence proposals from some schools to limit the class size and workload; each year these would come from some schools but would not be supported by representatives from other schools because they don't recognize that problem ... whether or not the system is better off with this [tying staffing down in a contract], certainly the teachers are, since there is a tendency to run the system as cheap as you can. So if the teachers get along with a particular PTR, they try to nudge it upward to see if they can get away with it.

Underlying the workload issue were questions not only about job protection and quality of education, but also about the role and prerogatives of the principal and, implicitly, about where a principal's loyalty lies, since he/she is both an administrator on behalf of the SBE and a member (as a teacher) of the OSSTF.

In the agreements previous to 1979, there were clauses dealing with the status and implementation of the contract and with procedures for complaints or grievances about infractions. These were to be dealt with through a Staff Relations Committee, composed of members of the branch affiliates and a grievance officer (1977-78), who reviewed such problems and acted on behalf of the teacher(s) involved, according to a series of steps outlined in the agreement. In the 1979 negotiations, both teachers and the SBE proposed several changes to complaint and grievance procedures, arising directly from grievances filed by either side in the previous year. Further, the teachers proposed several changes that would provide more effective means for a teacher to challenge an alleged infraction and would require the SBE (trustees and administrative officers) to act in a more open and consistent manner in running the school system. These proposals were important because, if implemented, they would not only improve grievance procedures, but also extend the limits of a teacher's right to complain, or grieve, beyond the bounds of the collective agreement itself.

a) Just Cause. In 1979, the teachers proposed a new clause in the collective agreement which would give a teacher the right to grieve "that his disciplinary demotion or disciplinary transfer (that is, involuntary nonsurplus transfer) is without just cause" (Items Outstanding, p. 3). They argued that such a clause should be included in any collective agreement as a fundamental protection for employees against arbitrary, inconsistent, or unjust decisions by an employer and that "the concept of 'just cause' has been supported in hearings at the level of the Supreme Court of Canada and such clauses are contained in all major industrial clauses" (Communications Bulletin, no. 11). The SBE, however, objected to such a proposal as unnecessary because teachers do have redress to a Board of Reference under the Education Act for such matters. But, more importantly, to write in such a clause would be to imply that the real world of trustee/teacher relations was a legalistic and impersonal one of management/union interests. While the trustees admitted that sometimes an unjust decision did occur which needed review and correction, they believed that a more specific and personal approach would be maintained if such problems were handled more informally. It would be better for SBE/staff relations in general and would foster a more trusting and honest atmosphere within the system. Indeed, they felt that to write such a clause into an agreement would cause a proliferation of grievances; teachers would more likely try it out, whether or not they were really convinced that a disciplinary action was unjust, simply because the mechanism existed.

b) The SBE Policy/Practice. Besides the collective agreement, there is also the SBE Policy Manual, which defines a number of matters affecting teachers, such as the management of schools and programs. When changes are made in the Policy Manual by the SBE, prior notice of such changes, as stipulated by the collective agreement, is given to the teachers, and if it is so requested, the OSSTF bargaining committee may meet with the SBE representatives to discuss these. However, the teachers thought that, beyond what was in the Policy Manual, there were standard practices affecting teachers as well, and similar notice should be given such changes. The teachers argued that, following casual consultation with them, unilateral decisions affecting the well-being of teachers and the effectiveness of programs were made. In defence of their position, they cited decisions that occurred in the recent past about the closure of some school rooms, and the role of physical education heads. Teachers are often best informed about the implications of such

decisions for the educational system, so their expertise should be consulted. Indeed, they should have "the right of challenge" to changes in SBE practice.

The SBE objected strenuously to such a proposal. First, "practices" covered many matters which were minor and difficult to define precisely. Second (as in the case of the proposed just cause clause), including the word practice would encourage the filing of grievances because there were so many ambiguous practices. Third, the SBE would be required to specify practices as rules. But the SBE believed the school system to be better served through flexibility and efficiency in ad hoc decision-making than through a proliferation of defined procedures and of meetings to defend them.

c) Teacher Evaluation. A specific SBE practice which affects and concerns teachers considerably is evaluation of their teaching skills. While teachers certainly agree on evaluation, they believe that evaluation procedures should be standardized throughout the system. It should be done in a way which is least threatening to the teacher, encouraging mutual discussion of the teacher's merits and insights, as well as faults. It should neither disrupt the flow of classroom work nor create an artificial situation in which the teacher must be evaluated. Because, in the teachers' view, these ideals are recognized and followed by some members of the SBE but not others, they proposed in the 1979 negotiations that guidelines for evaluation be written into the collective agreement.

The SBE recognized this problem and pointed out that steps were being taken to alleviate it by implementing uniformly the suggestions made by the evaluators. It did not believe that the proposed evaluation procedures, however excellent, belonged in a collective agreement. The SBE's and the teachers' attitudes about the purpose and value of the collective agreement were different. The teachers believed that a collective agreement specifying such procedures would improve, rather than hamper, relations between the SBE and the staff:

We feel that this entire article can facilitate, even create communication and understanding between the teacher and his immediate superiors. The climate so created will surely enrich both parties to the ultimate benefit of those most concerned, the students. [OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder, p. 78]

In contrast, the interviewers found, in talking with trustees and superintendents, a general attitude that the more a collective agreement "legalized" the relationship between the SBE and teachers, the more communication and understanding would be replaced by "letter of the law" behaviour. People would tend to do no less and no more than was required and paid for; a shift from professional responsibility to union mentality. To those TSS respondents, the collective agreement should only regulate matters not easily resolvable and not directly related to educational matters; primarily, salary, benefits, jobs, and grievances.

Others, including teachers and community leaders, rejected such a view as paternalistic, certainly outmoded, and unrealistic in regarding those in the teaching "profession" as different from people in other kinds of work. Teachers were similar, in their need to have job protection in any area affecting their well-being and interests, professional or otherwise; and in their desire to be so protected as a priority over other job-related concerns.

The District Grievance Officer (DGO) in his report to the OSSTF District 31 Fall Assembly (November 1979) made the following observations about grievances over the previous two years:

The box score is 14 wins against the Board, 6 losses and 3 pending arbitration decisions. Bill 100 has ended the old paternalistic relationship between Boards and teachers. No longer are administrative decisions accepted without question but are subject to appeal on a grievable or non-grievable basis. ... Unfortunately some of the Board's administrators are still under the impression that their decisions are not subject to scrutiny by the lowly classroom teacher but this false impression will disappear with time and "education."

d) Anti-harassment. In fall 1979, the teachers added another proposal, reflecting two grievances which had been filed and won by the teachers affected in September 1979. According to their presentation to the Fact Finder, and the report of the DGO to the OSSTF Fall Assembly, these teachers had filed grievances "alleging harassment due to a previous grievance" under a clause newly added to the 1978-79 Agreement:

No teacher shall have any harsh or unusual changes made to his/her terms of employment due to that teacher initiating Articles XIX, XX, or XXII of the Collective Agreement. These changes may include workload and positions of responsibility. [1978-1979 Agreement, p. 31]

Because of these grievances, the teachers argued that an anti-harassment clause, to protect teachers who did pursue a grievance from future repercussions, should be part of the collective agreement. They appealed to the Labour Relations Act, which states that employees should have such protection, in defence of their proposal. The SBE, arguing from a different perspective about trustee/teacher relations, thought such a clause would generate more problems than it would resolve, and deemed it unnecessary.

In sum, it is evident from the issues and viewpoints regarding the need for various kinds of employee protection that there was tension about the relationship between the SBE and its teachers. Tension grew as OSSTF activity was becoming more oriented towards "union" goals--though not many unions have been able to get these types of restrictions on management. Also, there were different attitudes about the purpose and value of the collective agreement with regard to this relationship, and what, therefore, ought to be included in it. To typify the conflict regarding employee protection, as some did in the interviews, as a struggle between management and union rights, is to overlook this more fundamental difference of perspective. Whether the trustees' view of the role of the collective agreement necessarily equalled paternalism, or the teachers' view would inevitably result in legalism, were questions which were not raised, though they were implicit in the debates about the above issues.

Summer School and Night School

While some school boards in Ontario include summer and night school in their collective agreements, the SBE does not. In 1979, inclusion of the salary scale for principals and teachers in these categories became an important goal for the local OSSTF. The teachers argued that a great injustice was being done to those who were teaching credit courses during the summer or at night because they were being paid less than teachers in the regular school program, although they were assuming an equivalent amount of work. Citing salary figures for the previous four years, one teacher commented: "This represents an

increase of 12.6 per cent over a four-year period, when inflation rate itself has been almost that high in any one of those years." Though the teachers did not state this, they implied that these salary scales should be included in the collective agreement as the only way to rectify the injustice. They also pointed out that if all credit course teachers were paid at the same rate, teachers affected by declining enrolment who could not get full-time employment during the regular school year could supplement their income by teaching credit courses at summer or night school. In summer 1979, 1700 students took the 112 credit courses offered, representing the equivalent of 18.6 full-time teaching jobs.

The SBE objected to the teachers' proposal for several reasons. First, to implement it was perceived as too costly. While what the SBE paid these teachers was about \$250 less than a teacher in category 1 with no experience, the teachers' proposal would, in effect, place these teachers on the grid system. Thus, the SBE calculated (using 1978-79 SBE figures) that the cost of implementing the proposal would be \$168 731 (SBE, Report to the Fact Finder: Exhibits, p. 30). Second, several of the trustee respondents said they very much doubted that the OSSTF really had the interest of these teachers at heart. The issue was seen primarily as a means to generate jobs for full-time staff and, if this proposal were accepted, the "injustice" would be "rectified" by summer and night school teachers losing their jobs to SBE teachers on the redundancy list. Most importantly, the SBE refused to negotiate these salaries with the OSSTF because it believed that conditions of employment involving summer and night school staff did not belong in this collective agreement. To defend this view, the SBE cited a legal opinion derived from the Ontario School Trustees' Council--the recommendation that night and summer school teachers be excluded from collective agreements--and a decision of the Ontario Labour Relations Board, both referring to the scope and intent of Bill 100. The latter stated:

Nowhere in the Act, do we find any reference to summer school programs which is not a mandatory activity of a Board of Education but in the same order as evening classes and special education programs under section 147 of The Education Act and the whole scheme of the Act is to focus on relations between teachers and school Boards during the course of the regular school year as defined by The Education Act. [SBE, Report to the Fact Finder: Exhibits, p. 34]

Comparison of Respondents' Views About Issues

In earlier discussion, issues on the negotiating table, and a number of underlying perceptions about these issues by each side, were described in order to clarify what the negotiations were about. The perceptions presented there are what might be termed "public," that is, they are based on the documentation prepared by the two groups, and on statements made about them by spokesmen for the groups. The authors strove to present the issues fairly and to make no judgment about the validity or sincerity of the points of view expressed. Areas of incompatible perceptions, possible sources of misunderstanding, were pinpointed, requiring further and more fundamental examination of issues. This section is an analysis of individual responses by people making up the different groups affected by the strike (even as taxpayers). This will help to throw light on questions about whether both teams were communicating their concerns to each other, or to those not directly involved in the negotiations; about the support, or lack of it, each side received during the strike, or has since that time; and about the present educational concerns both within the system and Sudbury as a whole.

First of all, the perceptions and attitudes of the people interviewed in the "others" category will be discussed. This group, including those who discussed issues informally with the authors, is made up of subgroups which must be recognized--trustees (trustees on the negotiation team, other trustees); board officers (the executive and superintendents of schools); principals and vice-principals; federation leaders and community leaders (some associated with educational interests). Because of the nature of the questionnaire itself, and the very small number of respondents in each of the subgroups, the authors make no claim that the following findings are generalizable. Nevertheless, because the interviewers probed for very specific responses, we believe that the patterns of opinions discernible in this section of the study are worth reporting.

About the issues, an open-ended question was presented to the respondents: What do you think were the most important issues which were not being resolved in the 1979 negotiations and which eventually led to the strike in February 1980? In asking this question the interviewers were instructed to probe for (a) whether the respondent thought each side saw the same issues as being important; (b) which issues the respondent thought were the most contentious (but not necessarily the most important). The question was presented this way to permit the respondents to volunteer attitudes about the issues. Their answers reflected both what the two sides were saying officially and what the respondents were hearing them say, as filtered through their selective memories.

All respondents referred to salary and PTR (though not necessarily using those terms) as the two major issues. Workload was also frequently mentioned, but to a lesser degree. Only a few (almost never the community leaders) mentioned summer school, the SBE's proposed cutbacks, or employee protection clauses (just cause). Taking "others" as a whole, the TSS found that the most important issues identified were money (3.3 per cent), staffing (1.6 per cent), job security (4.9 per cent), or a combination of two or three of these factors (73.8 per cent). Only 8.2 per cent mentioned other issues, such as the just cause or contract-stripping.

Nevertheless, when responses were considered according to subgroup, the TSS found differences in the importance each issue had as a cause of breakdown in negotiations. Among all respondents, including trustees themselves, there was consensus that the major concern in the dispute was salary. Furthermore, trustees tended to give equal weight to salary and staffing when asked about teachers' priorities. No other group emphasized salary to this degree. While other respondents often translated staffing into economic terms, they identified staffing as the major issue. What staffing meant, however, was different for different groups. Trustees and SBE officers identified it simply as job protection. Very few volunteered comment about the teachers' quality of education concerns; when one did, he denied that this was a real concern. One SBE officer commented that if teachers really believed that a lower PTR produced better education, the issue would have surfaced before the problem of declining enrolment. Another said, "It bothered the Board that locals were concerned about job protection rather than with qualified people." A third said that the SBE was more concerned about the quality of education than "the vociferous minority [of teachers] running the show."

The question of SBE cutbacks (particularly sabbatical leave and retirement gratuity clauses) was raised frequently by both trustees and SBE officers (and only these groups), but there was no consensus about what importance either trustees or SBE officers placed on this. Generally, both regarded the proposed cutbacks as a negotiation tactic,

but seemed to react resentfully to the teachers' refusal to allow the SBE to take, as well as give, in negotiations. One trustee commented, "Industry gets things out, why shouldn't we?" Similarly, many trustees and SBE officers took the view that "teachers saw it as something less serious but good for propaganda." Nevertheless, one or two expressed the feeling that teachers took the stripping issues much more seriously than trustees believed.

In response to teachers' attempts to tie down items affecting education, such as transfer of teachers, workload, and teacher evaluation, in the collective agreement, trustees frequently referred to "managerial rights" of the employer to control the quality of the system, or expressed a frustration that the teacher requests showed they wanted "the benefits of the collective agreement but to be part of the club." Some trustees, though, took a more sympathetic attitude:

In 1969, teachers were campaigning for trustees. Three years later [sic] they were picketing. With the problem of job security, professionalism went out the window. Teachers are victims of Bill 100 because they are classed as labour. On the one hand they equate themselves with doctors and lawyers. Yet they want the 6500 local rights of negotiation.

Others were more inclined to take a "you've got what you asked for" attitude. For the trustees, these issues were peripheral to the problems of salaries, jobs, and economics. Community leaders with no educational association held the same attitude as trustees. Understandably, their views were more simply expressed as "wages and jobs." The issue of job protection was raised far more frequently than salary protection, and the quality of education and cutback issues almost never.

A striking contrast was presented by leaders in the wider educational community (the group includes only one member of another teachers' federation, though several former members), who generally recognized declining enrolment as a major problem but sympathized with teachers' concerns about class size. One respondent at the university level made the following statement:

I don't think that the reasons for the whole thing were clear--I don't think that the reasons for class size were appreciated. Parents argued that this was just an issue about job security but I don't buy this at all. There is genuine concern here [among teachers].

Another, identifying trustees' views with that of the Minister of Education, stated flatly, "Stephenson is out to lunch. Would she agree that a doctor could see 100 patients a day and give them individual attention?" This group also expressed the issues causing difficulty as a power struggle between trustees and teachers about who should control the educational system. One respondent stated, "It was a spin-off from declining enrolment; who is going to decide who gets let go and how do we establish priorities for programs?" Another said that trustees see what teachers want--more control of the system--as taking away their "rights."

What was most distinctive about the perspective of the "middle men" in the educational system--superintendents of schools and principals--was that these respondents (in describing the issues as well as in answering other questions) identified with neither trustees nor teachers. They referred to both as "them" or "the board" and "the teachers," rather than as "they" and "we," and discussed critically the points of view of both sides

as sometimes sincere and sometimes unrealistic in their positions. These respondents, of those within the system, also were least confident that they knew what the issues really were, that they were being given an objective assessment, or that they knew what the resolution of the issues should be. Underlying this uncertainty was their recognition that teachers do need some protection and that they do have a valuable contribution to make to planning in the system. They felt unionization to be inappropriate, both in the sense that it tends to work against educational values, and that it conflicts with the image of teaching as a profession. One SBE officer made a comment about the personal reactions of this group, which the interviewers found to be well justified:

The strike was harder on those who have come up through the school system and have friendships with the teaching staff. A lot of people don't accept the fact that there is a collective agreement with a union. This has to temper how you handle a situation.

Thus, this middle group, like the respondents in education outside the system, interpreted the issue as a struggle for control of the system. One respondent summed it up this way:

The strike issues were money, PTR, and tenure. They were about sharing decision-making, decisions about what programs are viable, who is really surplus, about open timetabling to inspection of other teachers ... about the amount of time that makes up a teacher's working day.

In their responses, this group of respondents came closest to expressing the views of the authors (developed in the next chapter), that there were many complex questions underlying differences between the two sides which remained unexamined, and which contributed to the breakdown in negotiations. Struggle for control of the system was a way of identifying this conflict of principles. The general attitude of federation negotiators can only be reported from the way it was expressed in the documentation. One negotiator, willing to discuss the teachers' point of view in detail, identified staffing, representing both jobs and quality of education, as the teachers' major focus, and commented about the priority of other issues:

I don't think that the Sudbury teachers would strike for money unless it was very very poor--and the Sudbury money is not (though we were sinking fast) ... [during the strike] there were 13 issues on the table ... they would strike on one of these--for example, the transfer clause ... teachers are highly principled and would not sit still for this. ... It is true that when we sit down to the table we expect to get something we didn't have before ... but for the most part are we getting ... or are we responding to things which have happened which are unfair? ... Trustees have a mental attitude that the public won't pay more but surveys have shown that it would be prepared to pay more if it could be shown that the quality would improve. ... We weren't scared about that [contract-stripping items] but they sure made wonderful issues to strike on because we knew we could get them ... the previous years they had put them back just before settlement.

A respondent in the community, who took part in negotiations with another group of educators, summarized the problem at the bargaining table in 1979:

No one questions that their budget is right. Service does not equal money. We must begin by asking what are we here for and do it within the resources available. The most important quality is the commitment of the teacher ... unions by the very nature of the beast are there to protect jobs of their members. They are also there to protect the weakest link of their members ... educational unions should be more concerned about the quality of the individual providing the

service ... they get all excited about protecting the weakest when they should be concerned about protecting the strongest ... they tend to deal with the ten per cent problems and generalize.

This view, though expressed only by this respondent (but typical of respondents who, through personal friendship or work, were more informed on negotiations), is critical of the polarized positions on both sides and concerned to resolve the perplexing idea of a unionized profession.

The following observations can be made:

1. The interviews confirmed and contributed to the analysis of issues based on documentation presented, and of underlying and unexamined questions which the authors suggested were present there.
2. Division within the larger community, expressed by impartial people, about the PTR issue (i.e., job protection versus quality of education) reflects the division at the table and confirmed the genuineness of the different attitudes expressed by the two sides.
3. Though the respondents were asked about the issues more than a year after the documents were written, the perceptions and attitudes of those closely involved--except the middle group--have remained relatively fixed, despite the strike. Respondents were asked at the end of the interview what they learned, if anything, from the strike. None had reevaluated either teachers' or trustees' points of view on any matter. If the strike was generated partly by a "heard-it-all-before" attitude regarding the issues, it did not resolve this.
4. A pattern emerged in the responses, related to respondents' access to negotiation details, in that the more a respondent knew about the issues, the less willing he/she was to agree with either party, and the more he/she attempted to examine them objectively.

Summary Analysis of Issues

The issues important to the teachers during the 1979 negotiations were complex, though neither new nor unique to the Sudbury negotiations. Some issues (e.g., COLE, PTR and workload, just cause) were major in scope. Collectively, they represented a very large agenda, and teachers were not prepared to sacrifice. In particular, they wished to achieve gains on both cost-of-living and staffing clauses. To trustees, neither was the large agenda unique to 1979, nor did it indicate that this negotiating year was to be different. Possibly that fact that a settlement had customarily been achieved by focusing on one or two major items obscured what offer from them would bring about a settlement. Indeed, trustees and board officers felt that teachers didn't know themselves what this would be.

The issues were major in scope partly because they reflected the disturbing effects of declining enrolment and a difficult economy. In some ways, teachers' expectations about what should be in a contract to ensure fairness--protection against inflation, loss of jobs, exploitation, or paternalism within the educational hierarchy--were in tune with the expectations of labour negotiations in our society. The teachers felt that they

should not be expected to accept lower wages to help fight inflation, any more than other workers. In fact, a certain bitterness remained from several years earlier when their settlements had been overruled by the Anti-Inflation Board.

The issues were also determined to an extent by the provincial OSSTF, which outlines the bargaining objectives for each year. As one principal commented, "Many teachers don't realize that they have to bargain for various objectives if they want the Federation support. For example, this year there is something about maternity leave which the team has to go after," and he added, "They have to do it although sometimes their hearts are not in it." The authors do not know what the provincial OSSTF objectives were for 1979-80. However, for 1980-81, the local provincial councillor reported to the 1979 District 31 Fall Assembly that the objectives fell into four areas (very similar to the major issues in the 1979 negotiations):

1. Job security clauses
2. Improvement of staffing ratios
3. Improvement of current levels of real income
4. The maintenance and improvement of conditions of work and benefit programs
 - maximizing tax advantages from benefit plans
 - teacher funded leaves
 - just cause
 - protecting positions of responsibility.

This person also reported that the Ontario Teachers' Federation (OTF) was attempting to "change the Act and Regulations to allow occasional teachers to be statutory members of OTF and the affiliates as well as members of the branch affiliate for bargaining purposes." This would resolve the disagreement between the SBE and teachers about including summer school teachers in the collective agreement. Meanwhile, if it were already part of some agreements in the province, the OTF lobby would have more weight.

It is probable, then, that the proposed salary savings sharing plan and the sabbatical leave with salary holdback plan were recommended as OSSTF objectives, as well as the more general summer school, workload, staffing, and COLE clauses and resistance to cutbacks in the sabbatical and retirement gratuity plans. It is also probable, since the provincial councillor--a member of the local OSSTF executive for several years--was chief negotiator for the previous contract and played a large role in the conduct of the strike and related matters, that the provincial objectives were very important to him.

At the same time, it was evident that the OSTC was consulted about what belonged in the contract and what point of view to take on issues. Here, too, the leadership was probably conscious of a provincial perspective. Several trustees had been for some time on the salary committee and prominent at the provincial level. The chairman of the SBE (a member of the OSTC for the past 35 years), who was a member of the bargaining team, had been president of the Canadian School Trustees' Association.

The issues also represented a growing trend, evident in previous contracts, towards federation-related clauses and a specification of the responsibilities and duties of trustees and staff. The number of terms, conditions, and procedures specified by the agreement was growing; for example, the meaning of seniority and seniority lists, viability of program, redundant teachers, and rights of recall.

Analysis revealed that the two sides differed in principle and attitude on many aspects, and gave priority to different issues. Therefore, bargaining would necessarily be difficult, because of inevitable communication problems at the outset. To resolve most issues would require not merely a closing of the gap in quantitative terms but a compromise of strongly held principles. Because some issues were ambiguous, allowing very different rationales (job protection and quality of education, for example, could both be used to defend PTR), there was an inherent potential for emotional conflict and hostility. This potential extended into the community because issues based on principle could lend themselves to propaganda and misrepresentation. There were three issues that might be confusing:

1. Salary. Because the grid system has a built-in yearly increment for teachers who are below their pay-category ceiling, a new agreement supersedes the old one by increasing each pay level above the increment a teacher expects. Thus, before negotiations begin in any given year, the teachers feel that the board is already morally, if not technically, committed to a certain increase in salary costs (about half a million dollars in Sudbury); this increase may or may not be added to the total costing of a new agreement, depending on whether one speaks about the increase of costs to the taxpayer from one year to the next, or about the cost of the increase in the new offer or settlement over the previous agreement.
2. Pupil/Teacher Ratio. The reason why the system PTR is lower than the actual size of many classes and why a number of classes, even in the academic program, are smaller than others is not easy to explain, even to teachers. According to principals, teachers sometimes take umbrage at being "loaded down" with extra students, although student distribution is a product of school variables--e.g., options, special programs, subjects taught in a second language, a small or large student population. Further, regarding the effects of decreased PTR on number of jobs, when the SBE stated that teachers requested 52 "more" teachers, it is not clear whether the SBE would be paying 52 more salaries than it had been or 52 more than it would pay if the enrolment remained the same. In other words, would the SBE be giving work to 52 more teachers than were presently teaching?
3. Workload. It is not clear what constitutes a teacher's working day or responsibilities. For example, why do teachers accept supervisory duties and extracurricular involvement as part of their workload and yet ask that teachers who teach a single credit course rather than six (either as a replacement or at summer or night school) be paid one-sixth of the salary of a full-time teacher?

It seems strange, after years of negotiations and a number of strikes generating bad public feeling, that no conventions have been established to permit meaningful communication about the issues to staff, other trustees, and the public, thus preventing manipulation of opinion. Both parties were clear about the issues themselves, though differences arose about the actual costing of the various proposals. A number of questions underlying differences in principle were not really addressed. Should they be addressed at the bargaining table? Or apart from negotiations?

People strike about issues--those on the table and those perhaps "under the table." Sometimes they strike about other things, using the particular issues on the table as the occasion for imposing sanctions on their employer. Similarly, because two

negotiation teams differ substantially about issues does not necessarily mean a strike. What causes people to strike about issues certainly has something to do with the issues themselves; in the case of the 1980 Sudbury secondary school teachers' strike, the issues were complex and far-reaching enough to contribute to a breakdown in negotiations.

What happened while the two teams were negotiating these issues in 1979 prior to the strike is the subject of the next chapter. Only in the light of this history is it possible to see to what extent the differences between the two teams caused the teachers to request and get a strike vote from their federation members; and what other factors also contributed.

Introduction: The 1978 Negotiations

It is possible to argue that the 1980 strike was a culmination of conditions and events that could be traced back for years. Undoubtedly, the strike had its roots in specific circumstances in the local educational system preceding the December 1979 strike vote by Sudbury secondary school teachers. It would have been useful to trace and illustrate such causal relationships, but this task was beyond the resources available to the TSS. Nevertheless, a number of respondents believed that the strike had been in the making for several years. A teacher negotiator made this observation:

There was an attitude that we had settled short for a number of years, but this year it was to be our turn. The year before we were almost there but we settled short and inflation did something terrible. The strength and attitude began building in the staff that there could be one--if there was ever going to be a strike it was going to be that year, and so you plan your tactics according to the power that you yield. ... If you ask if we could have settled without a strike then, I hesitate to say no. Sooner or later there would be one. Well, if not this year, then next.

The formal interviews and informal discussions held with people involved in the Sudbury educational field, together with information culled from local newspaper reports and other written sources, all suggest that the atmosphere preceding the 1978 negotiations, and the subsequent agreement signed in October of that year, were characterized by three major areas of concern. These concerns remained as a legacy for the 1979 negotiations between the SBE and teachers. The first concern related to teachers and involved:

1. Dissatisfaction, anger, and frustration over the low rates of monetary settlements, dictated by AIB rules, in the years 1975 to 1978.
2. Previous monetary gains were being eroded by the inflationary spiral, and future prospects of catching up were not promising, even after the removal of AIB controls.
3. The size of the Sudbury Board of Education, the diversity of its programs, including an unusually large number of students at the basic and modified levels (12 per cent), a substantial French-language program, as well as the anticipation of further program changes (e.g., introduction of a special education program, and french immersion at the secondary level), all created problems for the board in planning programs, school space, staffing, and other resources. This was further complicated by a dropping enrolment (4.7 per cent the previous year), an increasing per student cost to the taxpayer, and decreasing grants (i.e., in percentage terms, not in dollar figures). These factors all had implications for teachers' jobs, workload, and creative teaching in the classroom.
4. Tension was generated within the educational hierarchy and the staff about the need for teacher input to ensure a policy formulated primarily on educational values rather than economic exigencies. Public concern was also growing about possible school

closures, increased busing, and value for the tax dollar, and trustees were becoming more conscious of their political image.

The second concern referred to perceptions and evaluation of public schools and teachers by Canadians at large. Much publicity was given to first-year university students who could not compose a simple sentence in English, or who were ignorant of Canadian history and geography. A national study conducted by Mel Hurtig in 1975 found serious gaps in knowledge about Canada among secondary school students across all provinces. At the same time, the press played up stories of people with M.A. or Ph.D. degrees driving taxi cabs for a living. Questions were asked: Was the educational system doing its job? Was it all a waste of people's tax dollars?

Two large opinion polls indicated disenchantment with public educational systems and with teachers. The Gallup Poll of May 1978 asked if parents were satisfied with the education their children were getting. The national results showed a significant decrease in the level of satisfaction since 1973. At that time, 51 per cent of Canadians were satisfied, 41 per cent were dissatisfied, and 8 per cent did not know. In 1978, only 34 per cent were satisfied, 53 per cent were dissatisfied, and 13 per cent did not know. In Ontario, 36 per cent were satisfied and 51 per cent were dissatisfied. Differences between national and Ontario samples were not significant.

The second opinion survey, based on 1121 telephone interviews in 32 of Canada's largest urban centres, was carried out by Weekend Magazine and published on 9 September 1978. Of the total, 59 per cent considered modern teachers less, or much less, dedicated than in the past; 15 per cent considered them more, or somewhat more, dedicated; and 21 per cent thought there was no change (the remaining 5 per cent did not respond). Asked about teachers' salaries, 46 per cent said they were about right, 18 per cent, too low, and 23 per cent, too high. Ontario respondents considered teachers overpaid.

Prominent individuals like Lloyd Dennis, co-author of the Hall-Dennis Report, Living and Learning, criticized the educational system and pronounced teachers' strikes as dehumanizing for everyone involved. It is likely that the much publicized teachers' strikes in Toronto, Ottawa, Windsor, and elsewhere in Ontario contributed to the general public image of teachers and had some bearing on the 1978 and 1979 negotiations in Sudbury. This indirect evidence suggests that teachers had to assume a more defensive stand, while the SBE saw the opinion polls as leverage to reject teachers' demands, relying on public support for its position.

The response to the TSS study by federation representatives, as well as by individual principals and teachers, indicated that such a defensive attitude does exist in the system. There is no way of knowing if these people reflect the attitude of Sudbury teachers in general, or if their feelings result from the events of the strike. Nevertheless, one member of the OSSTF executive said, "The public didn't like us then and it doesn't like us now." Other comments were, "Teachers are paranoid," "if I could get out of teaching I would," and "teachers are afraid of the public."

The third concern stemmed from economic conditions of that time. As noted earlier, 1977 was a year of massive layoffs of workers from the two largest local employers, INCO and Falconbridge. This blow to the local economy and its residential

taxation base* was accentuated by a six-week shutdown of operations at INCO in July and August 1978. The layoffs and the shutdown were a prelude to the strike of the hourly paid workers at INCO (from 15 September 1978 to 3 June 1979). A total of 11 700 workers, representing over 9000 families, prepared for a long confrontation with the employer. They had to dip into savings since strike pay of \$30 weekly for a couple, with an additional \$3 for each dependent child, was not even sufficient to meet the basic food requirements. Other workers, and many small businesses dependent for their livelihood on INCO workers' wages, experienced economic hardships through the "ripple effect" of diminished monetary resources in the community.

Under this economic situation, city council passed a budget containing only a minimal increase for general municipal needs but an 8 per cent increase for education, bringing this portion to \$27 744 172. Noting that 77.12 per cent of this was towards teachers' salaries and that the province had decreased its support to the SBE by 7 per cent, the local press urged a need for fiscal caution, given the economic state of Sudbury at the time. Also, because of declining enrolment, no more schools should be built, no further teachers hired, and a moratorium placed on the training of new teachers. In general, the editorials in the Sudbury Star urged the SBE, and all elected politicians, to practise restraint and hold the line on spending.

According to one informant, the SBE tried to deal with the loss of teacher jobs as sympathetically as possible. To that time (and they hoped this would continue), secondary school teachers deemed redundant could be retained because of dropouts through normal attrition. Though there was a difference of 56 teachers between 1978 and 1979, no permanent staff member, according to SBE members, had been laid off. To this end, a formal SBE measure was initiated--i.e., postponing the hiring date for one month to allow teachers thinking of retiring or resigning to do so. However, the SBE felt it could not justify keeping on surplus teachers at \$15 000 to \$20 000 each. Some trustees also felt that the OSSTF/AEFO leaders were inflexible to this approach as a solution to the problem of surplus teachers: "They were shortsighted in 1978," said one trustee, "concerned only with immediate problems." Another felt they were taking little initiative in finding new "consumers" for the teachers' expertise. Nevertheless, the authors found that the local OSSTF had submitted a brief to the Ministry of Education in January 1978, urging that redundant teachers be kept busy teaching older people, housewives, and special needs groups, thus creating a need for more teachers.

Some TSS teacher and community leader respondents felt that the SBE administration was unsympathetic to the plight of the teachers facing declining enrolment and unfavourable local economic conditions. One teacher respondent from this group claimed that in 1978 the SBE was already using declining enrolment and the "poor image" teachers had at the time to "intimidate the teachers, telling us to sharpen up."

It is not clear if accusations, made by some trustees, of a high rate of teacher absenteeism and other unethical practices were a part of this "sharpen up" indicator. This matter was given some publicity. The Sudbury Star (25 April 1978) reported that principals were over-generous with personal leaves of absence for secondary school teachers, resulting

* The laid-off workers were consumers and potential, or actual, property owners. Many of them left Sudbury by 1979-80.

in 956 days lost in January 1978 alone. The cost for supply teachers was \$62 140. This report also mentioned that the schools had lax rules, inconsistencies, and nepotism. It was also claimed that "close to 30 per cent of those who call in sick take time off for personal reasons." A probe was ordered and, following a study conducted by the SBE Director, these accusations were determined to be largely unfounded. Nonetheless, this matter contributed to the growing strain between the SBE and teachers in the following years.

These three areas of concern, though rather indefinite in nature, nevertheless provided a strained atmosphere for the 1979 negotiations. Few of the tabled issues were discussed in public; negotiations were conducted in camera; the public was informed briefly on 2 June 1978 that they were taking place. No details were given regarding teachers' demands or the SBE position. On 4 August 1978, the SBE negotiation team chairman said that the key issue under debate at that point was class size, and that there were hopeful signs of a settlement in the near future. Subsequently, there was the usual news blackout in effect between August 8 and the time agreement was reached in October 1978. Obviously, both sides considered it unnecessary, or unwise, to publicize details prior to settlement. This was common practice and contrasted sharply with the extensive publicity given by both sides to their positions during the strike between February and May 1980. As a footnote, the 1981 negotiations reverted to secrecy, with few details available to SBE ratepayers.

On 28 October 1978, the Sudbury Star reported that an agreement was reached between the SBE and public secondary school teachers, resulting in salary increases ranging between 4.5 per cent and 10.3 per cent for an average increase, including the 7.71 per cent increment for experience. The federations negotiated a slightly improved staffing formula, which reduced the general-level PTR from 20.6 to 20.35 and saved eight teaching positions. A clause allowed for leave without pay in hopes of avoiding possible layoffs, and there was a recall clause whereby laid-off teachers were to be first to be rehired when vacancies occurred. Despite the fact that the monetary settlement was substantially less than the teachers had requested, according to the SBE, the 1978 settlement was \$550 000 over the grant ceiling, and it would be up to the ratepayers to cover this gap.

The 1978 agreement was reached with clear indications on the part of the SBE that the projected declining enrolment would necessitate further and substantial layoffs in 1979. According to the Sudbury Star (15 December 1978), a workshop, with a visiting expert on motivation, was organized for SBE principals and administrators to help them cope with expected problems of teacher morale stemming from inevitable staff redundancies. In general, teachers were not happy with the 1978 settlement, but were persuaded to accept it because of the poor economic status of the community at the time. Two additional factors have some bearing on the 1979 negotiations:

1. Because of the relatively late date the agreement was reached, there was only a short "cooling-off" period before the next round of negotiations began in 1979.
2. It is not certain if the chairman of the OSSTF/AEFO negotiation committee was held responsible for what was seen by the teachers as "a very poor deal." However, this person was a prominent influence on 1979 and 1980 negotiations, through his position as chairman of Communications for the OSSTF and as a member of the Rules Committee. Available material issued by Communications and by the Rules Committee shows that the teachers had to assume a hard line, or a militant position, in their demands, rather than be swayed by the SBE arguments.

The issues evident during the 1978 negotiations were neither new in 1978 nor resolved by the completion of negotiations. The 1979 negotiations continued the debate about salaries and inflation, PTR and job protection, staff/board relations, and grievance rights and procedures--issues recurring through the 1976 to 1978 negotiations. Nevertheless, in the authors' opinion, the original position of teachers (and consequently of the SBE, since it was essentially reactive) did not crystallize into a clear stance until the fall with their presentation to the Fact Finder, eight months after negotiations had begun.

Possibly this impression is partly because very little documentation about negotiations dated before late spring and early summer, 1979, was received. Requests for the minutes of the SBE Salary Committee and the joint meetings of the SBE and the secondary school teachers' bargaining team were refused. Little information on the progress of negotiations is available from the media; the meetings between the two sides, beginning in early 1979 and continuing throughout the year, were seldom reported in the press. Indeed, the major source of information, the Sudbury Star, was itself affected by an employee strike between 26 June and 3 November 1979. Local radio and television stations had news bulletins on major developments, such as the arrival of the Fact Finder in mid-October, but no transcripts of such broadcasts during the prestrike period were available to the TSS. Thus, hardly any information can be provided about the progress of negotiations before summer 1979. The TSS has a fairly complete set of negotiation documents from July 1979 to the conclusion of the strike. (These, listed in the Bibliography, provide background for discussion of the development of negotiations and the roles of the parties involved.)

Changes in the OSSTF/AEFO position between July and September 1979 are evident from these documents and suggest that the teachers had no fully formulated position until the Fact Finder stage. These changes were also mentioned by a number of respondents, representing both sides; each offered interpretation about why this was the case. Many with direct knowledge about negotiations reported that they were surprised, and were not sure which items really were the major blocks to settlement in late fall. One must ask: Were teachers clearly communicating their overall position once it was established? Were trustees making unfounded assumptions about the teachers' position? The analysis of issues in the previous chapter suggests that there were so many articles and clauses to be dealt with, generating diverse viewpoints, that there probably were communication problems. Trustees and teachers both complained that they never received a total package response to their positions--"the old nickel-and-dime trick" was a phrase used by representatives of both.

The Opening of the 1978 Collective Agreement: January to June 1979*

On 10 January 1979, "a letter was sent to the Director of Education and Secretary for the Sudbury Board of Education, expressing the desire of the Secondary Teachers (OSSTF District 31 and AEFO Region 4) to negotiate a new agreement to replace the contract expiring August 31, 1979" (OSSTF/AEFO, Report to the Fact Finder). On January 26, a notice of intent to negotiate was filed with the Education Relations Committee (ERC).

* For an abbreviated prestrike history, see Appendix 2, chart 3.

The first meeting between the OSSTF/AEFO and SBE bargaining teams was on 20 February 1979. At that time, as a follow-up to the joint committee studying the articles of the 1978-79 contract regarding teacher redundancy and transfer as per the letter of intent included in it, these items were discussed. This was a matter of increasing concern because, according to the Sudbury Star (27 February 1979), a drop in enrolment of 700 students was expected in the next year and a decrease of 30 teaching jobs at the secondary level. The Superintendent of Operations was quoted as saying: "The Board may resort to layoffs for the first time." However, he pointed out, if some teachers take advantage of the "year's leave without pay" written into their collective agreement, this problem might be reduced somewhat.

In early March 1979, the SBE officers presented a budget to the SBE Finance Committee projecting a 15.5 per cent increase in taxes, which was rejected. A second budget was prepared, seeking an 11.9 per cent increase, and was rejected. A third, seeking 10.9 per cent, was accepted and brought to the SBE for approval. It represented a first-time deficit in operations of \$800 000 at the secondary level (one-half was overspending in salaries) and it reflected a 4 per cent increase in grants from the province, a number of cuts such as \$30 000 from capital works, and increases in teacher salaries (projected at \$1.25 million), fringe benefits, instruction, and transportation costs.

The budget caused immediate dissension among the SBE members; the former chairman of the Finance Committee was highly critical of it. He argued that the proposed increase of 5.6 per cent was too high, and that the plight of striking INCO workers be considered in setting the budget. Further, he said, there existed "a revenue cushion" of \$800 000 which would "cover, in part, the excess spending through income which had not been included by financial officers as part of the budget"--something desirable in 1980, an election year (Sudbury Star, 9 March 1979).

The chairman of the SBE negotiation team disagreed with these criticisms, noting that teachers had respected the local economic situation and had accepted a lower settlement in 1978. He stated: "If you want an education system that is reasonable, you have to pay the bill," and this meant a certain amount of catch-up for the teachers. Another member of the team stressed that last year's budget had not been realistic, that the 1979 budget should not again result in a deficit. According to the new Finance Committee chairman, a deficit would occur if wage settlements, still to be negotiated, were to exceed the budget (Sudbury Star, 13 March 1979). At the outset, it was evident that behind the SBE negotiation team was a more conservative, hard-line group of trustees.

The wave of media reaction to this controversy, and the announced tax increase, favoured the conservative element. An editorial in the Sudbury Star, "Education Costs Up While System Shrinks," began:

Perhaps not in their own minds hearts and consciences but certainly with the taxpayers, the members of the Sudbury Board of Education struck out ... came up with the booby prize ... or in the jargon of the milieu in which they legislate, came up with a big fat F. [15 March 1979]

This reaction, according to the Sudbury Star, then resulted in a counter-reaction by the SBE:

Tension appears to be mounting within the Sudbury Board of Education in regard to its press relations and the image it projects to the public. [4 April 1979]

It started when one member of the negotiation team expressed concern about the effects the news coverage would have on contract talks. Whatever the effects on the talks, the public stance at the beginning was critical of costs and trustee management of the educational system. The conflict within the SBE was making trustees look foolish.

On 29 March 1979, the bargaining teams met again to discuss negotiation procedures. Over the next few weeks, the two sides changed their initial positions. They met again on 24 April 1979 to clarify these positions. The TSS does not have copies of these; it is likely they were similar to the positions outlined in the previous chapter.

Joint meetings, of which the TSS has little record, were held weekly during May and June 1979. On 22 May 1979, the two teams met with an OSSTF representative to discuss possible solutions to the problem of teacher redundancy, in particular, types of self-funded leave plans. After this meeting, the SBE Salary Committee continued to study such an option. At a meeting on 29 May 1979, the SBE responded to teachers' requests concerning just cause, board policy, remuneration, and positions of responsibility, but nothing was resolved. On 5 June 1979, the teams achieved agreement on the fringe carrier, some of the leave clauses, and, three weeks later, on several other minor clauses.

Negotiations on a Non-Offer Basis: July to August, 1979

In July, the parties agreed to negotiate on a "non-offer" basis,* and achieved agreement in some areas and movement in others, as outlined in table 4.1.

Salaries. The teachers made alternative proposals for either a one- or two-year agreement. In both cases, the proposals equalled COLE as if COLE were in effect. Thus, the proposed salaries for maximum 4, if there were a two-year agreement, were \$29 999 and \$32 699 respectively, or increases of 5.63 per cent and 9 per cent, excluding increments. During July 1979, the SBE made two successive non-offers to teachers, which increased maximum 4 salaries in the end to \$29 896 and \$31 792 for the two years (increases of \$96 and \$588 over its position of 26 June 1979). The teachers also reduced their proposed 10 per cent increase to responsibility allowances to 5 per cent, and the 10 per cent increase to principals' salaries to the equivalent of the percentage increase of maximum 4 salaries. The SBE retained its original position regarding principals' salaries in the first year, and added \$100 to its proposal for the second.

The monetary differences between the SBE's and the teachers' positions are shown in table 4.2. For the first year, the teachers and the board each altered their positions sufficiently to narrow the gap considerably. For the second, the teachers' position was,

* "Non-offer" negotiation: both sides make an offer or series of offers without prejudice to their formal positions. If it appears that the parties are fairly close, one or the other may make a formal offer, either to achieve a step in negotiations or for settlement only.

Table 4.1: Summary of Major Changes on a Non-Offer
Basis: July 1979

	The Board	The Teachers
<u>I. Remuneration</u>		
<u>Max 4</u> 79/80	\$29 896	\$29 999
80/81	\$31 792	\$32 699
		COLE withdrawn
<u>Administration</u>		
79/80	+\$1800	equivalent to percentage
	+\$1900	increase of maximum 4
<u>Responsibility Allowance</u>		5 per cent increase
<u>II. Benefits</u>		
	Tri-Care, with 75/25 split on premiums	
<u>III. Leaves</u>		
<u>Sabbaticals</u>	reduce 3 to 1	status quo
<u>Retirement</u>	proposal withdrawn	
<u>Others</u>	- add 5 days to personal leave - sabbatical leave with salary holdback	proposals withdrawn
<u>IV. Staffing</u>		
PTR-general	- status quo	- status quo
-others	- not agreed	- 33 teachers
<u>V. Employee Protections</u>		
	amendments in arbitration procedures	

Table 4.2: July Non-Offers: Monetary Difference on Remuneration

	(Original)	1979/80	(Original)	1980/81
Teachers (July 12)	(1 359 075)*	1 202 880	(1 995 364)*	2 070 841
SBE (July 20)	(911 576)	1 130 342	(955 122)	1 318 804
Difference	(447 499)	72 538	(1 000 242)	752 037

* Teachers' figures.

in monetary terms, slightly more than their estimate of the cost of the COLE proposal (though less relative to board costings). The reduction in the difference was due primarily to movement (about \$250 000) on the part of the board.

Benefits. The teachers agreed to the SBE's proposals regarding group benefit plans; and the SBE to the teachers' proposal that fringe benefits be extended to employees on long-term disability, if there were a two-year maximum period, and to additional optional life insurance.

Leave. Under the article governing leaves, there were about a dozen items to be negotiated, most representing teacher requests. On a non-offer basis (26 July 1979), all of these were resolved with the exception of the sabbatical leave clause. The teachers agreed to maintain the status quo on the sick-leave clauses and to withdraw their proposals on all other leaves, except sabbatical. The SBE agreed to delete its controversial proposal about the retirement gratuity allowance (both agreed to the name change), add five half-days to personal leave time, and add a new clause about sabbatical leaves with salary holdback. Precise details of this new plan were still to be worked out. It is unclear from the documents whether agreement to the SBE's proposal to reduce sabbatical leaves from three to one was a condition of its acceptance of this new plan or not. Finally, no mention is made in the non-offer of the SBE's original proposal to grandfather the graduate allowance. Presumably it was resolved.

Staffing/PTR. Both the SBE and the teachers agreed to maintain the status quo on PTR for the regular program. However, teachers maintained their requests for other program levels which, if implemented, would add 33 positions next year to the required number, given the projected drop in enrolment. At their last meeting, the teachers and the SBE agreed that a possible resolution to the PTR issue might be to add five to eight modified-level teachers to the system in 1980-81, if provincial funding for special education remained the same (personal note). Two other matters were resolved. First, arbitration procedures were revised. Second, teachers withdrew their proposal for a salary savings sharing plan in favour of the sabbatical leave plan. No other issues were resolved in July, but the remaining ones were non-monetary in nature. It appeared that progress was being made on monetary questions. Furthermore, three of five SBE cutbacks--PTR, retirement gratuity, and graduate allowances--and teachers' COLE proposals were withdrawn on the non-offer basis. A large gap still remained in the 1980-81 proposals regarding salary. One SBE officer summarized the July 1979 meetings:

We said, if we don't go for COLE what would the two-year grid be. They proposed a grid; we were \$11 apart if we talked about a one-year agreement. They withdrew their COLE proposal but put back the proposal about staffing. This wasn't scheduled. They also had some proposals about special education. This was minor. We didn't agree at that point but through negotiations we added eight teachers in this area in the end. Originally they had wanted 50 teachers but this had been resolved. ... It was just because it was July, there was no point in signing a memorandum of understanding, that there wasn't a settlement then.

Appointment of the Fact Finder

On 21 August 1979, the teachers and the SBE each indicated their progress to the ERC. In September 1979, negotiations were resumed. According to some trustees, representatives of the provincial OSSTF were at the first meeting, when it became apparent that the July discussions had produced nothing concrete. The teachers told the trustees that the informal agreements were unacceptable. Whether the two sides were, in fact, close to settlement has since become debatable. Viewpoints about this will be summarized when the respondents' assessment of the prestrike negotiations is presented.

The teachers returned to their original position and the SBE followed suit. The only discernible progress (from the documentation) was the decision to adopt the Tri-Care benefit plan, and changes in grievance procedures. Consequently, on 11 September 1979, the teachers and the SBE requested a Fact Finder, who was appointed by the ERC. Each side then

prepared lengthy reports for him presenting positions established the previous spring. At this time, the teachers requested and received assistance from two provincial federation representatives, one from the OSSTF Provincial Secretariat, Toronto, the other from the AEFO, Ottawa. These persons eventually became part of a takeover team to assist the local group in the first mediation session.

The Fact Finder met with the parties on 16 October 1979, and presented a report dated 31 October 1979 and made public on 21 November 1979. The report stated that "both parties were well prepared and had a thorough understanding of the issues." Further, it noted that "prior to commencing the fact finding meeting the parties were able to narrow the issues considerably ... [and the major issues remaining were] monetary, the staffing formula, workload, just cause and existing practice."

For simplicity, the Fact Finder made recommendations for a one-year contract on all matters except salary. He identified 54 items as outstanding (including whole articles, or parts of articles): on 36, he made no recommendation, either because the parties requested this (12) or because they seemed close to agreement (three) or, because in his opinion, the parties ought to resolve the differences themselves (seven); on 14, he made no comment. This group included articles concerning benefit and leave plans and articles dealing with staff redundancy, transfer, and redeployment due to closing of schools. On 10 of the remaining 18 items he recommended that the status quo be maintained. These included six proposals by teachers, two by the SBE, and two clauses about which proposals had been made by both. He accepted only two of all of the proposed changes, both by teachers, as they stood. On the remaining six, regarding salary, working conditions, and summer school, he made major recommendations. The recommendations, as outlined, are drawn from the Report of the Fact Finder.

Fact Finder's Recommendations

Salary. The one-for-one COLE proposed by teachers had received only minimal acceptance in Ontario because it was too costly. Despite the difference in SBE and teacher calculations about its cost, the effect was evident. The Fact Finder noted that the SBE did have financial problems, especially in these "times of restraint," and that it was the pattern of settlement not the cost of living which dictated a fair salary. Thus, he recommended a percentage increase but not the COLE clause.

He also stated that close examination of the figures revealed that, though the teachers ranked favourably in the province, the SBE offer was "clearly too low." Thus, he recommended a salary increase of 6.5 per cent across the grid for both year one and year two, which, according to the ERC, was the pattern in the rest of the province. He also noted that the two parties might wish to consider a COLE allowance of some sort for the second year or a reopener regarding salary. He also recommended a 7.5 per cent increase for principals, noting that they had fallen behind relative to the salary scale of the rest of the staff. He made no recommendations regarding responsibility allowances.

The Fact Finder rejected both the teachers' and the board's proposals regarding classification of teachers for salary purposes. He said that the SBE had not made its case, for it was self-evident that principals would make every effort to have teachers teach their own specialty anyway. He said that teachers, in attempting to make an

exception for those not teaching in their area of specialization because of declining enrolment, were taking the wrong approach. They should try to negotiate out entirely the general requirement that teachers teach their specialty to qualify for the salary category.

Leave Plans. The Fact Finder made several comments regarding leave plans. He recommended that the teachers' proposed sabbatical leave with salary holdback plan be part of the collective agreement. He considered the issues regarding retirement gratuity and sabbatical leave to be minor. He suggested that, as the former was no longer necessary, teachers use it to bargain working conditions; and that the latter remain as it was.

Staffing. The Fact Finder did not find either the SBE's or the teachers' points of view on PTR compelling enough to justify any change. In light of declining enrolment, to cut the number of jobs further by means of a higher PTR would be unjustifiable; but the cost of the teachers' proposal was much too high. In his rationale, the Fact Finder reported the quality of education arguments, but made no comments, preferring to appeal to pragmatic questions of job security and costs. He stated that the parties themselves should resolve all other issues related to staffing. He commented that the SBE and the teachers were close to agreement on the seniority-viability controversy and no recommendation was needed. However, he rejected the SBE's proposal that teachers hired after September 1 should not be included on the seniority list.

Workload. The Fact Finder stated that he sympathized with teachers for wishing to include a workload specification in the agreement, but that implied an additional 14 teachers, a significant increase in cost to the SBE. Further, he saw no need for including clauses about pupil period contact for "surely the principal and staff would free a teacher teaching an extra credit from supervisory duties." He concluded that the best plan would be to include a letter of intent "to the effect that a work load of six out of eight periods shall be the teacher work load wherever possible."

Other Issues. The Fact Finder recommended that neither the just cause nor the board policy be included in the agreement because their implications would be too far-reaching. As a new proposal, the Fact Finder recommended that an anti-harassment clause be included in the collective agreement, because it was conceivable that harassment could take place in a way that would not be grievable under the existing contract. Despite the fact that the legal basis for inclusion of summer and night school was in doubt, the Fact Finder believed that because of the pressure of jobs, such a "concept is one worthy of consideration," and he recommended that "the parties seriously consider alternative proposals in this regard for inclusion in the contract."

Mediation and the Strike Vote: November 1979 to January 1980

While the Fact Finder was preparing his report, negotiations continued. Some progress was made again in areas where agreement had been reached in principle during the summer months. The benefit plans, including the SBE's position that it be responsible for 75 per cent (rather than 100 per cent) of premiums for the Tri-Care plan, were finally off the table. Several teacher-proposed leave plans and the salary savings sharing plan were dropped. It was agreed to increase personal leave from five to six half-days, but approval for such leave still rested with the principal. Partial agreement was achieved about grievance procedures but the major issue regarding the extension of such grievances beyond the

collective agreement remained outstanding. Teachers also agreed to maintain the status quo on the time periods allowed for sick leave and the amount of retirement gratuity, if the SBE agreed to withdraw its proposal to grandfather the latter.

Before the Fact Finder's report was made public, the ERC appointed a mediator for the Sudbury negotiations, following the request made by the parties on 8 November 1979. The mediator met with them November 13 to 15, 1979 (in the first of nine mediation sessions), in order to deal with what were, according to the SBE's negotiation team chairman, the three major outstanding issues: money, staffing formula, and workload. The mediator stated that the teams were aiming for a two-year contract and that if these issues were resolved, "The rest should fall into place." It was his opinion that they were fairly close on these and that "it is possible to bridge the gap so that teachers in that group [OSSTF/AEFO] would not be required to go to a strike vote" (Sudbury Star, 13 November 1979).

Nevertheless, the mediation talks achieved very little. The SBE increased the grid salary offer to 6 per cent in both years, but teachers maintained their original request for the COLE formula for the grid and allowances. Agreement was reached about responsibility allowances, with the difference between the two regarding the qualified positions being split for an increase of \$100 for each. The SBE also increased its offer for the various principals' categories by \$500-\$700 per category (now approximately 7 per cent).

As the Fact Finder recommended, the two parties agreed to maintain the status quo on clauses regarding placement of teachers for salary purposes. Some movement was achieved on the remaining clauses respecting sabbatical leave plans, and the teachers agreed to the SBE's offer of leave with salary holdback in years of declining enrolment. The SBE also proposed to limit sabbatical leaves to two per year, but teachers still requested three.

On staffing, the negotiation teams agreed to maintain the status quo regarding the academic PTR and the ratio on positions of responsibility, but teachers maintained their request regarding the other PTRs. They agreed to the SBE's proposal regarding the filling of positions of responsibility on the basis of the SBE's judgment of competency. Agreement in favour of the SBE's proposals was reached concerning the redeployment of staff. Nothing was changed, despite the Fact Finder's recommendations regarding workload, summer school, the new anti-harassment and teacher evaluation clauses, and the clauses respecting just cause and existing practice.

On 22 November 1979, OSSTF District 31 held its Fall Assembly, which a number of representatives from each school attended. At this meeting, a report of the Collective Bargaining Committee (CBC) was presented, summarizing for teachers the progress in negotiations. According to the CBC chairman, although there were "valuable discussions in the summer, the Board has shown virtually no flexibility on staffing, workload and salaries since last June," and that "their latest offers are in some areas less than 'unofficial' offers made during the summer." He outlined the contract-stripping items and stated that "we are still insisting on a cost of living clause." On December 6 the board and staff made formal offers on all outstanding items. At this point, most minor issues had been resolved and, of the 50 to 60 items originally on the table during fact finding, 12 major items remained, as shown in table 4.3.

Table 4.3: Major Issues Unresolved as of 1 January 1980

	For the SBE	For the Teachers
1. Salary Grid	- 6 per cent both years on grid (Nov.) - small cost of living (Dec.)*	COLE
2. Principal's Salary	- 7 per cent both years (Nov.)	10 per cent + COLE
3. Retirement Gratuity	- grandfather, to Aug. 31/80 (Nov.)	status quo
4. Sabbaticals	- reduce 3 to 2	status quo
5. PTR - general - other	- status quo (Nov.) - status quo	- return to 19 teachers - 33 positions
6. Period Count - positions of responsibility - subject supervisors	- status quo - period count	- section count - status quo
7. Redeployment of principals	- salary for two years/"bumping"	- maintenance of salary and positions
8. Workload (new)	- not agreed	- 6 periods, pupil/period contacts specified
9. Just Cause (new)	- "discipline" (Dec.)	"discipline, demote or discharge"
10. Board Policy/ Practice	changes that will be recorded in the manual (Dec.)	any changes in policy affecting teachers (Dec.)
11. Teacher Evaluation	not agreed	guidelines in the agreement
12. Summer School (new)	not agreed	inclusion in the agreement

Note: The months in parentheses indicate the dates the negotiation teams took the position. Otherwise, the positions indicated are the original ones.

* "Each teacher on staff on 1980-09-01 will receive \$100 up to a maximum of \$200 for each full percentage point increase in the All Items Consumer Price Index For Canada (1971 = 100) over 9 per cent for the period 1980-01-01 to 1980-12-01" (Formal Offers on Outstanding Issues).

With the exception of the SBE's offer on salaries, just cause, and existing practice, the SBE and teacher positions on all of these clauses remained unaltered from the beginning of negotiations, 10 months earlier. With this offer, negotiations ended and teachers took the SBE's offer to the whole staff for an ERC-supervised vote. On 12 December 1979, with 762 ballots cast (of a possible 888) 87.5 per cent of teachers voted to reject the offer. Two days later the negotiation committee advised teachers that a strike mandate, not a work to rule, was required, stressing that such a mandate would press the SBE into making a second formal offer. The following questions were put to the teachers in a second supervised vote, on 19 December 1979:

I vote to accept strike action _____.

I vote to reject strike action _____.

With 832 ballots cast, 77.4 per cent of teachers voted to accept strike action.

On the day that the sanction vote took place, the OSSTF/AEFO executive formally requested that a provincial OSSTF team of negotiators become involved in the Sudbury talks.

Before this occurred, however, the two teams met again. The teachers' chief negotiator outlined his committee's position on the outstanding articles. This meeting stands out in the mind of one SBE officer as a "bench mark"--where decision had been presented as "hard and fast." The following is an excerpt from the minutes of that meeting.

The Chief Negotiator for the teachers outlined his committee's position on the various outstanding articles:

Take Away Items That Were Non-Negotiable

1. Article 7.03--counting of multiple credit/sections.
2. Article 13.02--status quo on retirement gratuity.
3. Article 13.04 (h)--status quo on number of sabbatical leaves.
4. Article 7.03--criteria of period count for Subject Supervisors.

Matters of Principle on Which Staff Had Reached Their Bottom Line

1. Article 3.02--"just cause" of matters on discipline, demotion and discharge.
2. Article 3.03--review of all items on policy that affect teachers.
3. Article 29--Guidelines for teacher evaluation.
4. Article 26--redeployment of staff.

Monetary Matters That Are Negotiable

1. Article 14.02--additional staff requested.
2. Article 28.00--teacher workload.
3. Article 6.00--concept of COLE.
4. Article 8.00--administrative allowance.
5. Article 8.00--allowance for Resource Personnel.
6. Article 25.00--Night School and Summer School Salaries.

The Chief Negotiator for the teachers stated that "though the parties were far apart on the issues, the teachers wished to resume negotiations as soon as possible in January." The Chairman of the SBE negotiation committee thought that "it was unfortunate that an agreement could not have been reached in light of the effort that had been put forth by the parties." He indicated his committee's intention to resume negotiations in the New Year, with either the local or the provincial Takeover Committee.

It was evident from this meeting that teachers would accept no reduction in items established in previous contracts--i.e., take-away items--items referred to in the press and in newsletters as contract-stripping. Further, there were other non-negotiable matters of principle, but these did not include the concept of COLE or the salaries of night school and summer school staff. For the latter, teachers declared redundant in the regular system were to be given priority in hiring. Further, as they had suggested in July 1979, administrative allowances were to be given the same percentage boost as the grid. They also warned that if they went on strike they would go for a pupil/period contact clause in the agreement (personal notes). In sum, it appeared that, on the major issues, teachers' priorities were pretty well as indicated in the abandoned July position (personal notes). It was reported in the press that both sides said relations were good and that they intended to resume negotiations in January 1980.

January 1980

The first three weeks of January 1980 were spent by teachers in presenting the takeover team to the Collective Bargaining Committee, the principals, and the teaching staff. On 14 January 1980, the teachers approved the team, which then met on January 17 to prepare for a

meeting with the board. The TSS has no record of negotiation meetings prior to a second mediation session held January 29-31, 1980, with the mediator. At this time, the SBE and the teachers exchanged position papers. The SBE made a non-offer for a settlement on the salary grid and principals' salaries, proposing to split the grid in each of the two years, providing increases effective September 1979, January 1980, September 1980, and January 1981. Overall, these increases, excluding increment, amounted to about 7.5 per cent and 7.3 per cent in the two years. Principals' salaries would also be increased by about 7.3 per cent in each of the two years. Both of these exceeded the Fact Finder's recommendations. Nevertheless, the teachers rejected this non-offer and, on the day following mediation, filed notice of their intent to strike if the next round of talks should fail.

February 1980

A third mediation session was held with the mediator on 3 February 1980. For purposes of settlement only, the SBE agreed to withdraw its proposals regarding sabbatical leave and retirement gratuities. Tentative agreement was also reached on the SBE's policy clause, on the just cause clause (though the extent was not yet determined), and on the guidelines for teacher evaluation. Still unresolved was whether the guidelines should be included in the collective agreement as teachers wished or in the policy manual as the SBE wished.

On matters of salary, the SBE once again proposed a split grid, but teachers maintained their COLE request. They withdrew once again their PTR proposal for the general level, reducing their staffing request to 33 teachers, and agreed to modify their summer school article to give redundant teachers priority, on condition that the SBE withdraw its proposal about credit/sections. However, the SBE refused both. The teachers also maintained their position concerning the redeployment of principals and vice-principals and their new clause concerning workload. While they reduced their request for resource personnel from 10 per cent to \$200, they persisted in the COLE request.

In sum, on the eve of the strike, the remaining items in dispute could be divided, apart from the just cause clause, into two categories: those reflecting the COLE request and those representing jobs. With regard to the former, the SBE negotiation team reported that the positions were approximately \$2 million apart in salaries over the two-year period. In addition, the teachers' request for 33 teachers represented about \$1.5 million in salaries. The teachers' request regarding the counting of sections rather than periods meant an additional 15 positions of responsibility; their workload article, a decrease in PTR, meant 14 jobs. It was also estimated that the summer school program represented 11 jobs. During the 12 months of negotiation and 80 hours of mediation, apart from the non-offers in July 1979, no movement had been made by teachers on salaries and by the SBE on jobs. Because the SBE's offer for settlement was refused, both teams returned to their December 1979 positions. On 6 February 1980, the teachers went out on strike. The positions of the two sides are illustrated in table 4.4.

Causes of the Strike

So far, the events leading to the strike, beginning with negotiations for the 1978 contract, the 1979 bargaining, the strike vote, and the final weeks before the strike sanctions vote became a reality have been dealt with: the positions of both sides were examined in some detail through a chronological overview of these events, and an in-depth examination of specific issues.

Table 4.4: Mediation 3, 4 February 1980:
Differences between the Two Sides Immediately Preceding the Strike

<u>Salary Grid</u>	1979/80 3 per cent	\$ 675 000
	1980/81 7 per cent	\$1 800 000
<u>Principals' Salary</u>	1979/80 9 per cent	\$ 100 000
	1980/81 9 per cent	\$ 100 000
<u>Resource Personnel</u>	\$100 per teacher	
<u>PTR</u>	33 teachers. \$1 million (\$600 000 according to personal notes)	
<u>Period Count</u>		
i) Responsibility	- Teachers wish to count sections--i.e. 15 positions	
ii) Subject Supervisors	- SBE wishes to count periods only	
<u>Workload</u>	- Teachers request 6 periods/pupil period contact written into agreement--i.e. 14 teaching positions	
<u>Teacher Evaluation</u>	- Teachers wish to have procedures written into contract	
<u>Redeployment of Principals and Vice-Principals</u>	- SBE: two years of salary and redeployed to another position - Teachers: maintenance of positions and salary	
<u>Summer School</u>	- Teachers wish priority for redundant teachers if SBE withdraws <u>Period Count</u> ii	

Views of Parents and Teachers. One task of the TSS was to ask respondents for their views on the causes of the strike. Teachers were also asked what they considered major contributing factors leading to the strike. Possibly, answers may be distorted by time. Yet the comments suggest that respondents had decided what the major causes of the strike were. The explanations are diverse; parents identified two major factors by an overwhelming majority; more than one-third of teacher respondents blamed the SBE. In the third field study, respondents gave their versions of the causes of the strike through in-depth answers to several subquestions. The majority saw the hard-line, uncompromising attitude on both sides as the primary cause of breakdown in negotiations and thus the strike. (See table 4.5.)

Cross-tabulation of parents' answers shows that families earning under \$15 000 annually emphasized money as the main factor responsible for the strike, in the sense that teachers' demands were rejected by the SBE; those earning over \$15 000 saw work conditions as an additional important factor. Similar distinctions were noticeable for those claiming "other" religious affiliation--mainly Greek Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches--and for home owners rather than renters.

Despite the extensive publicity given to the unresolved issues by both sides during the actual strike period, parents gave only a limited number of explanations. This would indicate that either the public absorbs only information which reinforces already established beliefs* or particular information has been forgotten one year after the strike

* This has been researched extensively by political scientists dealing with attitudinal changes and opinion formation.

Table 4.5: Perceived Causes of the Strike: Parents' Responses

Parent Variables	Money	Work Conditions	Money and Conditions	Poor Negotiations	Combination of Factors	Other	N
Income							
Under \$10 000	70.0	-	-	10.0	-	20.0	10
\$10 000-14 999	75.0	-	-	-	12.5	12.5	8
\$15 000-19 999	50.0	37.5	12.5	-	-	-	8
\$20 000-24 999	52.9	-	17.6	-	11.8	17.6	17
\$25 000-29 999	45.5	-	36.4	-	-	18.2	11
\$30 000 +	50.0	7.1	21.4	-	-	21.4	14
Religious Affiliation							
Roman Catholic	57.1	4.1	18.4	2.0	6.1	12.2	49
Protestant	50.0	-	18.8	-	-	31.3	16
Other Religions/ No Religion	66.6	16.6	-	-	-	16.6	12
Home Ownership							
Own	60.3	3.2	17.5	-	4.8	14.3	63
Rent	46.7	13.3	6.7	-	6.7	26.7	15

ended. The first position is likely correct; some parents thought that the teachers listed a great many demands as a "bargaining ploy" but were more concerned with one or two. Very few parents mentioned sabbaticals or just cause factors.

The TSS parents were also asked to evaluate the position of the SBE and teacher teams in the prestrike negotiations. While the federations were criticized more than the SBE for their stand, the parents did not take a strong position for or against either. (See table 4.6.)

Table 4.6: Evaluation of Position Taken by the SBE/Federations in Prestrike (1978-79) Negotiations: Parent Respondents

	SBE	Federations
Negative Evaluation	46.3	53.7
Neutral or Mixed Evaluation	15.9	24.4
Positive Evaluation	20.7	13.4
Various Comments	2.4	1.2
Don't Know	14.6	7.3

The statement, "both sides were very 'hard-nosed' about the settlement," was heard frequently.

The 44 responses from teachers emphasized the hard-nosed position of the SBE, and 40.9 per cent considered it the major cause of the strike--the "unbending" or "inflexible

position of the SBE on all the major points in the negotiations." One often mentioned accusation was, "The Board was fully intent on contract stripping." Other opinions were: "The Board refused to negotiate in good faith" and "the Board ... felt it could take advantage of teachers after they accepted several previous poor agreements." One-half thought the major causes of the strike were the inadequate salary offers, provisions for job security, lack of concern for poor working conditions, or a combination of two or three of these factors. Only 9.1 per cent had other explanations: "Rejection of the COLE provisions by the Board" ... "the arrogance of the trustees and the Board in general" ... "the inevitable outcome of Bill 100." None blamed the strike exclusively on their federation negotiators; one teacher felt it was the end result of "pig-headed, power-hungry negotiators on both sides"; another claimed that the Sudbury negotiations and the resulting strike represented "a test for the provincial OSSTF Executive."

The teachers were also asked to identify what they thought were the major contributing factors to the strike and, again, the position taken by the SBE emerged as the single main factor. (See table 4.7.) Among "other reasons" named by teachers were PTR, workload, just cause, lack of faith in the trustees, and contract-stripping.

Table 4.7: Major Contributing Factors to the Strike:
Teacher Respondents

	%
Attitude of the SBE	20.5
Fault of the Trustees	2.3
COLE	2.3
Declining Enrolment	2.3
Poor Money Offer	18.2
Other Reasons	38.6
No Answer	15.9

The teachers were asked if their federations, and the negotiation team, had explored all the possibilities for an agreement with the SBE. In mailed responses, 75 per cent answered yes, 11.4 per cent no, 11.3 per cent not certain, and 2.3 per cent did not answer. This reflects the majority position of teachers, who voted for strike sanction in December 1979, believing their negotiation team had explored all normal avenues of discussion without the desired result.

The perceived causes of the strike, the contributing factors, and the last set of responses above were cross-tabulated with the selected variables pertaining to the teachers' background: marital status, income, age, affiliation with federations, and some additional characteristics. This information may be of interest to the SBE and the local teachers' federations and is included in Appendix 1, tables A2 and A3. However, these data indicate no noticeable trends and pose problems of interpretation. No analysis is undertaken since, in addition to lack of pattern, they are based on a small sample, not randomly chosen.

Views of "Others" Respondents. Respondents in the "others" category of the field study were asked five major questions about prestrike negotiations, in order to determine their

attitudes to the negotiation teams and the factors they considered as direct or underlying causes of the breakdown in negotiations. The first two questions addressed the respondents' knowledge about the two teams, and asked them to describe, in turn, their basic position and approach prior to the strike. The third (described in the previous chapter) asked what the respondents considered as the major unresolved issues. The fourth covered the period from the summer 1979 negotiations to the December votes. Respondents were asked about possible changes in attitude of the teams, the fact finding, and the first mediation session. The fifth question, the most general, asked respondents to consider whether the teams could have settled without a strike--i.e., to speculate about what happened and what other possible factors contributed to the strike.

It is stressed that these questions were deliberately open-ended in order to get respondents to volunteer their points of view, which were then probed further. Thus patterns in the responses can be described only generally. A composite of each subgroup's responses was used to consider its assessment of the two teams, the events of July to December 1979, and other factors contributing to the strike.

a) Assessment of the Two Teams: Trustees. The negotiating trustees expressed several points in assessing the prestrike negotiations. They expected 1979 to be not much different from other years and they did not anticipate a strike until "shortly" before (November-December). As usual, they "tried to work on a package basis" within the limits of the budget, considering what was happening in the rest of the province and, given the ceilings of provincial funding, what increases local taxpayers could bear. During negotiations, they expected to give in to some demands (e.g., the proposed cutbacks and seven or eight teachers' jobs). Occasionally, a respondent expressed self-criticism. For instance, one trustee commented that in 1979 "in fact, the Board had crept up [gradually increased its salary offer], and maybe this led to the strike [this raised teacher expectations]."

Trustees who were not on the negotiation team tended to be more critical. One described some of the team members as "too tactful with school Board negotiations," especially because Sudbury was to be a test case that year. Another used the term "amateurish." Surprisingly, a significant number did not seem to know what the approach was. The SBE officers described the trustee approach as generally conservative, and one of restraint. One said, "They were preserving the public purse and attempting to hang on to management rights." Another said the plan was "to get the teachers position and react to it. It was a very demanding one and the Board reacted in kind." Others referred to teacher requests as "a shopping list" set of demands, some of which the SBE simply had to eliminate.

The teachers, however, felt the SBE was reacting too little. On the staffing issue--identified in their presentation to the Fact Finder as their major concern--the SBE had offered nothing. As one teacher put it, "If the Board had offered anything at all on staffing in the summer, it sure disappeared. We were on strike before we saw a first staffing proposal."

Other respondents' comments generally centred on the financial element. Most were attempting to be realistic without being overly critical, although the SBE was criticized by principals for being "influenced too much by the OSTC," and for using

delaying tactics, waiting for the teachers to capitulate. However, these respondents were often equally critical of the teacher team. One principal said that neither team could find a middle ground.

b) Assessment of the Two Teams: Teachers. The teacher negotiator spoken to said the question which determines the teachers' approach and position is, "What can we do to get the Board to move half way?" The teachers begin with a fairly comprehensive set of requests and "take bigger steps in order to get the trustees to move." But this is a game of "brinkmanship," he said, because "you cannot strike for the remaining issues if you have moved too close to their position." With such a gap remaining, the SBE is optimistic that the teachers will capitulate but

the thing that was different this time was that we knew we could get a strike if we didn't move in big steps. We kept issues back knowing that they were winnable. We didn't, for instance, give up the retirement gratuity. ... It's dumb to go on strike for a small amount.

Yet, this teacher was also critical about the teachers' stance on salary. He felt that while the cost of living justified their position, had they won it, "This would have put us above the norm for teachers, a problem which perhaps we didn't recognize as clearly as we should have. And it is difficult to break out of a pattern once it is set."

Generally, trustees and SBE officers felt that the teachers' team lacked a strategy, that the teachers couldn't agree among themselves and, as a consequence, "They had a settlement but they couldn't see it," citing as evidence that "they got little more than what they had prior to the strike." Another commented:

Teachers tended to come up with a grab bag of things which affected only individuals on the team.... It was difficult to distinguish between the important and the contentious issues. Minor issues were advanced as important and only gradually were they put in the right perspective.

A third said, "Staffing was more important but they were married to the principle of COLE." The teachers thought that "they made it easy" for the SBE not to settle because the gap was so large and the issues so many. Each side believed the other was using delaying tactics, waiting for other settlements to come in, and never presenting a unified full package for reaction, that it was a power process, where each needed to stand firm and not be ground down.

Other respondents (apart from those directly involved in negotiations), who were relatively well informed, viewed both sides as hard-line, unprepared to find middle ground, or to give and take. Those who were part of the wider educational community took this more neutral stance but were more hesitant to even express an opinion about the approach of either side.

c) July to December 1979: Failure of the July 1979 Non-Offer. What happened in the intervening six months was questioned several times by people advising the TSS about the questionnaires being prepared for this study. Thus, the TSS tried to discover the answer through interviews with negotiators and SBE officers, and received two answers. The first, given by a teacher negotiator, a principal, an SBE officer, and one or two trustees, was

that the CBC (which advised the teachers' negotiation team) did not accept the changes teachers had made in July 1979, and instructed them to return to their original mandate. As a teacher commented,

We took a position we thought was justifiable to the CBC. As I remember, they didn't buy it. We came below our marching orders in some area, I can't remember what. It may have been money. We probably did consult with the provincial representative present but we weren't yet in takeover--so this person didn't have veto power yet.

Other respondents (trustees, SBE officers, and one community member) believed that the provincial OSSTF executive in Toronto had told the local team that they were settling too easily and encouraged them to take a more militant stand and, indeed, had already earmarked Sudbury as a good place to have a strike. They cited, as evidence, that there had been an observer from Toronto present at the meetings in July 1979 (others said it was in early September 1979). One trustee said ruefully that he laughed when he was told in late July 1979 by friends at the OSTC in Toronto that there was going to be a strike in Sudbury. He was also told in August 1979 that OSSTF meetings were being held concerning Sudbury. One other respondent, in education but not with the Sudbury board, also attributed the change in attitude and eventual strike to the provincial OSSTF:

That is what officials of the Federation in Toronto told me privately, whom I happen to know through completely other connections. ... They said 'what do you expect?' There certainly was some militancy in terms of the situation here but they certainly saw it as one which would hold out so they were going to give it all of their support.

The chairman of the teachers' negotiation team, however, denied at a meeting with the ERC the following spring that the two teams had ever been close and called this "just a myth." He and other teachers also denied that the provincial OSSTF had marked out Sudbury as a strike region. Perhaps the following assessment by one of the older trustees is closest to the truth: "They felt they had the horse's ear, and the issues on the table [in the summer 1979]--COLE and staffing--were of interest to the province." Most of the trustees believed, in any case, that by mid-fall they were negotiating not with the local team but with the province, and the spokesman for the team was really the provincial person.

d) Fact Finding: Fall 1979. When the Fact Finder's report was made public on 21 November 1979, the teachers' chief negotiator termed it "a very inconvenient process" and "a waste of time," especially because some aspects were already outdated; negotiations had continued while the parties awaited the report. The then chairman of the SBE said the report was "useful" and that "the Board had taken into consideration some of the recommendations which have been made" (Sudbury Star, 21 November 1979). These comments were reflected in responses about the fact-finding process made to the TSS. One teacher negotiator said he thought that the Fact Finder contributed very little:

It is not well understood by me or by others what he is supposed to contribute. We weren't impressed by him. The problem of staffing and what proposals do are difficult for an outsider to understand and we felt that the understanding was not there.

The trustees defined the Fact Finder's report as "fair," and believed that the Fact Finder had supported their position rather than the teachers'. However, they also believed, as did the SBE officers, who were unanimous on this matter, that the report had either no effect on negotiations or possibly a negative one. One trustee called it "pointless." Others said it made teachers "furious" because the Fact Finder brought out the facts. One problem with the process from the trustees' point of view was that some things on which the Fact Finder did not make recommendations--things which the teachers claimed would be easily resolved--proved to be difficult after all. One trustee commented that the teachers said some of these were "a matter of semantics yet they became rather tricky items. We worked a week on one of them."

The SBE officers were critical of the process itself as defined by Bill 100. One called it a "make work project," good only for making sure that both sides knew the facts. But, he believed, the facts were already known, so the procedure militated against getting on with negotiations. Another thought that the report might have been more effective if "the truth" had been better publicized to the teachers. Apart from these groups, the TSS found that few respondents knew or remembered anything at all about the report. Even principals had little to say about it.

e) First Mediation. All respondents with any knowledge about the mediation sessions in November 1979 agreed that they had a negative effect both on negotiations and on mediation sessions in January 1980 and later. Negotiators on both sides felt uneasy about the mediator's tactics during the first session because it appeared that he was sharing information (which he should not have been) with each party. Comments from various trustees included the following:

He wasn't doing a good job. He shafted us. He gave them our position when he said he wouldn't. ... He treated us like children. ... He committed a breach of faith by giving our offers to the teachers. ... He gave us lectures on negotiations and on trust. He was somewhat pro-teacher. We had a let-down feeling when the talks ended. ... He didn't make a proper assessment of the teachers' position. He didn't realize what the big items were in the contract on which they weren't flexible.

A teacher negotiator made the following comment, which indicates that the federations were equally disturbed:

... a Mediator is someone who enjoys the trust of both sides, who explains a position and sees where compromise may be possible. But we began to think sometime during the mediation process that he was telling the Board what we were telling him and there was a loss of trust. Whether he was, or not, I don't know, but by the same token we were not prepared to have him come in and tell us what the Board was thinking because it worked both ways. On one occasion in particular he did this and this destroyed his credibility.

The first mediation session set the tone for both parties at the next two sessions, held immediately prior to the beginning of the strike. The trustees were very apprehensive about speaking openly to the mediator. One said he should have realized when "we had torn a strip off him" on the first day that he was not going to be acceptable. One SBE officer described the effect of the mediation sessions prior to the strike:

... the Mediator hadn't been effective. He had tried a strategy which didn't work with us. He got an offer from us and was supposed to get one from the teachers but he couldn't although he had given us a commitment that he would. He

just said "sorry"! This didn't affect the final result but it did affect our movement with the subsequent Mediators ... that they believed they could do something ... but we weren't too gullible after that.

Meanwhile the teachers were frustrated:

We had difficulty getting him to believe we were serious about staffing. It was too late by the time he realized it. The money offer just before the strike was almost as good as what we settled for but there was no staffing.

Another SBE officer explained the lack of their effectiveness:

All of the mediators are generally inept. The negotiations in education demand the best brains in the province but because of the low pay scale we don't get them. We should have had outstanding mediators. This is the responsibility of the province.

The responses about the mediation sessions, and the fact-finding process to a lesser degree, revealed a surprising degree of unanimity. Both sides were highly critical of the negotiation tactics and positions of each side, and sometimes critical of their own. They also felt (though it was not expressed this way) that their own efforts to negotiate in good faith, and to communicate their positions to the other side, were undermined rather than assisted by the outside help they were receiving under the guidelines of Bill 100. Whether or not respondents also believed the guidelines themselves are inadequate will be addressed later, but they believed their implementation at the prestrike stage was poor.

f) Other Strike-Contributing Factors. These respondents were also asked what other factors besides the issues under negotiation might have caused the strike; whether either side might have taken more initiative in getting a settlement without a strike; and whether, in retrospect, the strike could have been avoided. On these questions there is a distinct difference in attitude between community leaders with no educational association and all other respondents. The majority of the former group believed, in retrospect, that the teams could have settled without a strike, whereas the majority of the latter group believed that, regardless of the outside help the teams received, a strike could not have been avoided. Most interestingly, the majority in both groups attributed the strike to hard-line attitudes on both sides and mentioned this factor most frequently as the cause of the strike.

What appears to have made the difference in expectations about the strike's occurrence was respondents' familiarity or unfamiliarity with previous negotiations and other circumstances that made negotiations in the field of education different. Community leaders took the view that no strike is unavoidable; that when one does occur, it is due to the intransigence or the stupidity of one side or the other and probably both. In the case of the teacher strike most respondents in this group blamed both, often pointing to the image each had established in the media. A smaller group in the other respondents (primarily trustees) thought that teachers seemed determined to have a strike; but many, including some of this group, saw the 1979 hard-line positions as part of a long-term power struggle gradually coming to a head, which would remain unresolved because neither side would take the initiative to resolve it. Superintendents of schools and principals in particular believed that this power struggle, focused at the negotiating table, had produced deteriorating relations between the SBE and teachers in general, making the "Big Bad Board"

a real issue in the strike. One SBE officer, more familiar with previous settlements, summarized what he saw as the major cause:

The strike was brewing for two or three years. ... The Board was taking a pretty strong stand and we hadn't been able to get in the budget enough to get a settlement that they would accept willingly. We had a number of trustees on the Board who were trying to limit how much the taxes would go up and we didn't have enough (and we knew it) to settle for what was reasonable (this time) and we tried to deal with this by spreading money over two years with split grids and other measures.

Another SBE officer, reflecting the views of respondents both in the system and the community, identified a few trustees as particularly annoying to teachers ("hawks in the backroom") because of "the blatant statements they were making regularly at the open Board meetings, and which then were all quoted in the paper." He said they would raise sensitive issues publicly instead of in the committee of the whole because they were "hungry for recognition." This kind of attitude made teachers ready to "bring the Board to its knees."

A large proportion of respondents identified one other major factor contributing to the strike--outside interference from provincial OSSTF leaders. Sudbury was, in the words of one trustee, "the cow-bell for the province." One SBE officer claimed that "the provincial Federation is always looking for spots to gain concessions. This is a strong labour town and they thought Sudbury would be a good place to do this." A respondent in education, but not part of the SBE, stated that the "OSSTF and OTF are of the opinion that under Bill 100 they are not given a fair shake in bargaining. They claim Boards have little incentive to settle and may wait for the teachers to be legislated back." A long strike in Sudbury, he implied, would challenge the government to interfere, legislate the teachers back to work, thus revealing the alleged one-sidedness of present legislation. He also thought that the Matthews Commission scheduled review of Bill 100 that winter heightened the OSSTF's interest in the Sudbury strike.

Summary Analysis: Causes of the Strike

None of the events, issues, and causes of the strike discussed so far explain, in themselves, why the Sudbury teachers' strike occurred. A number of subquestions must be asked to determine the causes of the strike. For example:

1. What was the nature of the conflict about the issues on the table?
2. What were the negotiating tactics of the two parties?
3. What was the effect of the assistance which they received?
4. What other interests or factors might have influenced the negotiations?
5. Why did the teachers vote to strike and why did the SBE not act to prevent it?

Partial answers have already been given in preceding sections. In chapters 2 and 3, it was argued that the two positions were generated partly by conflicting and unexamined perspectives, and partly by the changing relationship between boards and teachers in general. The authors offer the following summary of the causes of the strike.

One respondent quoted above remarked that the strike probably would not have occurred if enrolment were increasing rather than decreasing. Similarly, if the economic situation were better; if boards were still expanding schools and programs; if the Ministry of Education and local trustees were not under pressure to reduce, or at least hold, spending

lower than current inflation rates; if taxpayers were assured that upward mobility in income continued to be a part of "progress"--there would not have been a strike. Under such conditions, education would still be a "seller's market," "with the public still convinced that education and a good income were somehow interdependent, and trustees still convinced that better service results from better (and bigger) budgets." Teachers seem to think that the public is still willing to pay more if it believes it will get better quality in education. Trustees are beginning to think that the public measures quality not in terms of "more dollars," but in terms of service "per dollar," that is, the further a dollar goes, the better the educational system. Whether the teachers or the trustees are right matters less than the fact that all parties (including the government and the taxpayer) are not in agreement on who should be paying for the growing costs of education. This is complicated further by the lack of parameters on what are acceptable costs for quality or for any secondary school education.

It is true, then, to say that declining enrolment and a strained economy were contributing factors to the strike. Since Sudbury's enrolment is dropping more quickly and Sudbury's economy is poorer (at least according to the SBE) than the rest of the province, these factors must have contributed even more to the likelihood of breakdown in negotiations.

A teacher negotiator, as well as several SBE officers, attributed the strike to poor communication between the two teams, partly because of over-exposure to one another and to their arguments. While people on either side of the bargaining table were aware, to a certain extent, of each others' differences of perspective, there seemed to be a block against listening to each other sufficiently to examine the bases on which their differences of principle or priority rested.

The authors agree with this assessment, but mention two notable exceptions. The two teams pursued constructive solutions to the problems generated by teacher redundancy, and the positive effect on negotiations is evident. First, as directed by a letter of intent in the previous agreement, procedures for transferring teachers and declaring staff redundant were examined, three lengthy articles were produced and (apart from the problem of salary and position of principals and vice-principals) agreed upon by mid-fall. Second, the two teams jointly examined possible means--in particular, the sabbatical leave with salary holdback and the salary savings sharing plan--of reducing the pressure on jobs and agreed by mid-fall to implement the former and drop the latter. A third issue, teacher evaluation, might also fall into this category, for the SBE and the teachers were in agreement about what the procedure ought to be, though they did not agree about its inclusion in the collective agreement.

Remaining issues, new in character and scope, such as COLE, just cause, board policy/practice, summer/night school, and workloads, required as much concentrated discussion as those where success had been achieved. Thus, the problem of negotiating matters of principle before quantitative differences was made worse because of the lack of communication about the principles themselves. Detailed debate about the value of having these articles in the agreement did not occur, to the authors' knowledge, apart from the fact-finding stage. For example, the question about whether workload belongs in the contract needed to be considered before what the teachers proposed PPCs should be. Consequently, the situation seemed particularly frustrating because many were yes/no issues rather than issues on which there could be a certain amount of give, so a lot of time should have been spent on them. The question remains: Why were the teams so attached to these either/or principles in their positions that they could not get beyond them to the stage of give-and-take bargaining?

Most TSS respondents attributed the strike to hard-line tactics on both sides during prestrike negotiations. Two events reinforce this view. First, in March 1979, when the budget was presented to the SBE by the Salary Committee, several trustees, critical of members who wished to begin negotiations with a behind-the-scenes liberal salary offer, forced the committee to take a position which several of them and several SBE officers considered less than "reasonable." As one SBE officer described it, the situation was unusual because "the doves" were up front while "the hawks" were in the back room. Similarly, TSS interviewers were told that the July 1979 non-offers went asunder because teachers in the background on CBC would not accept the compromises their team was making. The teachers' team, too, had people behind it who were more demanding and less willing to compromise.

Given a situation where both teams were finding it difficult to satisfy militant people in the background, it is likely that the value of face-to-face discussion of the issues at the table was reduced. Because it was the people behind the scenes who had to be convinced, the psychological effect of personal contact--i.e., a softening of attitudes and possibly an adjustment of viewpoints--would be lost in the translation. Those who did not have to face the other side would find it much easier to remain hard-line and overly critical. If worthwhile discussion was already lacking on a number of major issues it was aggravated further by these background pressures.

The number and complexity of issues, as well as these hard-line elements, probably account for the fact that when the 1978 contract expired, the two teams were still presenting their original positions. Why were negotiations so slow? The first response to the teachers' salary request, for instance, was in late June 1979, six months after the ERC had been notified that negotiations were beginning again. Further, the sorting process which the teams went through in October and November 1979--when clauses concerning benefits, category definitions, most of the leaves, procedures for complaint and grievance, hiring practices, seniority, transfer and redundancy (except, as noted, the treatment of principals and vice-principals), and anti-harassment were taken off the table--should have occurred six months sooner, and long before a Fact Finder and a mediator were called in. Examination of documents and dates shows that almost all of these were eventually achieved apart from this assistance.

Each side has accused the other of using delaying tactics in order to advantage their positions. The teachers were hoping that other settlements in the province would add punch to their own stand, and the SBE was hoping that the late hour would pressure the teachers into settling. The authors do not know whether either side deliberately chose to use such tactics. In any case, the effectiveness of either is suspect; perhaps the respondents are simply rationalizing their critical attitudes. Nevertheless, despite the many meetings, there were still significant time gaps between periods of negotiation (e.g., between the exchange of positions in early April 1979 and the first responses 29 May 1979; between the end of the July 1979 negotiations and resumption of negotiations in mid-October 1979; and between the end of negotiations in late November 1979 and their resumption in late January 1980). Though the authors have no record of the amount of actual discussion on the various issues, from information about the periods of negotiation and the changes in position which did take place, it would seem that relatively few occasions were actually spent discussing the major issues before the strike vote was taken. In January 1979, only one session (mediation) was spent negotiating before the teachers filed their notice to strike. One person, who has been a long-time, active OSSTF leader locally and provincially, was extremely critical of the teachers' team for not making better use of the strike vote as a negotiating weapon. At the same time, others were critical of the SBE for not responding to the strike vote with an offer on staffing at least equivalent to what they had been discussing the previous July.

The authors agree with both of these criticisms, but do not think that either team was inept or deliberately trying to provoke a strike. It is probably more accurate to say that neither team, because of what had taken place in previous years (i.e., the SBE maintaining a firm stand against teachers' demands until they capitulated), was negotiating to prevent a strike and, as it gradually became more evident that there might be one, negotiated with that expectation.

The teachers, if not from the beginning, certainly by September 1979, were negotiating in a way that would enable them to conduct a successful strike. They maintained a clearly defined, strong stand so that if a strike were to occur (and this depended ultimately on the attitude of the staff they represented) both the teachers and the public would know what it was about. Teachers spent fall 1979 watching to see whether the momentum of dissatisfaction would build in the staff about the SBE's position, and in what areas the SBE was prepared to compromise. By the beginning of December 1979, it appeared to them that enough issues on the table could be won with or without a strike, issues which could stand as "face savers"; but on the two major ones, salary and staffing, little more could be achieved without one. Because the teachers' position was then clearly defined in terms of a large number of unresolved issues, with a large monetary gap, and the teachers were not moving on these, the SBE was reacting with a strongly opposed position including the staffing issue, in order to maintain negotiating room.

There are two further reasons which might explain why the SBE did not respond on staffing. It is possible either that they were simply being intransigent on principle or that they did not realize, until they believed it was too late to prevent a strike, that the staffing issue was a central block. In the authors' view, the teachers' firm demands on so many issues tended to reduce the pressure on the SBE, especially since they did not realize how important it was to teachers to move on staffing. This uncertainty was illustrated by one SBE officer: "We knew staffing was important but apparently so were other things. We couldn't zero in on one or two issues and let others go. ... And when we made a proposal it was never satisfactory. They would hang on to a word or clause and try to 'nit pick' us to death." Further, TSS responses indicated that the trustees' expectation of a strike lagged behind that of the negotiating teachers (probably because of the July 1979 meeting); consequently, if they were negotiating to prevent a strike at all, they focused on salary. Only afterwards was it apparent to them that staffing was the other major problem.

In sum, neither side was negotiating to prevent a strike, but for different reasons, and this, in itself, helped to generate one. By the time the trustees realized that strike was a real possibility they also believed that there was little they could do

about it. One SBE officer described the trustees' attitude in late January: "We explored the possibility of making a significant change in our offer to see if that would change anything but one impression was that unless we were prepared to go along with practically all of their requests, that there was no hope of reaching a settlement. We could see no change that the teachers were making in their position. We had been inching our way up but the teachers' demands remained the same."

Other factors which could have helped to prevent a strike were lacking and, as tension began to build, nothing happened to pressure the parties to settle. First of all, there was a lack of communication about the state of negotiations. Neither the teachers (until late November 1979) nor the public were aware of the impasse or of the issues which were impeding settlement until the expectation of a strike by the teachers' negotiation team (and possibly the SBE's) was already conditioning its approach to negotiations. The authors found, for instance, that besides the people very closely involved, few indicated any knowledge that fact-finding and mediation sessions had occurred, much less what recommendations the former had produced.

In part, this may have been because the local daily newspaper was on strike. However, it seems to be a general rule that little information about negotiations is given to the press anyway. While there was talk, prior to the strike, among superintendents and trustees, as well as among OSSTF leaders, that this was going to be "the year," any deterrent influence that "outside" people, such as parents, students, and teaching staff who would be affected by the strike, might have was not there. A number of community leaders told TSS interviewers that teachers they knew said they did not expect a strike to take place when they voted for one: they thought only that their team needed a negotiation weapon and, indeed, they did not really want a strike. One teacher described it as a "flash fire" when he realized there was going to be a strike, since it happened very suddenly. The timing of the vote immediately prior to Christmas also suggests that the teachers' negotiation team was looking for a bargaining weapon and not necessarily intending to use it at that time.

Another factor which could have helped to prevent the strike was the assistance received from the ERC. The almost unanimous opinion of knowledgeable respondents was that the assistance received from fact finding had little effect on negotiations, and that from mediation was not only poor but probably contributed to the impasse. Because it was impossible for the authors to interview the Fact Finder, or the mediators, they know only how the negotiators themselves reacted to this assistance. They cannot judge whether the assistance was itself poor, or whether the two parties either did not understand how to make good use of it or were too entrenched in their positions to respond positively to the suggestions of a third party.

The authors did examine the arguments of the Fact Finder to see why, on the one hand, the teachers found the report "a waste of time" while, on the other hand, the SBE found some of its points useful. In terms of the number of recommendations on items in dispute, and the compromise on monetary issues, the Fact Finder favoured the SBE's position rather than the teachers'. This could have disaffected the teachers. However, the reasons why the Fact Finder favoured the SBE's position are worth considering further, since they indicate a similar perspective to the SBE's. The report shows a preference for the status quo, thus placing an onus on the team proposing modifications to show sufficient reason for a change. This, of course, is a third-party bias, simply because a Fact Finder takes it for granted that the two parties have agreed in the past and found the conditions acceptable. The teachers were already in a weak position because a number of items (including COLE, and seven of the 12 other items outstanding at the beginning of the strike) were new, and on most the SBE was objecting to the change or to additional regulations. Further, the Fact Finder rejected changes or additions to the agreement (e.g., the just cause clause) if they would have a "far-reaching" effect on SBE/staff relations, or if they would unnecessarily regulate such relations.

The Fact Finder also recognized the need for economic restraint and accepted the SBE's concerns about rising costs and the difficulty in meeting them, rather than the teachers' view that the public could and would pay more for a good educational system. While he outlined the teachers' arguments about PTR and quality of education, and acknowledged that staffing was for them the major concern, he recommended the status quo--rejecting the SBE's proposal to increase the general level PTR, because of the pressure on jobs, and the teachers' proposal to decrease all levels, because of costs. None of the Fact Finder's recommendations were based on education-related arguments even though several of the teachers' were.

Whether or not the Fact Finder should use economics, or jobs and management/union relations, instead of quality education as his frame of reference is irrelevant. Unless his understanding of the issues coincides with both parties', and theirs with each other, the fact finding, as in Sudbury, will make little difference to the negotiations and to the blocks impeding settlement. As it was, the trustees felt that the Fact Finder's

report had vindicated them on a number of issues (especially COLE and staffing) and, if the negotiations were to go to arbitration, they would do well in the final judgment (personal notes).

A number of respondents from the "others" category blamed the strike on the influence of the provincial OSSTF, implying that without the presence of the provincial body, the strike would never have occurred. The TSS interviewers found that, especially among trustees and SBE officers, "the teachers" represented three very distinct groups: a) the provincial representatives on the takeover team, who, they believed, were present long before the strike began and who were manipulating local team members; b) the local OSSTF executive and team members, regarded as the militant minority, who cared little about the implications of increased unionization on the quality of education in the secondary system; and c) "our teachers," the large majority of the staff who did care about the system and the students, and were led into the strike because the militant minority in turn manipulated them.

It is not known to the TSS how accurate this assessment of the teachers' group was, because much information is missing. From interviews, the TSS sensed, however, that attributing the strike primarily to provincial OSSTF/AEFO directions underestimated the frustration and determination of local federation leaders and poor staff morale. They believed a strike to be the only way to break out of deteriorating relations with the SBE. A strike, wanted or not, would be a protest showing support for the OSSTF/AEFO negotiation team, regardless of the issues on the table that year. The TSS cannot substantiate this view but can point to indirect evidence, for instance, the difference in assessment of SBE/teacher relations, with administrative officers and prominent trustees seeing them more positively than school superintendents, principals, and trustees in direct contact with teachers, who saw a gap in communication. Another instance was the lack of consensus in teachers' responses about why they were striking but a uniform negative attitude about their working conditions. (These issues are detailed in later chapters.) No doubt the strike experience has coloured teachers' attitudes about the prestrike situation in post hoc justification, but the fact cannot be discounted that the strike was a direct result of the teachers' vote. Without it, the provincial OSSTF and militant minority would have had little power.

In sum, the TSS field studies and documentation have shown that the strike occurred out of a complex combination of circumstances. Economic realities, poor communications, and ineffective outside assistance all contributed. Also, the teachers' negotiation team members were frustrated with previous settlements and were waiting for their "turn to win." This frustration about negotiations, and other elements (such as grievances the previous year in SBE/teacher relations), was filtering through to classroom teachers who were becoming psychologically ready to protest--something of which the SBE seemed unaware. The issues were coincident with a number of provincial OSSTF goals; doubtless, local and provincial OSSTF/AEFO leaders recognized a mutual interest. Further, judging from material written during the strike, the OSSTF perhaps saw Sudbury as a strong union town, where the public would sympathize with its goals and gains could be made. Meanwhile, the assistance which the teams received--for reasons related partly to the teachers' determination to make some gains and partly to the nature of the assistance itself--did little to defuse the situation. Each factor, by itself, would likely have caused the strike, but together they created a situation requiring major concessions from one or both sides to prevent it.

The TSS believes that most people involved in negotiations were acting responsibly (i.e., following procedures accepted as appropriate to their roles). But there were individuals behind the scenes, on each side, who have been criticized for irresponsible behaviour before, during, and after the strike, not only by opponents but by colleagues. The presence and activity of these people (dubbed by their critics as power/publicity seekers for self-aggrandizement) possibly contributed to the strike's occurrence and length. They aggravated the emotional strain by "stirring up the troops," or making the other side angrier. However, others must judge the role of these individuals.

Because the situation and events leading up to the strike were so complex and interrelated, it was difficult to distinguish between direct causes of the strike and contributing factors. The authors were impressed by the dynamics of the situation, where a number of interrelated factors gradually propelled the Sudbury system into a strike; where, for example, people's expectations about what the SBE or the teachers would do, this time round, became self-fulfilling prophecy. Despite this element of inevitability, the fact is that neither side recognized what was happening; and neither side directly

intervened with any pattern-breaking or creative approaches to negotiation prior to the strike. The authors, in emphasizing the apparent inevitability of the strike, do not mean to imply that the teachers' negotiation team did not deliberately present information about negotiations to the teachers in such a way as to "get a strike." One team member who stated this was the case has already been quoted. A more realistic view is to put what many TSS respondents saw as a deliberate generation of a strike into perspective. If either of the two groups were able to manipulate the teachers into voting for a strike, two questions still remain:

1. Why did the OSSTF leaders believe that strike action in Sudbury would be necessary and worth the accompanying loss of pay?

Or, if their motives were less laudable,

2. Why would teachers continue to accept poor leadership in a union whose purported purpose was to represent their interests?

The answers to these questions require examination of the broader situation. Ontario teachers' federations and boards are still experiencing the pains of change and inexperience in the growing unionization of teachers; and teachers are still unaware or unaccepting of the responsibilities accompanying membership in any union which is to remain democratic and balanced in its views about issues. These matters are beyond the scope of this report.

5 Strike Period

The Eleventh Hour

Talks continued under the auspices of the first mediator appointed by the ERC, but the teachers' negotiation committee chairman was "not optimistic" about their success. On 30 January 1980, while discussion was in progress, the teachers issued a notice of intent to strike, and the die was cast. Only a drastic change of position by either side could avert the strike, but no such change took place by 3 February 1980. The mediator adjourned the talks and left Sudbury. The strike began on 6 February 1980 and ended 5 May 1980, when the teachers returned to school. Classes began the next day, ending the 56-day pause in the students' formal education.

In January 1980, preparations for the strike were carried out by both sides. The SBE established a Strike Committee, organized a contingency plan to meet emergencies in the system, assigned specific duties to SBE officers for the duration of the strike, established information and communication channels to meet the expected inquiries from parents, made provisions for securing school properties, and planned weekly, rather than monthly, meetings for the trustees. The comprehensive preparations covered a broad range of expected strike developments, including a change of locks in school entrances to prevent vandalism of school property. The SBE wanted to prepare students for the likelihood of the strike but this was turned down by the teachers.

On their part, teachers gave consideration to such matters as information to members of the federations and the general public, rules regarding prestrike behaviour of teachers, and the financial needs of the striking teachers. The teachers' Rules Committee began to publish a Communications Bulletin on 27 January 1980 as an internal press organ, and 25 numbers were issued by 30 April 1980. In addition, a series of ads were planned for broadcast on the local radio stations and to appear in print in the local press. The rules of behaviour specified who, among the teachers, could cross their own picket lines. Principals and vice-principals were obliged to continue working under the provisions of Bill 100, and the OSSTF/AEFO Rules Committee advised those teachers on occasional contract, those in the last years of employment, and some other categories, involving in all about 20 teachers, to report for work as usual. With regard to finances, teachers were to receive \$30 daily for each working day of the strike and were told that a Strike Funds and Loans Committee would be established, with provisions for "forgivable loans for hardship cases." It was also announced that principals and vice-principals "volunteered" to turn over their salaries to the strike fund and would receive the same strike pay as the other striking teachers (Sudbury Star, 4 February 1980). This report proved to be erroneous, but provisions were made to meet the financial requirements of the "needy" teachers.

Additional planning was carried out regarding picketing, strike captains, local strike offices, channels of communication, and behaviour during the picketing. There was to be a period of picketing, then monitoring of school entrances from parked automobiles. There was to be no harassment of anyone entering school property. Individual teachers were requested not to talk to reporters. In addition, the Communications Bulletin of 27 January 1980 emphasized that teachers should not continue any extracurricular activities, or tutor or assist students in any other way. According to the report on a meeting of the

OSSTF/AEFO Collective Bargaining Committee (24 January 1980), teachers were "not to hand out outlines or courses of study to the students in preparation for any possible strike." The teachers were also told not to teach any night school courses.

It is obvious that the SBE and the teachers expected the strike, but many parents did not. Exactly half the parents thought that a strike would not take place because the two sides would reach a "last minute" agreement, or that teachers would not jeopardize the students' education. It is not certain if most students knew of the impending strike. Teachers responding to the TSS through the mailed questionnaires were asked about this, and 27.7 per cent indicated that they had formally discussed the possibility of the strike with their students, 27.3 per cent had hinted to students that the strike might take place, and 38.6 per cent had not raised this matter at all. Only 20.5 per cent of teachers claimed that they had offered students advice on what to do if a strike took place (over two-thirds of this advice was for students to acquire the study programs), while five teachers (11.4 per cent) had suggested that alternative schools should be considered. Another 36.4 per cent did not offer advice, 29.5 per cent gave such hints as "keep busy" or "do your work at home." Only 18.2 per cent of teachers felt that an alternative form of education should have been available to students in case of a lengthy strike. Concern over this position was raised by the editor of the Sudbury Star (5 March 1980), "The teachers declined to map out any suggested course of study for their students in whatever length of shut down lay ahead."

The TSS asked teachers if they were ready for the strike: 65.9 per cent answered yes, 6.8 per cent were uncertain, 22.1 per cent answered no, and 4.5 per cent did not answer. Information collected from teachers established that 54.5 per cent felt that their financial resources were fully adequate, 6.8 per cent barely adequate, 25 per cent inadequate, and 13.6 per cent did not answer. Only three teachers (6.8 per cent) reported experiencing financial problems during the strike. Asked about their frame of mind regarding the strike, 52.3 per cent said they were fully ready, 15.9 per cent were somewhat ready, 4.5 per cent were not ready, 9.1 per cent were uncertain about their resolve to strike, and 18.2 per cent did not answer.

The question of financial readiness was cross-tabulated with selected background characteristics of teachers (see table 5.1). The results indicate that those who were single, earning under \$20 000 annually, with teaching experience under five or over 20 years, and with ethnic background in the "other" category were not as well prepared for the strike. Those whose income was over \$30 000, with six to 10 years of teaching experience, and with ethnic background listed as "Canadian" and who saw themselves as "natives of Northern Ontario" were more prepared for the strike. Interestingly, all French-background teachers claimed that they were either ready or not certain about their readiness. While there is not adequate evidence to support this hypothesis, information gained through informal discussions with a number of knowledgeable people suggests that francophone teachers were more militant, more ready to strike, and more prepared to stay on strike to gain their objectives.

Negotiations During the Strike

As noted earlier, the mediator adjourned the talks on 3 February 1980, and the SBE, meeting the next day, decided not to increase its offer to teachers "because of the wide gap

Table 5.1: Teachers' Financial Preparedness for the Strike by Selected Variables

	No	Yes	Not Certain	N
	%			
Marital Status				
Single	50.0	25.0	25.0	4
Married	22.2	72.2	5.6	36
Other	-	100.0	-	2
Income				
Under \$20 000	50.0	50.0	-	2
\$20 000-24 999	25.0	62.5	12.5	8
\$25 000-29 999	33.3	66.7	-	3
\$30 000 +	20.7	72.4	6.9	29
Years of Teaching Experience				
Under 5	50.0	50.0	-	4
6 - 10	10.0	80.0	10.0	10
11 - 15	25.0	68.7	6.3	16
16 - 20	28.6	71.4	-	7
21 +	50.0	-	50.0	2
Ethnic Background				
Anglo-Celt	26.1	69.6	4.3	23
French	-	66.7	33.3	6
Canadian	-	100.0	-	2
Other	40.0	60.0	-	10
Native of Northern Ontario				
No	23.5	58.8	17.6	17
Yes	24.0	76.0	-	25

between the two groups" (Sudbury Star, 2 February 1980). The major points emphasized by an SBE spokesman were that the two sides were \$3 million apart on wages and staffing. To meet the teachers' demands regarding staffing and PTRs, the SBE would need 52 more teachers than budgeted for and it could not afford these extras while secondary school enrolment declined.

The teachers' position, as outlined by the chairman of their bargaining committee (Northern Life, 13 February 1980), pointed out that only one concern, the rewording of a transfer clause, had been settled in the past 13 months of talks. None of the major issues had been resolved: wages (including the regular increment and COLE); summer and night schools; workloads; standardized evaluation, retirement gratuity, and sabbaticals. In addition, teachers emphasized the need for formal avenues of input into policy matters, and consideration for redeployment of staff because of the closing of some schools.

The two sides were explicit in listing their positions just prior to the beginning of the strike. Whatever understanding was achieved in the past, both sides obviously reverted to their original positions, or withdrew any points of accommodation after the January 1980 talks broke down. Most likely, teachers expanded their terms for a settlement at this time.

Despite the wide gaps, predictions were for a four- to six-week strike. On the second day of the strike there were "indicators that a return to a bargaining table is imminent" (Sudbury Star, 7 February 1980). Nonetheless, as a sign of strength, teachers set up picket lines in front of SBE offices on 8 February 1980, and about 200 teachers "demonstrated" for a few hours (CKSO, 8 February 1980).

The SBE did not issue any statement on the teachers' decision to strike, but one trustee wrote to the Sudbury Star (9 February 1980) urging the parents to "harass the teachers" to accept the offer and return to work. The teachers were criticized for being too concerned with money, and were advised to take an example from Mother Theresa, the 1979 Nobel Peace Prize winner, also a former teacher, as a model for modesty in demands. The letter created a furor, but the other trustees formally dissociated themselves from their colleague's statement on 11 February 1980, and teachers allowed this matter to rest.

On 11 February 1980, the SBE received a written request from the chief negotiator for the teachers' takeover team to reconvene "non-stop" negotiations. This "overture" was studied by the SBE and a request was submitted to the ERC to provide a mediator for the dispute. The mediator would first establish if there was a sincere attempt by both sides to bridge the gap, "since negotiations from a rigid position were a waste of time." The ERC was advised, too, that the first mediator was unacceptable. The SBE negotiation committee chairman thought that the teachers wanted to settle and "the climate for a settlement is right; after, the teachers' attitudes will harden."

The vice-chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board (OLRB) was appointed on 14 February 1980 and, assisted by the Director of the ERC, began to mediate the dispute on 18 February 1980. As in all such cases, a news blackout was imposed but the mediator was quoted as saying, shortly after, that the issues separating the two sides "are very complex and time consuming" (CKSO, 20 February 1980). The talks were recessed "for a few days" on 21 February 1980, to allow the mediator to "attend previous business commitments." It was learned from one informant that the mediator left "in disgust," as both sides were rigid, with no flexibility on either side. Officially, both parties undertook to reassess their position prior to the next bargaining session.

No further negotiations were announced at that time, and on 26 February 1980 the SBE served notice of intention to lock out the remaining "working" teachers. The lockout was termed a "control mechanism," to allow the SBE a more orderly start-up once the strike ended. It was likely intended to indicate to teachers that the SBE was resolute in its position on negotiations. According to the Globe and Mail report (28 February 1980), the lockout of about 15 teachers, mostly those nearing retirement, was meant to serve "as a pressure tactic, to force a change in the teachers' bargaining position." On the same day, the SBE spokesman was quoted on radio station CKSO as saying that only three or four areas of dispute remained and others were near settlement. The SBE also clarified its position on contract-stripping in a public announcement on 29 February 1980. This clause, which the SBE wanted withheld from any new teachers hired, referred to retirement gratuities. The SBE argued that it faced a \$10 million "unfunded liability" unless a reserve was established for this provision.

On 3 March 1980, the SBE clarified its stand on working conditions and the talks, with the mediator present, resumed on 6 March 1980. Neither side was hopeful for success in this round of negotiations. The sessions were characterized by growing acrimony and accusations from both sides, as a result of prominent ads which had appeared in the local press shortly before. (More on this later.) Teachers speculated that "some members of the Board's negotiation team may have vested interests in prolonging the strike" and that the SBE's public ads "have poisoned the well" (Sudbury Star, 8 March 1980). There were accusations that the teachers were not only changing their position but escalating their

demands as the strike continued, and that they were fighting the battle of the provincial federation executives.

Each side blamed the other for their rigid position. They were \$2.5 million apart in wages and, according to the SBE spokesmen, "The wages, workload, and staffing are the major outstanding issues, but all other items can be resolved." Only 12 major issues were listed by teachers after their submission to the Fact Finder in late 1979; now 14 major issues were outstanding, especially the cost-of-living clause.

It was not surprising, given the lack of flexibility combined with bitter accusations on both sides, that the talks broke down on 8 March 1980. According to the SBE negotiation board chairman, "Both sides were no closer to a settlement than they were on February 6th" (CKSO, 10 March 1980). Subsequently, the two sides modified their position on salaries, narrowing the gap to \$1.5 million by 11 March 1980. "Both sides were willing to resume bargaining but neither side was moving in that direction" according to a CKSO newscast on the same day. Also, on that date, the SBE implemented lockout, a decision affecting 14 teachers still showing up for work. The sanctions on both sides were now complete.

The acting mediator had likely indicated to the ERC that the situation was extremely complex, and that a new mediation approach should be considered. The ERC announced on 14 March 1980 that a three-member mediation team would come to Sudbury to help resolve the stalemate. At the same time, the ERC clearly specified that the onus for a settlement was on the disputants; they should not look to mediators or government to resolve their differences.

The three-man team of mediators, appointed 18 March 1980, included a Toronto lawyer, a former provincial NDP leader, and the previous mediator appointed by the ERC. Talks were to resume on 28 March 1980. According to Communications Bulletin no. 21, the three-man team was "a high powered attempt to encourage both sides to settle." Failure was expected to result in a legislated settlement. There was hope that with the help of these "experts" in mediation, the talks would be successful and "the strike would be over by Easter," that is, by 6 April 1980 (Sudbury Star, 17 March 1980).

In the meantime, some trustees were lobbying for jeopardy hearings by 19 March 1980. There were also suggestions for binding arbitration, which was rejected by the Sudbury Star (19 March 1980) as "not a workable option" since the major issues would not be solved. On 17 March 1980, the provincial OSSTF threatened that, because of inability to reach a settlement, teachers may have to fail some students. This brought a quick response from the Minister of Education, who termed such threats "abuse of power" (Toronto Star, 19 March 1980).

Talks with the mediators resumed on 28 March 1980. The usual news blackout was in effect. A reporter for the local daily pointed out that "the right to information on the bargaining position of both sides was not available to the public," although he doubted if the public would be interested in the details (Sudbury Star, 26 March 1980). The team met for 37 hours with both sides and, though the SBE promised more money and staff, the talks broke down on 30 March 1980. "Reconciliation was not achieved" was the official statement on this failure.

Despite the brevity of negotiations and the presence of three skilled mediators, the talks served only to deepen the unfriendly attitudes on both sides. A bitter spokesman for the teachers' negotiation committee claimed that "a threat of arbitration has impeded the Sudbury talks," and that "the teachers were being used by the ERC--the threat was there--to settle or else." Further,

... the Board was avoiding the bargaining process. ... The Board is waiting for the government to step in ... the OSTC waited, hopeful that the strike in Sudbury would be another reason for eliminating Bill 100. ... Obviously, more than Sudbury was on the line. [CKSO, 31 March 1980]

The chief negotiator for the takeover team claimed that "jeopardy hearings [which the SBE requested] are an easy way out ... they [the SBE] are sitting tight, they are not moving. They are presumably waiting for legislation to get them off the hook" (CKSO, 2 April 1980). The SBE was in favour of voluntary arbitration, charging that the Sudbury teachers "are puppets of provincial Federations," and many trustees wondered if Sudbury was a "special test case" for the provincial OSSTF/AEFO (Sudbury Star, 31 March 1980). In the SBE's view, "The provincial Federations are using our students, and our teachers to promote their provincial objectives" (Sudbury Star, 1 April 1980). The proposal for voluntary arbitration was rejected by the teachers because there were too many unresolved items, not likely to be solved by an arbitrator. According to a spokesman for the teachers, "Arbitration is burying the hatchet in a shallow ground" (Sudbury Star, 4 April 1980). A strong rebuttal was presented to SBE charges that Sudbury teachers "are puppets of provincial Federations"--"absolutely absurd" (Sudbury Star, 2 April 1980).

The teachers' negotiation team sought reaffirmation of its mandate to continue its position. At a closed mass meeting of teachers, held at the Local 6500 USWA hall, they voted for continuation of the strike. No information is available on the number of teachers attending or the proportion voting in favour.

From December 1979 to April 1980, the teachers' negotiation team was inflexible, according to a trustee on the SBE's negotiation team. Because of the breakdown in the latest negotiation efforts, and little prospect of a change in position on either side, the SBE formally asked the ERC to hold jeopardy hearings. Teachers saw this as an attempt to use the ERC to break the strike. "The Board decided before the negotiations began that back-to-work legislation could be the route they could eventually follow" (CKSO, 1 April 1980). There was no immediate answer to the SBE's request, but on 2 April 1980, the chairman of the ERC issued a formal statement requesting the two sides to reevaluate their positions and to return to the bargaining table. There would be no hearings since the students were not considered in jeopardy at the time. In response to this refusal, the chairman of the SBE announced that "the Board will reevaluate its position."

Officially, teachers had guidance from the provincial takeover team in negotiations since 14 January 1980. In turn, the SBE voted to empower a lawyer to advise, "and possibly carry out some negotiations on behalf of the SBE," on 3 April 1980. This advisor participated in negotiations from 10 April 1980 until agreement was reached. He was termed "an impediment to settlement" by teachers (Communications Bulletin, no. 14).

On 4 April 1980, the SBE sent a registered letter to Lieutenant Governor Pauline McGibbon, requesting that jeopardy hearings be held regarding the continuing strike in

Sudbury. This did not change the position taken by the ERC. By 11 April 1981, the strike was nine-and-a-half weeks old, 40 teaching days were already lost. It was becoming a major concern not only for both sides, but for parents, students, and the community. Various groups, organizations, and individuals expressed their concern. While the common theme was "end the strike," there were few public signs of support for the teachers. Indeed, public sentiment was expressed in a Sudbury Star editorial (5 April 1980): that the teachers' position could not merit sympathy, rather "the trustees have an obligation to hold the line" because of inflation and heavy demands on the taxpayer. The editor urged a repeal of Bill 100 so that "students and taxpayers cannot be plagued by school strikes."

On 8 April 1980, the teachers sent a letter to the SBE indicating willingness to resume talks, but with a proviso that arbitration would not be considered. The SBE also indicated willingness, so the three-man team returned to Sudbury on 10 April 1980 for another attempt to settle the dispute. Radio station CKSO announced, "There is a great deal of optimism about the renewed talks" (10 April 1980). The team asked each side to prepare, in total confidentiality, its final position on each disputed item (i.e., how far each was willing to compromise). The submissions showed that the two sides were far apart on some major points and were unwilling to modify them. Negotiations were adjourned on 12 April 1980 without achieving anything and the team returned to Toronto. On 17 April 1980 the Sudbury Star editor marked the occasion of the 45th day of strike, the longest on record in Ontario's history; he urged, once again, that Bill 100 be rescinded.

The ERC, concerned with the lack of success of its appointed mediators, convened a special meeting of all members on 15 April 1980 to consider the situation in Sudbury. It was announced publicly that the Minister of Education had no plans to get involved in the strike but was obviously keeping a close watch on its developments. The Hon. Bette Stephenson, Minister of Education, said:

No one is more concerned about the educational experience these children are having than the minister at this point. I can say that some method of making up some of the lost time for the students in Sudbury, will be necessary ... the educational system can be modified to achieve the necessary quality of education those deserve and will achieve. [Hansard, Legislature of Ontario, 15 April 1980; 779]

As a result of the ERC meeting, both sides were called to Toronto to resume negotiations on 18 April 1980. The three-man team continued to assist in these talks, which continued to 20 April, and again broke down, since neither side was willing to compromise further. According to the Communications Bulletin (21 April 1980), "The teachers reduced their demands by \$1 260 000 and the Board increased its offer by \$122 000." Also, that the board was waiting "for an outside solution" and that "if trustees wait long enough they will subvert Bill 100." The teachers returned to Sudbury angry and frustrated. The report of 21 April 1980, presented by the teachers' negotiation team to the strike captains, claimed that the team of mediators "worked on the teachers ... there were heated exchanges ... the teachers felt victimized; that after an all-night session, teachers were subjected to further pressure at 5:00 a.m. but held firm." The sides were half a million dollars apart on wages and 10 teaching positions apart and it was up to the board to make the necessary concessions. Facing a stalemate, the mediators adjourned the talks, advising the ERC to disband the team, but did not recommend any other form of bargaining, or arbitration, or jeopardy hearings.

On 21 April 1980, the SBE submitted a brief to the ERC, including a preliminary evaluation of instructional effects of the strike on students, as well as social effects, referring to the increasing incidence of shoplifting among the idle young people. The ERC refused to hear this brief and denied that the students were in jeopardy. In a public announcement, the Minister of Education stated that "steps will be taken to ensure that all Sudbury students finish their year successfully."

After the unsuccessful talks in Toronto, the SBE negotiation team made an unexpected new offer to the teachers that provided salary increases from 10.66 per cent to 12.5 per cent, the contentious sick-leave gratuity, and no changes in sabbaticals. The offer, which would have made Sudbury teachers among the highest paid in Ontario, was delivered directly to the teachers' negotiation team and simultaneously announced in the local daily press. It was news to many teachers, who thought that the SBE was still intent on contract-stripping, with only a 6 per cent increase in salaries. It was also news to the other trustees on the SBE. The announced terms of settlement were termed "capitulation" by one trustee. The new proposals were not approved by the whole SBE. According to the Sudbury Star (23 April 1980), there was confusion on this position between the negotiation team and other members of the SBE. The SBE voted that the previous offer, already rejected by the federations, was to be the only and final position of the SBE. The teachers were "to take it or leave it" since "the offer was not negotiable."

Despite these contradictory SBE positions, talks resumed on 24 April 1980. For the first time in 1980, there were face-to-face meetings, assisted by two very experienced mediators--the Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour and the vice-chairman of the Ontario Labour Relations Board. The presence of these two individuals at the talks was not announced to the public. Despite the news blackout on proceedings, the strike in Sudbury, according to the Director of the SBE, was not only the longest but was given the most press coverage of any such strike (Sudbury Star, 25 April 1980). On the day talks resumed, the Minister of Education announced, "I am running out of patience" with the situation in Sudbury. In a direct response, the provincial OSSTF threatened a half-day study session across the province, should the government force Sudbury teachers back to school.

The talks made some progress. Ten of 16 outstanding items were quickly signed off, but the contentious issues of salaries and staffing remained deadlocked. The talks were adjourned on 27 April 1980 for each side to review its position. The mediators returned to Toronto. On 28 April 1980, at what was reported as "a stormy meeting," the SBE vetoed any increase in the monetary offer to teachers; it was to remain at 17.5 per cent over the two-year contract.

Informal talks were held on 29 April 1980, and formal talks were planned for the following day, although prospects for a settlement were considered "very dim" (CKSO, 28 April 1980). On 30 April 1980, the Minister of Education called both sides to Toronto to resume talks, beginning at 7:00 p.m. After just over 13 hours of nonstop negotiations, with the two mediators who took part in the last talks, a tentative agreement was reached at Queen's Park at 8:15 a.m. on 1 May 1980. The Minister of Education admitted that legislation to force the teachers back to work would have been introduced and binding arbitration imposed if agreement was not reached that day. A ratification vote was planned for 2 May 1980 by the SBE; teachers expected to hold a mass meeting on 2 May 1980, and vote on the contract during the next two days. The SBE voted in favour, with only one dissenting vote; 63.8 per cent of teachers voted in favour (493 out of 773 votes cast).

In brief, the new two-year contract included average salary increases of 8.26 per cent and 8.17 per cent. Teachers were not at the top of provincial standards but near the middle. The new agreement included COLE provisions of \$100 for every full percentage point of the Consumer Price Index above 9 per cent from 1 January 1980 to 1 December 1980. Among other major issues settled were just cause for dismissals, demotions, and discipline; redeployment of staff affected by the closure of Copper Cliff High School; more staff rights in the teachers' evaluation process; the establishment of standard workloads. The planned cutbacks in staff were reduced from 130 to 110, and there was no stripping of previous gains (i.e., gratuity). There were no provisions for allowing students to make up lost time. In general, teachers were disappointed and bitter, attested by the fact that 36.2 per cent voted against the terms. According to one spokesman, "The members are returning to work with bitter feelings" because of the statements and the attitude of the administration. The 1980 strike "will haunt Sudbury for years to come" (Sudbury Star, 5 May 1980).

Evaluation of the Negotiations

All TSS respondents were asked to comment on and evaluate the strike period negotiations between teachers and the SBE. Each segment--"others," teachers, parents--will be considered in turn, with additional attention to parents' responses because of the nature of the sample.

Of the 61 "others" who considered the question of whether one side or the other took greater initiative in settling the dispute, 62.3 per cent did not think so, were uncertain, thought that both sides were inflexible, or did not answer. The remaining 37.7 per cent believed that initiative was shown, but did not indicate clearly which side showed more concern for a settlement. Asked if a settlement could have been reached without a strike, 39.4 per cent disagreed, 35.4 per cent agreed, 26.2 per cent offered mixed explanations or did not know. These answers were cross-tabulated by specific subcategories making up this group, and the results are shown in table 5.2.

Table 5.2: Could Have Settled without a Strike:
"Others" Respondents

	Disagree	Not Certain	Agree	Other	N
	%				
Board Officers, Trustees	44.7	6.9	37.9	10.3	29
Principals, Vice-Principals	60.0	20.0	20.0	-	5
Community Leaders	37.5	16.7	33.3	12.5	24

N = 61

Principals/vice-principals were more certain that the strike was inevitable than the other two subcategories of respondents. As members of teachers' federations, they were aware of the seriousness of issues separating the two sides. No subcategory of respondents had a majority who believed a settlement was possible without a strike. Other responses commented: "The teachers kept shifting their position" ... "the Board underestimated the seriousness of the teachers' demands" ... "if there was more pressure from the community" ... "if the parents were more aware of what was going on."

As expected, teacher respondents had a partisan view of the efforts towards a settlement by the two sides. The data in table 5.3 show that teachers had a positive image of the federations' efforts to settle, in sharp contrast to an overwhelmingly negative evaluation of the SBE's stand.

Table 5.3: Teachers' Evaluation of Strike-Period Negotiations

	%	
	Federations	Board
Willing to Compromise	50.0	6.8
Unwilling to Compromise	9.1	70.5
Mixed, Depending on Issues	36.4	13.6
Other	-	2.3
No Opinion	2.3	4.5
No Answer	2.3	2.3

N = 44

Even when qualifying their responses, or indicating that the answer depended on issues, teachers had a more negative evaluation of the SBE: "The Board took a hard stand on most issues" ... "everytime we compromised the Board would play games" ... "we compromised but in the end little was gained" ... "the Board sat out one month of the strike and then offered us an extra penny" ... "the Board chose to use the tax base as the issue rather than to try to work out a compromise." There was little indication from teachers' comments that they accepted the SBE rationalization of its position because of economic constraints and declining enrolment.

Fewer than half the parents remembered specific events of the 1980 strike negotiations: 59.7 per cent did not remember any details one year later; 17.1 per cent remembered the presence of mediators; 6.1 per cent remembered the students' marches and sit-in; 1.2 per cent mentioned the ads used by both sides; and 15.9 per cent recalled other events such as the students' trip to Toronto, public meetings, petitions, or more than one of these.

Parents were more evenly divided in their evaluation of settlement efforts. Table 5.4 shows that both teachers and the SBE were deemed by close to half the parents not to have made all possible effort to settle their dispute. A far greater proportion of parents thought that the SBE did make such an effort, compared with less effort from teachers.

Table 5.4: Were There Special Efforts Made to Settle the Strike?
Parent Respondents

	%	
	By Federations	By SBE
No	52.4	41.5
Yes	18.3	45.1
Uncertain/Don't Know	28.0	13.4
No Answer	1.2	-

N = 82

In general, parents thought teachers more guilty of obstinacy than the SBE. Their comments reflected a broad range of views and criticism: "The teachers wanted to go on strike. The strike pay was too good" ... "the teachers tried to settle but the Board didn't want to" ... "the leaders of the teachers wanted to make themselves look good" ... "Sudbury was a test case for the Federations because it's a union town" ... "educational concerns should be above personal gain" ... "granting the teachers the right to strike was political and not dictated by concern with education." Some comments were more general, applying also to the SBE: "The negotiations were confrontation politics and the Board was playing politics" ... "the Board was hard nosed" ... "the necessary communication between the Board and the teachers was lacking, or was based on half truths" ... "the Board should have held out longer" ... "the Board held their position and suddenly caved in ... they shouldn't have capitulated" ... "the students were totally shortchanged in their educational opportunities because of the long strike."

What did parents see as the main stumbling blocks to settlement of the strike? The SBE's position was interpreted in a clearly different way than was portrayed by teachers. Only 2.4 per cent considered the SBE the "guilty" party; 35.4 per cent stipulated teachers' demands as the main barrier to settlement; a significant proportion considered both sides shared the blame for the length of the strike by their inflexibility. (See table 5.5.)

Table 5.5: Main Stumbling Blocks to a Settlement: Parent Respondents

	%
Position of SBE	2.4
Teachers' Demands	35.4
Obstinacy on Both Sides	22.0
Poor Negotiation Process	3.7
Other, More Than One	13.4
Not Certain, Don't Know	23.2

N = 82

It is interesting that over one-fifth of parents blamed both sides for being too rigid in their respective positions, since many TSS teacher respondents thought that parents were overwhelmingly supportive of the SBE's position. The parents' comments expressed impartiality: "There was lack of communication" ... "when the two sides were ready to settle, they did" ... "personality clashes contributed as well." (For additional data on these points see table A4 in Appendix 1.)

Table 5.6 shows that Protestant-background parents with higher education saw the SBE's position as the main stumbling block to a settlement, and many of these respondents sympathized with the teachers' position. Those who were not sure about the question fell into the category of grade 8 education and Roman Catholic church affiliation. But the blank spaces, where no blame was attached (in the "SBE's Position" column), are in sharp contrast to the consistent indictment of teachers by over one-third of all respondents in this category. With minor variations, the factors of education, religious affiliation, and home ownership did not signify wide differences of opinion; few saw the SBE alone as responsible for the length of the strike; over half the parents considered that the

Table 5.6: Main Stumbling Blocks to a Settlement: Parent Respondents by Selected Background Characteristics

	Not Certain	Teachers' Demands	SBE's Position	Poor Nego- tiations %	Both Sides Obstinate	Other	N
Education							
Less than Grade 8	-	33.3	-	-	33.3	33.3	6
Grade 8	8.3	41.7	-	8.3	33.3	8.3	12
Some High School	-	48.1	3.7	7.4	29.6	11.1	27
Completed High School	-	60.0	-	-	20.0	20.0	5
Higher Education	-	55.6	11.1	-	-	33.3	9
Special Education	-	33.3	-	-	66.7	-	3
Religion							
Roman Catholic	2.4	43.9	2.4	4.9	29.3	17.1	41
Protestant	-	46.2	7.7	-	15.4	30.8	13
Other Religions	-	50.0	-	12.5	37.5	-	8
Other, No Religion	-	50.0	-	-	50.0	-	2
Home Ownership							
Own	1.9	44.2	3.8	5.8	25.0	19.2	52
Rent	-	50.0	-	-	47.1	8.3	12

teachers' position alone, or the obstinacy on both sides, accounted for the strike "dragging on."

Parents' Reaction to the Strike

Only 12.2 per cent of parents were unconcerned with the effects of the strike on the education of their youngsters, largely because they considered their children good students and it would be easy for them to catch up or make up the time lost to the strike. A proportion of parents were unconcerned since their children were enrolled in other schools. Of the total, 63.5 per cent claimed that they tried unsuccessfully to enrol their children in local separate or private secondary schools. Still, according to interview data, 8.5 per cent of affected students were enrolled in other schools--2.4 per cent in Sudbury and 6.1 per cent elsewhere. These percentages do not correspond to the figure of 444 students (3.3 per cent of 13 525) given by the SBE, and no ready answers are available for the discrepancy. If the SBE figures are correct, it may be possible that parents confused the intent of enrolling their children in alternative schools with actual enrolment.

Parents concerned over the effects of the strike on their children identified the possibility of failure (45.2 per cent); inactivity leading to laziness (5.5 per cent); danger of picking up bad habits (1.4 per cent); difficulty in finding alternative education (8.2 per cent); more than one reason (4.1 per cent); and a variety of reasons (35.6 per cent). Frequently expressed concerns were the expected problem of catching up after all the school time missed; the inactivity, which encouraged quitting school

altogether; the possibility that the diplomas would not be acceptable by some universities; and the likelihood of failure in "harder" subjects. Only 2.4 per cent of parents did not encourage their children to continue studies during the strike period. In their comments to the TSS interviewers, an overwhelming majority of parents expressed deep concern over the possibility of their children losing some or all credits for the year, developing negative attitudes towards education and towards the teachers, or deciding not to continue with their education.

During interviews, parents were asked exactly what effect the strike had on their children. For 57.3 per cent, parents claimed the strike had no serious effect; 2.4 per cent said students made up the lost time by studying more; 17.1 per cent said students were in danger of failing a year or subject(s); and 23.2 per cent gave various responses: "The strike affected different children differently" ... "they got discouraged and quit" ... "my son got a job and is working full time" ... "he moved away" ... "had to repeat a grade."

It was pointed out by some TSS respondents in the "others" category that teachers' strikes in other parts of Ontario were characterized by great parental pressure on both sides in the dispute, and that this pressure speeded up settlement. The TSS inquired if Sudbury-area parents exerted pressure on the negotiation teams to speed up settlement. Their involvement in the educational system was determined first by asking about their input into the school system. Only 6.1 per cent belonged to an education-related association or organization. Asked why they did not belong to a school association, 18.3 per cent said no such association existed in their school; 22 per cent had no spare time; 17.1 per cent were not interested; 18.3 per cent had never heard of an association for secondary school parents; 11 per cent gave a variety of responses; and 13.4 per cent did not answer.

The fact that few organizations concerned with secondary schools, or education in general, were active before the strike explains the dearth of organized parental activity during the strike. Some individual "activists" tried to organize and co-ordinate parental concerns in their schools. The most prominent and successful group was the Association of Concerned Parents, which held a meeting on 26 February 1980 with spokesmen from both sides in the dispute. The local press reported that about 175 parents and others attended. This meeting served primarily as a forum for a few parents to voice their concerns and for teachers and the SBE to restate their positions. No specific resolutions were made at that time.

There were no further public meetings, but a few members from the Association of Concerned Parents continued activities such as gathering names for petitions and writing letters to the ERC, newspapers, and the Minister of Education. A close check of newspaper reports discovered no other parental organizations. There were a few meetings of concerned parents, but they did not lead to the formation of organized activities. Information from parents shows that 20.7 per cent were aware of such school meetings but only 3.7 per cent participated. More than half the parents (59.7 per cent) did not know of any parental organization concerned with the strike. One respondent told the TSS that "some parishioners wanted to form an organization to teach their children, or to supervise studies, but not many parents were interested so it fell through."

Parental concern involved signing petitions: one, with over 3000 names, was sent to the Ministry of Education on 5 March 1980; another, with over 4000 names, was delivered to the Minister of Education on 9 April 1980. The petitions urged the Minister of Education to end the school strike, as students were in jeopardy of losing their year. The message was "to restore the educational system." Signatures were not limited to parents of secondary school children.

In addition, a telegram signed by 40 concerned parents was sent to the ERC on 4 April 1980, another on 21 April 1980, both urging the ERC to hold jeopardy hearings. A telegram was sent to Premier William Davis on 5 April 1980, asking him to order jeopardy hearings for Sudbury. The Minister of Education responded to the second petition on 12 May 1980, after settlement of the strike. Neither the ERC nor the Premier responded publicly to the telegrams. How effective this form of concern can be is uncertain, but, in the case of Sudbury, it is doubtful if the signatures and the telegrams had any effect on the decisions made by the ERC or the Minister of Education.

Efforts were made to determine what parents did during the strike to affect its length. Each possibility, such as "Did you telephone?", was raised and parents were given every opportunity to indicate their involvement in these areas (see table 5.7).

Table 5.7: Parents' Activities during the Strike:
Parent Respondents

Communication to/with:	Trustees	SBE Officers	Principals	More than One	Mass Media	Minister of Education	Teachers' Federation	Teachers
Telephoned	2.4%	3.7%	6.1%	4.9%	-	1.2%	3.7%	1.2%
Sent a Letter	-	-	-	-	1.2%	-	-	-
Verbal Communication	-	-	-	-	1.2%	-	-	1.2%

N = 82

Table 5.7 shows that only a small proportion of parents expressed concern in concrete form over the duration of the strike. Communication with principals was mainly to inquire about students' study outlines or to request other information. Calls to the SBE were either for inquiry or to express support for the stand taken by the SBE negotiation team. The Director of the ERC told the authors that many parents telephoned him in Toronto and expressed a "great deal" of concern over the effects of the strike.

Both teachers and "others" respondents of the TSS were asked to comment on parents' reaction to the strike. Only 11.4 per cent thought parents were concerned; 2.3 per cent said parents acted on these concerns; and 38.7 per cent believed parents were unorganized, or apathetic and not concerned. Asked if they expected greater parental concern over the strike's effects, 65.9 per cent answered yes; 29.5 per cent, no; and 4.5 per cent did not answer. Some teachers explained the low level of parental activity by: "People in Sudbury are used to strikes" ... "Sudburians are blasé about any work stoppage" ... "the parents lacked education to organize."

Teachers were asked to evaluate the parents' position towards the two sides during the strike. Over 50 per cent considered parents unsympathetic to their demands. Some were resigned--"one cannot expect anything different from a community dominated by union mentality"--but the majority thought that parents were angry and bitter--"their baby sitters are making too much money."

"Others" respondents were also asked to evaluate the parents' position towards the two sides during the strike: 32.8 per cent considered parents anti-teacher and pro-SBE; 1.6 per cent, anti-SBE; none, pro-teacher. The responses were examined further to see if the subcategories within this group differed in their views (see table 5.8).

Table 5.8: General Strike-Period Attitude of Parents:
"Others" Respondents

	Indifferent	Impartial	Anti-Teacher	Pro-SBE	Anti-SBE	Pro-Teacher	Other	N
				%				
SBE Officers/ Trustees	-	-	25.0	3.6	-	-	71.4	28
Principals/ Vice-Principals	16.7	16.7	33.3	16.7	-	-	16.7	6
Community Leaders	8.0	4.0	36.0	-	4.0	-	48.0	25

The three subcategories differed significantly. Surprisingly, only a small percentage of SBE respondents (SBE officers/trustees) considered parents pro-SBE. Yet, many trustees and SBE officers realized, from analysis of letters to the editor and telephone calls to SBE offices, that parents were overwhelmingly supportive of the SBE's position during the strike.

The TSS "others" respondents had a different view from parents and teachers, ascribing more concern and activity to parents than they had. Only 8.2 per cent considered parents apathetic or unconcerned with the strike's duration; 80.3 per cent considered that parents expressed concern through petitions, public meetings, letters to educational authorities and newspapers, and similar actions. Teachers had a more negative view of the parents' position: only a minority showed concern; most were uninvolved or disinterested in working towards a settlement.

Students' Reaction

The activities of students affected by the strike can be divided into two periods--the immediate reaction on 7 February 1980 and the more concerted efforts of late April 1980. The number of students actually involved in strike protest was never more than two or three hundred of the over 13 000 enrolled at the beginning of the academic year. Since students were not research subjects, the TSS cannot say what motivated them to petition the SBE in February 1980, or to take more visible and demanding steps in April 1980. Undoubtedly, senior students, especially those who were not top academic achievers, were concerned over their future prospects, even more if they planned to enrol at a university. This was not

necessarily borne out in their reaction to the opportunity of catching up in May and June 1980. (More about this in the next chapter.)

On the second day of the strike, the president of the Students' Council of Franco-Jeunesse Secondary School organized a petition, to be signed by students and parents and submitted to the SBE. This was to be accompanied by a massive march on the Civic Square complex housing the SBE offices. The petition, bearing 3000 signatures, and requesting the SBE to end the strike, was submitted to the SBE chairman by the president of the Students' Council, accompanied by 51 students, on 20 February 1980. The Director of the SBE told the TSS that the students were not interested in discussing details of the strike. Their message was: "Just end it."

Once the strike became a certainty, concerned parents and students considered other schools in Sudbury and in nearby school boards. The four private secondary schools or colleges in Sudbury had an enrolment of 2508 at the time and, so far as it was possible to ascertain, not one student affected by the strike was admitted to any of them. A spokesman for one college claimed, "We just did not have any space." This is not doubted, but the question of admitting public school students was most likely dictated by a decision not to get involved in the dispute, not to alienate the striking teachers, not to be considered strike breakers.

Sudbury students were enrolled in Nipissing Board of Education schools, the North Shore, Espanola, Elliot Lake, and secondary schools further afield. In all, 444 transfers of Sudbury students were registered by the SBE on 9 April 1980 and 90 dropouts from SBE public secondary schools were reported on that date. An overwhelming majority of the 13 525 students enrolled in the system on 31 January 1980 were studying at home or enjoying an enforced holiday.

Parents were asked about the activities of their children affected by the strike: 25.6 per cent said "they did nothing"; 12.2 per cent told the TSS that their youngsters worked for wages during the strike; 37.7 per cent said they were enrolled in other schools, studied at home or in a library; 22 per cent made such comments as, "They wanted to study but had no textbooks" ... "they tried at first but got discouraged" ... "they lost initiative to study." Only 12.2 per cent said their children were active in some student organization during the strike; 1.2 per cent were not certain; 85.4 per cent said their children did not belong to any student organization concerned with the strike; and 1.2 per cent did not answer.

Following the February demonstration at the SBE offices, the students seemed quiescent for the rest of February and all of March. The next indication of student concern was an ad in the Sudbury Star (24 March 1980) by the spokesman for the Ontario Secondary Schools Students' Association, stating that students were in the middle in the dispute, and the adversaries should show more concern for their fate. There was no further reaction from the students until April 1980, when radio station CKSO reported on 11 April 1980 that "the students sent a letter petition, bearing over 3000 names, to the Minister of Education." At the same time, it was announced that students from Lo-Ellen school were planning a protest sit-in to draw attention to the length of the strike. The sit-in did not take place.

The Sudbury Star (17 April 1980) reported that because students felt left out of negotiations, they formed an organization, "Students Working Against Time" (SWAT), with a membership of about 80. The leaders of SWAT met with representatives of both sides in the dispute to voice concern over their future. SWAT members were not satisfied with the responses of SBE and teachers' representatives; nor were they reassured by a promise from the Minister of Education in the legislature, pledging ministerial intervention unless a resolution of the negotiations was achieved, and promising that all Sudbury students would finish their academic year successfully. "Successfully," and the means of achieving this end, were not defined.

On 21 April 1980, about 250 students occupied the Council Chambers (the regular SBE meeting place) for 45 hours. The following day, students demonstrated on the main thoroughfare, encouraging motorists to honk in support of their demand for an end to the strike. These two events received extensive publicity from the local mass media, from such newspapers as the Globe and Mail and the Toronto Star, and from national radio and television networks. Editorially, the Sudbury Star (23 April 1980) commended the students for taking action. The Minister of Education was lauded for setting a cut-off date for negotiations, but the EFC was lambasted for not leading the way towards a solution, or even holding jeopardy hearings.

Encouraged by public support, SWAT spokesmen issued a settlement deadline for 28 April 1980 and stated that, if this was not achieved, the Minister of Education should legislate the teachers back to work. Insisting that it was neutral in the negotiations, SWAT labelled the parties directly involved--the SBE, the OSSTF/AEFO, and the ERC--the "Three Blind Mice" for being blind to the plight of the students. As a further pressure tactic, SWAT announced that two busloads of students would travel to Toronto to confront the Minister of Education and demand an end to the strike. About 100 students made the trip. A few met with the Minister of Education but came away dissatisfied with her response to their demands. Others organized a demonstration in front of the legislative buildings. They were called "a tenacious lot" by radio station CKSO on 28 April 1980, but there was no indication of further action by SWAT after the Toronto trip.

Parents were asked if SWAT and its activities had any bearing on the settlement of the strike: 37.8 per cent did not think SWAT had any effect; 21.9 per cent thought there was some influence on the Minister of Education's decision to press for a settlement; 12.2 per cent did not know; and 28 per cent did not answer. The comments reflected the diversity of views: "Don't think anyone paid any attention to them" ... "yes, especially SWAT going to Toronto to see that Minister" ... "possibly some public pressure, but I don't know."

SBE Reaction

On 5 February 1980, the day before the strike began, the SBE issued student guidelines, including the advice that students could obtain copies of their course studies to enable them to continue their education at home. (Some parents told the TSS that the course outlines were difficult to follow without teacher help and the necessary textbooks were not available.) The SBE encouraged students to establish a routine for studying at home, to set up regular home study sessions with their classmates, if possible. A week later, the SBE announced that students enrolled in computer courses could have their programs

processed at the SBE computer facilities. Students were advised not to apply for correspondence courses, and parents were discouraged from offering volunteer service in schools since "regular programs and supervision could not be maintained."

The students' fate was discussed on a number of occasions by SBE officers, trustees, and principals. A major concern was the allowance of credit to students, especially those in semestered courses and in grades 12 and 13. Inquiries were made at local and other Ontario postsecondary institutions regarding the eligibility of the SBE students for acceptance, should the strike continue over a certain period of time.

In response to parents' inquiries, the SBE issued a report to parents and students on 19 March 1980, dealing with a variety of questions related to the effects of the strike. The report answered queries like, "Will I lose my school year?"--"Not if your work preceding the strike was satisfactory." In later statements, the SBE cautioned students and parents that it had "no intent of giving false hopes to the students' regarding final tests or examinations, and that the pass/fail grade would depend on students themselves. Meanwhile, the SBE Director informed them that "work to date, and their school patterns will be used to assess their standing" and that "the students who received passing grades before the strike will be receiving graduating diplomas" (Sudbury Star, 10 April 1980).

At a meeting attended by the chairman, other SBE personnel, and principals on 25 April 1980, it was decided to consult teachers on the feasibility of tutorial help for students once the strike ended. Further, the SBE announced that provision would be made for "independent study" students to be guaranteed tests (Sudbury Star, 29 April 1980), and students could petition their principal to be examined for full credits if they studied "systematically" at home during the strike. The provisions would apply primarily to senior students.

In early April 1980, principals were asked to inquire into and assess the effects of the strike on the overall academic progress of students. This information was the basis for the SBE's second application to the ERC on 21 April 1980 for jeopardy hearings. The assessment indicated that "borderline" students were definitely in jeopardy, and the length of the strike had resulted in additional dropouts. According to trustee respondents, the SBE showed a great deal of concern with students' welfare, and were frustrated with the ERC, which insisted that the students were not in jeopardy. Given the legitimacy of the strike, it seems that the SBE did all it could to meet its obligations to students and parents during this period.

Larger-Community Reaction

The concern of the larger community was expressed by spokesmen for specific interest groups, mainly during April 1980. By petitions and resolutions, they urged an end to the strike by whatever means necessary. Generally, these efforts were meant to reflect an impartial position in the dispute but indicated only a deep concern for the students. The record of these concerns was extracted from newspapers and radio broadcast transcripts (limited to CKSO) and, to the best knowledge of the authors, is complete.

The president of the Sudbury and District Chamber of Commerce first voiced concern on 14 February 1980 that the teachers' strike was adding to the image of Sudbury as a strike-happy city. Again, on 1 April 1980, a Chamber of Commerce spokesman called for an end to the strike, and an extension of the school year to 20 June 1980. In March 1980, a spokesman for the Sudbury and District Ministers' Association appealed to both sides to settle their dispute. On 7 April 1980, a notice in the Sudbury Star announced the formation of a new "Coalition" called "All Together Against Cutbacks" (ATAC). ATAC was to unite private agencies, consumer groups, trade unions, and individuals "concerned with maintaining a sound Human Services Sector." No further reports on any activity of this coalition was found in newspapers or radio broadcast transcripts.

On 14 April 1980, the manager of radio station CKSO announced a petition to be sent to the Minister of Education, urging her to enter the negotiations more directly and to terminate the strike. The petition, bearing 7677 names of Sudbury-area residents, was delivered at Queen's Park on 18 April 1980.

On 15 April 1980, the Capreol Town Council sent a letter to the ERC, urging the commission to hold jeopardy hearings. On 21 April 1980, the Sudbury Provincial Progressive Conservative Association sent a telegram to Premier William Davis, urging him to legislate the teachers back to work. The strike position of local members of the legislature is interesting. In 1980, the three MPPs for the Sudbury ridings were all NDP members and, undoubtedly, in a quandary. There was parental pressure for them to urge a settlement, or to become more directly involved in negotiations; but NDP ideology stressed respect for strikers. They were silent in the legislature but "were working behind the scene." One MPP urged parents to organize mass meetings and picket both sides in the dispute. The three MPPs announced a mass protest meeting for 20 April 1980, but, according to the Sudbury Star (21 April 1980), only about 150 people showed up, most of them teachers.

The short-lived Association of Concerned Parents, the proposed but never realized "Coalition" ATAC, and the active students' organization SWAT were the only known attempts to organize and exert pressure for settlement of the strike. In general, actions taken through individual initiative were limited to messages sent to the ERC or the Ministry of Education, or public statements reported by local or other media. There was no concerted action, and public concern never took on a consistent or well-organized form. The absence of recognized parents' pressure groups was likely a major factor in diffusing the concern of the larger community. The negotiation teams and the mediators were left in relative peace to deal with the issues at their own pace, until the much-publicized sit-in and other forms of protest started by the students on 21 April 1980.

The Mass Media and the Strike

According to the SBE Director, the Sudbury strike received record media coverage. There were daily news reports on the progress (or lack of it) of negotiations, or speculation during the news blackout. Both the Sudbury Star and the Northern Life editorialized on the strike. Both sides in the dispute used the media to publicize their position at various stages of negotiations. The SBE used the press to communicate directly with teachers, revealing the details of what was being offered to them. Teachers kept the public informed of what their demands represented (e.g., "it will only cost 51 cents per week per taxpayer to have quality education"), appealing to parents' concern about their children's

education. Both sides relied extensively on advertising to argue their "side of the story." As the strike dragged on, both sides resorted to polemics. At one point, these exchanges were termed "a war of words" by the Sudbury Star (2 April 1980).

The media campaign began on 15 February 1980 with the teachers' ad of a letter sent to the SBE, indicating readiness to resume nonstop negotiations. The "message" was that teachers did not want a strike but were "invited" to strike by SBE contract-stripping. The key issue for teachers was staffing, since "salary requests are reasonable." The issue of contract-stripping was emphasized in this and subsequent advertisements, as teachers believed that organized labour would condemn such intentions, and they would elicit sympathy in this staunchly pro-union town.

An SBE ad in the same edition of the Sudbury Star claimed that salary gaps were the major issue. The salaries offered by the SBE ranged from \$16 440 to \$42 500 and teachers wanted more in each group.

The media advertising campaigns were in the form of "correct" information and arguments to justness or logic made by the disputants. Thus, teachers argued that they believed their position "reasonable" on all counts, while the SBE wanted reduction in staffing and contract-stripping. The SBE responded by "explaining" teachers' working conditions, pointing out that class sizes were such that a high standard of excellence in education could be assured; that teachers' demands for smaller classes were unjustified; that the demand for a reduced workload meant that "each teacher will instruct no more than 4 hours per day" at an average salary, "with fringe benefits, of \$30 680 per year."

On 27 February 1980, the teachers had large notices in the local press claiming that the SBE was misleading the public through incorrect calculation of teachers' salaries and workloads; that teachers' demands for salary increases were not excessive since, on average, teachers were earning less than hourly paid INCO workers. This "message" was later recognized as a mistake; it weakened or destroyed the chance of support from the two major unions in the area. There were no statements of support from local labour leaders, and not until 30 April 1980 did the President of Local 6500 USWA announce, "The Executive of Local 6500 USWA stands squarely behind the teachers." Nothing was said about the ordinary members of Local 6500 USWA.

Another SBE ad on 4 March 1980 followed rejection of the latest offer from teachers. This message asked if readers enjoyed such good working conditions and very high salaries as SBE teachers. Despite all the benefits and holidays, the teachers "demand more." This ad raised a storm of protest from teachers as inaccurate and grossly misleading; it soured any chance of a quick and amiable settlement.

On 11 April 1980, the SBE published extracts from the Fact Finder's report on matters of salary, staffing, and working conditions--all points where the Fact Finder favoured the SBE stance. On 21 April 1980, the SBE published highlights of its "formal offer" to the teachers, submitted on the same day. Both ads contained only factual information. The INCO/teachers comparison ad and the SBE's good-working-conditions message were the major, and admitted, errors on both sides. These public exchanges of "information" alienated many people from the teachers and created extensive teacher hostility towards the SBE, or at least towards some SBE members.

Although the chief negotiator for the teachers takeover team maintained that "it is not by issuing press releases that a settlement is going to be achieved, but rather by sitting down and discussing the issues" (Sudbury Star, 12 February 1980), the teachers' mass media campaign was well planned and extensive. In addition to newspaper ads, they aired 10 "messages" on radio station CKSO between 27 February and 9 April 1980. The messages contained two types of appeals--"Shouldn't things be different?" and "You can affect the outcome of the strike."

The teachers' radio campaign opened on 27 February 1980 with, "Why are schools closed?" The following day, four different messages outlined the teachers' position in the dispute. "Teachers are only trying to keep what they have" and "Nobody wants a strike. Attend a Board meeting. Tell your trustees you want to see enough teachers in the classroom to do the job properly." Also, "Teachers want to protect their purchasing power--teachers have fallen behind in terms of inflation." The following day the message was, "250 crowded schoolrooms in the system but 136 teaching positions are threatened." And on 2 March 1980, "Three attempts at mediation failed. Teachers offered to bargain nonstop. Ask your trustees what are they doing."

After a brief pause, the campaign was renewed on 14 March 1980, aimed directly at parents. Listeners were told that "education is too important an issue to be left just to the trustees and the teachers. The present situation demands your attention. Become involved. Attend a Board meeting. Make your concerns known." And on 8 April 1980, the message was, "The trustees have abdicated their responsibility by not negotiating seriously ... the Board would prefer legislation to negotiations ... the two months old strike is bound to have some effect on the students." The final radio message on 9 April 1980 was, "The 17 empty secondary schools testify that they [the trustees] failed in their trust ... they will listen if you speak." From the perspective of 1981, the TSS found that the extensive radio campaign failed to convince many parents to speak up at SBE meetings, or even to attend them. The SBE did not use this medium to communicate directly with the public but its press releases were quoted regularly by all local radio and television stations.

In comparison with the daily or weekly press, which provided detailed coverage, local radio and television stations reported the news in brief, lacking range and detail. Reporting was factual and generally impartial but the news was often a day or so late. Radio station CHNO had a daily program called "Open Line," where listeners could express their views on various matters. The person conducting this program became known for his severe criticism of the striking teachers, earning their anger and contempt. The kindest comment by a teacher was that this person "continually demonstrated total ignorance of the major problems in education."

The teachers also published, and distributed door-to-door, two bilingual pamphlets. These outlined the history of the negotiations and gave the "correct facts," challenging the SBE image of "a good employer." The pamphlets contained the "truths" on such matters as sick-leave days, fringe benefits, and holidays with pay. The SBE Director was castigated for "shamefully misleading" parents that students would not suffer from the strike. In another pamphlet, the trustees were referred to as "very obtuse." The chairman and a senior trustee, both with positions in the OSTC and the Canadian School Trustees'

Association, were accused of fighting their personal battles "for management rights" and "to improve their positions in these Associations."

Like the radio messages, the pamphlets evoked little response, since no increased concern was noted in the media or by the SBE's count of telephone calls from concerned parents. There was one response. A columnist writing for the local weekly newspaper argued that the pamphlets were the work of provincial federations and that the local teachers were "used by Ontario Federation ... fighting their issues," such as cost-of-living escalator, workloads, and retirement gratuity (Northern Life, 12 March 1980).

Examination of reports dealing with the strike and the negotiations, especially those written by Marcel Lamarche for the Sudbury Star, shows that the articles were factual and generally objective. The editorials, however, were often critical of teachers but seldom critical of the position maintained by the SBE. On 8 February 1980, the editor of the Sudbury Star wrote, "It is not a strike likely to win the teachers much sympathy or public support ... in monetary matters alone, the people who foot the educational bill, have every right to be incensed." On 13 February 1980, "The striking teachers are not gaining any popularity with their fellow citizens." On 5 March 1980, the editorial noted, "In matters of salary, size of classes, and total number of teachers to be employed, the Board appears to be on solid ground ... the teachers think that in the matter of money 'there is always more where that came from.' " On 19 March 1980 the editor of the Sudbury Star termed the strike "disruptive and unjustified" while the teachers "regard the source of their pay cheques as something of a bottomless pit" and, on 31 March, "the rights to strike [for the teachers] have proved themselves a bust, and must at long last be revoked ... if back to work legislation is needed then bring on the bill."

The TSS had no way of determining if these editorials, in the only daily newspaper, reflected readers' views in general or shaped readers' opinions on the negotiation process. It is suggested that editorials are not the first item of interest for the average reader. Nonetheless, their effect in this case may have been significant, especially if they helped to shape the views of prominent community leaders.

Because of the extensive exposure given to various strike-related issues by the media, all TSS respondents were asked a series of questions dealing with the presentation of information by newspapers, radio, and television. The parents and the "others" were asked to evaluate the two controversial ads--the comparison of INCO wages to teachers' salaries, and the SBE's claim of a four-hour workday for teachers. Parents were also asked how much they relied on the media for information on the strike, and if they believed the spokesmen for the two bargaining sides.

Table 5.9 shows that an overwhelming majority of parents listened to the radio, watched television, and read the press to gain information about the negotiations; a slightly higher proportion relied on radio and television to gain their information, though both were sources of more limited information than the press. Only a minority read the brochures or pamphlets delivered by teachers.

How credible did parents find the spokesmen for the two sides during the strike? (See table 5.10.)

Table 5.9: Media as Sources of Information on Negotiations:
Parent Respondents

	Radio	Television	Newspapers	Other (Brochures, etc.)
	%			
Followed Regularly	45.1	52.4	40.2	11.0
Followed Sometimes	42.7	39.0	40.2	25.6
Did Not Follow	9.8	8.5	17.1	23.2
No Answer	2.4	-	2.4	40.2

N = 82

Table 5.10: Credibility of the Two Negotiation Teams:
Parent Respondents

"Did you believe the ..."	SBE's Spokesmen	Federations' Spokesmen
	%	
No, or Suspicious	22.0	30.5
Sometimes, Partially	15.8	10.9
Yes, Generally Yes	15.9	12.9
Don't Know, No Answer	46.4	46.3

N = 82

A surprisingly small proportion of parents accepted as true the information given by either side. We expected that the parents' more supportive attitude towards the SBE would also include more acceptance of its public announcements. One parent reported that she was upset every time she saw the SBE ads because "the Board was saying what they wanted to give teachers and the teachers [she knew] said that the Board was doing them an injustice by twisting the facts." Another parent thought that "sometimes they told the truth but they had to hide something to keep the public on their side." Most were puzzled and uncertain about whom and what to believe. The fact that the federation spokesmen were believed less often does not change the likelihood that parents saw both sides as secretive and manipulative.

All TSS respondents were asked to evaluate the mass media on the objectivity of reporting strike-related developments. The actual questions asked each group of respondents were slightly different, so the results cannot be presented in a more compact form. Table 5.11 is an analysis of the relevant contents of two local newspapers, the Sudbury Star and the Northern Life, for the whole strike period. This evaluation was carried out by the SBE Director of Education, as presented. Tables 5.12, 5.13, and 5.14 present the views of teachers, parents, and "others" respectively.

Of the three categories of TSS respondents, only parents viewed the media as treating both sides objectively; the other respondents viewed them as biased, favouring one side or the other, or changing their position on issues. Nearly half the teachers considered the media's image of teachers distorted and unfair. Inflated salaries, short work week, and excellent working conditions did not portray the reality; the "Open Line" CHNO radio program and the editorials in the Sudbury Star were especially virulent. It is

Table 5.11: Analysis of Sudbury Star and Northern Life Contents

	Teachers		SBE		Teachers and SBE Neutral	Teachers and SBE +/-	Other (ERC)
	+	-	+	-			
Editorials	-	9	1	-	5	7	4
News Stories							
Articles	1	38	7	6	110	15	1
Letters to the Editor	5	28	1	5	10	13	1

+/- = Positive or Negative Contents

Source: Director of Education, SBE

Table 5.12: Evaluation of Mass Media: Teacher Respondents

	Radio	Television %	Newspapers
Generally Objective	9.1	25.0	13.6
Generally Biased - Pro-SBE	70.5	29.5	52.3
Generally Biased - Pro-Teachers	-	-	-
Generally Concerned	2.3	18.2	18.2
Mixed Treatment	9.1	15.9	4.5
Uncertain	2.3	4.5	2.3
Changed Over Time	4.5	2.3	6.8
No Answer	2.3	4.5	2.3

N = 44

Table 5.13: Evaluation of Mass Media: Parent Respondents

	Radio	Television %	Newspapers
Generally Objective	51.2	62.2	45.1
Mixed, Biased	14.6	13.4	18.3
Generally Pro-SBE	8.5	3.7	11.0
Generally Pro-Teachers	2.4	1.2	2.4
Don't Know	14.4	9.8	4.9
No Answer	9.8	9.8	18.3

N = 82

Table 5.14: Evaluation of Mass Media: "Others" Respondents

	Radio	Television	Sudbury Star %	Globe & Mail Toronto Star
Pro-SBE	14.8	6.6	16.4	3.2
Neutral	13.2	21.3	18.0	23.0
Pro-Teachers	1.6	-	6.5	1.6
Mixed, Changed Over Time	26.2	26.2	41.0	19.7
Don't Know, No Answer	44.3	45.9	18.0	52.5

N = 61

startling that not one teacher respondent thought the media were on their side. The parents and "others" shared this view, although not as sweepingly, and only a small proportion of each felt that the media were pro-teachers. A surprisingly high proportion of "others" (including community leaders) did not answer or were uncertain. The TSS can only speculate that because community leaders were less directly involved in the strike, strike-related information was more easily forgotten one year after settlement.

"Others" respondents had more selective memories. Over 80 per cent remembered the two controversial ads in the local press, as did almost 70 per cent of parents. The TSS asked these two categories of respondents to evaluate those ads and to indicate if they prolonged the dispute. (See table 5.15.)

Table 5.15: Evaluation of the Two Controversial Ads
Parent and "Others" Respondents
(Controlled for Respondents Reporting Seeing the Ads)

		Parents	"Others"
		%	
Negative Opinion	SBE's Ad	17.6	23.0
Negative Opinion	Teachers' Ad	23.4	13.1
Neutral Opinion	Both Ads	32.2	3.3
Positive Opinion	SBE's Ad	10.4	1.6
Positive Opinion	Teachers' Ad	6.5	-
Mixed Opinion	Uncertain	9.9	58.9

Table 5.15 shows that a negative evaluation was a more common reaction than a positive. The largest single group of parents expressed a neutral opinion while the largest single group of "others" had mixed opinions (e.g., one ad was criticized while the other was accepted positively or neutrally). Only 8.6 per cent of parents thought the ads affected the length of the strike, and this reflects their position on the sidelines during negotiations. Few parents were aware of the degree of animosity between the teachers and the SBE as a result of the SBE's ad. Surprisingly, fewer than expected condemned the teachers' ad for comparing their salaries with INCO hourly wages. Of the "others," 45.9 per cent thought the ads affected the length of the strike. This category included SBE people and principals, who were fully aware of the effect the SBE ads had on teachers.

Conclusions

The factors contributing to the length of the strike are complex and it is difficult to unravel all the strands to arrive at a reasonable explanation. It is obvious that the two sides were mutually ill-informed and did not perceive the depth of resolve to maintain their respective positions. The strike began with a consistently firm position on the SBE's part and a long list of demands on the teachers' part. Despite the presence of concerned and expert mediators, the "whittling down" process was long and painful. The longer the strike lasted, the more each side was liable to lose face if it gave in easily. Mediation works best when compromise is an acceptable solution by both sides, or when one side has unrealistic expectations which can be reduced to more reasonable terms. Mediation does not work when one side is expected to capitulate, while the other side hardly budes. The negotiations were complicated further by unwise advertising campaigns on both sides, and by lack of pressure from parents to end the strike sooner.

The SBE favoured voluntary arbitration early in the strike negotiations, but this was rejected firmly by teachers. Why, when many other confrontations (e.g., post office disputes) are ended by binding arbitration acceptable to both sides? Teachers rejected this solution because "most awards made under arbitration and final offer selection have been less than the annual inflation rate, producing a cut in real income for teachers. These increases have been less than those in the industrial composite" (Report on the 1980 Provincial OSSTF Assembly; emphasis in the original). Also, it is well recognized that arbitration merely puts off conflict and represses a sense of injustice until a system eventually breaks down.

For a time, the media speculated that the strike in Sudbury was, in part, a result of personality clashes between individuals from opposite sides of the bargaining table. This assumption is unlikely, since negotiations proceeded with the help of a mediator beginning on 9 November 1979 and not in face-to-face meetings between the two negotiation teams. Not until 25 April 1980 (i.e., a week before the settlement) did the two teams meet across the table once again. This is not to say that both sides did not make that an issue for "internal consumption," to build up morale and support for the cause. A bogey man is a very useful anti-hero and, as noted earlier, the teachers' publications identified such persons.

Bitter polemics stemmed from accusations that the strike was a test case for one or another side in the dispute. Some TSS respondents thought the strike was a proving ground for the provincial OSSTF to challenge the authority of the OSTC and local school boards, or perhaps to test the full ramifications of Bill 100. This argument was reversed by other TSS respondents and used to blame trustees for attempting to halt the march of the federations towards greater control of the educational system. Also, there were hints and suggestions that the Minister of Education and the Ontario government wanted to determine if the right to strike, given to teachers in 1975, was an error.

First, if teachers won their demands for greater input into decision-making, cost-of-living provisions, and other gains, they would establish a precedent for other negotiations. A clear victory in Sudbury would allow other OSSTF branches to demand catch-up with Sudbury, and would allow teachers to take a bolder, more demanding stance with trustees across the province. The strike in Sudbury may well have been a test case for the OSSTF to flex its muscles.

Second, the trustees took a stand on the basis of a traditional position of power and on what the Sudbury economy dictated. It could possibly be argued that the SBE made so poor an offer that teachers had to reject it. The SBE could remain firm, knowing that public opinion would support its position and, in the end, could have jeopardy hearings, forcing teachers back to work under the rules of binding arbitration, which they confidently expected to favour their position. This solution could be seen as a restatement and reemphasis of the dominant SBE position.

Third, the ERC and the Minister of Education had to consider the implications of Bill 100: if jeopardy hearings had been announced the first time they were requested by the SBE, the outcome might have been interpreted by teachers as a subversion of Bill 100. The dilemma is that jeopardy for students is not well defined; therefore, the length of time that teachers can legitimately remain on strike is not clearly spelled out. (The

teachers would not be allowed to remain on strike indefinitely.) In that respect, Bill 100 is a sham. Possibly, the Minister of Education and the ERC were hoping the two sides would settle their own affairs. In fact, testing the possibility of removing the ERC altogether, but retaining the means of appointing mediators and individuals who would rule on jeopardy, was a threat for students affected by a strike. All these explanations are pure conjecture, since no evidence can be offered to support one or another possibility.

The relative absence of public concern with the length of the strike can be explained by a number of contributing factors.

Sudbury's occupational composition and predominance of blue-collar workers, with strong unions, dictate that it is unacceptable to cross picket lines, or even talk against any striking group. Further, parents were in a quandary, since as ratepayers they were, in part, employers of the striking teachers. Further, they were concerned with educational prospects for their children but also with rising costs of education, especially for teachers' salaries.

Negotiations, which took place every two weeks or so, were unproductive, but served to lull the public into believing that a settlement was near or at least that the two sides were working hard to achieve it. The hopeful public statements, made by one or the other side, allowed parents to accept the efforts and not organize into more formal groups to pressure for a settlement.

Most parents trusted the SBE officers and trustees to maintain the educational system to the best advantage for students and themselves. During the strike, both sides resorted to accusations, charges, and countercharges. One question raised was whether teachers were really concerned with the quality of education for the students, or were more intent on assuring better working conditions and greater job security for themselves. The question is no longer academic, since even some teachers see their occupation as a job first and a profession second.

The students' organization, SWAT, accentuated the growing public awareness and concern with the prolonged strike. SWAT's public demonstrations could have been the proverbial "straw that broke the camel's back." More likely, the ERC and the Minister of Education were fully aware of the potential danger to students and to the public educational system in Sudbury and would have stepped in to resolve this issue without the prodding from the students. Given students' later reaction to an opportunity for catching up, it is tempting to conclude that the sit-ins and other protests were a result of sheer boredom. Nonetheless, the students may have been something of a prod, generating new concern with the impasse and inducing the Minister of Education to step in more forcefully than she might have without SWAT activities.

The mass media campaign, or the "war of ads," had unexpected and undesirable outcomes for both sides. The teachers' ads alienated organized labour, and failed to convince the average parent of the justness of teachers' demands. The SBE ads likely generated additional parental support for the SBE's position, but created bitterness and hostility among teachers, principals, and vice-principals. Thus, the campaign of "airing dirty linen in public" by both sides resulted in a hardening of the teachers' position at the bargaining table.

6 Poststrike Period

Immediate Poststrike Developments

After classes resumed on 7 May 1980, there were 1390 fewer students than on 31 January 1980--550 SBE students attending schools elsewhere and 840 dropping out--159 from the lower grades, 435 from grade 12, and 246 from grade 13 (Globe and Mail, 14 May 1980). The SBE calculated that the normal loss of secondary school students would have been 500. Seven teachers did not return to work on 6 May 1980 because of illness.

Parents (84.1 per cent) were happy that the teachers' strike was over (11 per cent were indifferent to the settlement). Asked if the length of the strike had anything to do with the image of Sudbury as a union town, 59.7 per cent answered yes, 39 per cent no or uncertain, and 7.3 per cent did not answer. "Sudburians are proud that they can laugh it off." "No, it was the cost of living that made the teachers stay out so long."

The teachers' negotiation team recommended acceptance of the agreement hammered out at the all-night session, with the Minister of Education "looking over our shoulders." Almost 80 per cent of teacher respondents said they were prepared to strike for another four months, or until settlement, if agreement had not been reached on 1 May 1980, or if the government did not legislate them back to work. None of the teachers said they were ready to give in. There was some bravado. One teacher was prepared to stay out till all the federations' demands were met. Two were ready to leave the teaching profession for more remunerative jobs. In response to the question, Why did they vote the way they did? 3 May 1980, 9.1 per cent said because of concern for students; 15.9 per cent, because they would have been forced back to work anyway; 6.8 per cent, because of the recommendation of their negotiation team; and 13.6 per cent, because the issues were resolved to their satisfaction. Only one teacher said he "had enough," and wanted to get back to teaching.

"The conflict is over but the bitterness clings" were the words of the chairman of the local teachers' negotiation committee. Commenting on the resumption of education after 56 school days lost, the press maintained that "the teachers would be returning with bitter feelings towards the Board members and the administration staff," and "a large part of the public, especially the parents of high school children, will return the bitter feelings" (Sudbury Star, 6 May 1980).

The bitterness was demonstrated in a number of ways in the following months. In the aftermath of the strike, there was a campaign among teachers to defeat certain trustees at the polls during the forthcoming November 1980 municipal elections.

There were indications that the graduation ceremonies would be boycotted by teachers if trustees were to participate as guests of honour. There was a "hardening of feelings ... trustees were not welcomed at the graduating ceremonies" (Sudbury Star, 13 June 1980). Some schools avoided the issue by holding the graduating ceremonies on the SBE meeting night. Others were kept "low key." Some trustees, who were also parents of graduating students, were not certain if they could attend this ceremony at all.

Teachers changed their minds about working overtime to allow students to catch up on time lost in education. As noted earlier, the Minister of Education specified that Sudbury students would not lose their year because of the strike. They were to get a longer school year by a two-week extension of classes, and an additional hour of education for the remaining 24 days of school and the 10 extra days of the extension. The Minister of Education issued a directive to the SBE to organize and implement these plans. On 14 May 1980, the teachers agreed to these proposals, provided that the extra time would be counted as overtime. The SBE accepted this provision, which would have cost \$872 000, 30 per cent to be paid by the SBE and 70 per cent to be covered by the Ministry of Education "extra strike costs" fund. On 19 May 1980, the teachers voted overwhelmingly (90 per cent) to reject these proposals. There would be extra homework for students, no extracurricular activities, but no overtime. According to one headline, "Bitter teachers' rally scuttles longer school year in Sudbury" (Globe and Mail, 22 May 1980).

The Minister of Education was advised of these development but reiterated that students would get a longer school year and more hours of education each remaining school day. In response, students in three or four schools staged walkouts, even though the teachers had already refused to participate in this plan. Understandably, this puzzled the Minister of Education who, only four weeks earlier, heard the students pleading for an end to the strike since their education was in jeopardy. It is not clear what caused this reaction among students. Perhaps they were led by irresponsible leaders, who were not well informed on the need for additional school time. Perhaps they wanted to continue the high public image started by the sit-in at the Sudbury Civic Centre. Whatever the reasons, the walkouts clearly indicated that many of them were not seriously concerned over catching up, or over the loss of education. Faced with two negative reactions to the proposed extra school time--from teachers and students--the Minister of Education "gave in" on 24 May 1980. There would be no extension of the school year in Sudbury because of the strike.

Another example of the teachers' bitterness was the summer school program. The SBE approved a program on 17 June 1980 to allow students to make up failed grades. The teachers pink listed the summer school program, both day and night classes. Consequently, the SBE decided to cancel these programs on 2 July 1980, since no credit courses could be offered. That year, the local federations urged their members to vote out certain incumbent trustees and replace them with those representing Political Action Committee (PAC), a loose organization defending teachers' interests. No PAC candidates were elected but two members of Municipal Action Coalition (MAC), with similar views to PAC, were elected to the SBE.* Two of the many trustees that teachers wanted replaced suffered defeat at the polls. There was one positive note. The teachers' chief negotiator thought that "the strike was a long and bitter conflict" but that the SBE's chief negotiator "maintained poise and class" during negotiations and both sides should now dedicate themselves to a dialogue (Sudbury Star, 13 May 1980).

Students and Jeopardy

It is impossible to state with certainty what the effects of the strike were on students, without having them as subjects of the study; but the TSS attempted to gain such information by other means. All respondents were asked about jeopardy; parents provided spe-

* One resigned his seat in 1981.

cific information about their children; and statistical data offer further details. Only teachers were asked to define jeopardy. (See table 6.1.) Over one-third (36.4 per cent) did not answer.

Table 6.1: Teachers' Definitions of Jeopardy for Students

	%
Lack of Proper Supervision	6.8
Inadequate Work/Failure by a Student	11.4
Depends on the Proportion of Time Lost	25.0
Depends on the Individual Student	11.4
Nothing	4.5
Other Explanations	4.5
N = 44	

Surprisingly, there were no clear-cut definitions as to what constitutes jeopardy for students, and there was no common agreement among teachers on explanations offered in lieu of a proper definition: "Lack of effort on their part" ... "the intensity of study is so minimal during a school year that two or three months can't make that much difference" ... "any lost time could be made up, the Board would probably give them credit anyway" ... "I don't know what adaptations would be made after the strike but it's obvious you can't teach ten months work in seven months time" ... "jeopardy ... probably in post-secondary studies" ... "jeopardy ... those students who refused to do any homework" ... "some students, some subjects."

All the same, 38.6 per cent of teachers thought the SBE students were in jeopardy because of the strike; 4.5 per cent, some were, others were not; 2.3 per cent, not certain; and 50 per cent, not in jeopardy. Further inquiry shows that teachers with less than five years of teaching experience, and those teaching in city schools, thought students more in jeopardy than did other categories of teachers. (See table 6.2.)

Table 6.2: Strike as Jeopardy for Students: Teacher Respondents
by Selected Variables

	No	Yes	Not Sure	N
	%			
Years of Teaching Experience				
Under 5	25.0	75.0	-	4
Between 6 and 10	58.3	41.7	-	12
11 and 15	57.1	35.7	7.1	14
16 and 20	71.4	28.6	-	7
21+	50.0	50.0	-	2
Location of School				
City	46.4	46.4	7.2	28
Region	69.2	23.9	7.7	13

In contrast to the teachers, only 16.4 per cent of "others" respondents thought the SBE students were not in jeopardy during the strike; 75.4 per cent, were--most with

failure of grades or of the academic year; and 8.2 per cent did not know or did not answer. Of the parent respondents, 65.9 per cent said their children got all credits in 1980; 22 per cent, some credits; 9.7 per cent, different for different children; and 2.4 per cent, no credits. On the basis of parent responses, over one-third of the SBE students were affected by the strike in their academic performance.

As a result of the strike, formal examinations were cancelled and replaced by in-class tests. Despite some concern that the catch-up education served only to expose students to topics without in-depth understanding, and that the make-up tests produced "slap dash" diplomas, statistics compiled by the SBE show that the strike did not have the expected negative impact on the grades achieved by senior students in the year-end tests. There were fewer failures in 1980 (5.56 per cent) than in 1979 (6.62 per cent). In 1979, 34.42 per cent of grade 13 students received first-class honours, compared with 38.03 per cent in 1980.

In general, as in other school strikes, students who were weak in some or all subjects failed the year, or did not receive all credits. Those who received tutoring, or were enrolled in other schools, were not affected by the strike. For students who had few, if any, problems with learning, the 56 missed days seemed inconsequential.

At one point during the strike, some community leaders voiced concern that the prolonged strike, at a time of year when outdoor activities were limited because of inclement weather, resulted in idle students spending an inordinate amount of time at the two major shopping plazas in the area. It was feared that there would be a rash of shoplifting. Concerned merchants formed an organization called SHOP, to prevent any large-scale shoplifting. These fears were unjustified. Data prepared especially for the TSS by the Director of Research, Sudbury Regional Police, provide the actual number of offences committed in three years, for comparison purposes. Focusing on the three relevant months, February, March, and April, the figures show only a fractional increase in shoplifting--212 cases in 1979 to 232 in 1980. (See Appendix 1, table A5.) There was a decrease of 43 mischief charges in the corresponding time period. There is no evidence of an increase in drinking alcoholic beverages or a heavier use of drugs during this period. Parents did not report any special or unusual problems with their children at home, only that they acquired bad habits of laziness or were not doing their homework well.

The Role of the ERC

The ERC played an integral part in prestrike negotiations and talks throughout the strike by appointing a Fact Finder and a succession of mediators for the dispute between the SBE and the teachers. The Minister of Education entered negotiations only indirectly, and only towards the end of April 1980, but this involvement was undoubtedly the key factor in the signing of the agreement on 1 May 1980. Bill 100 remains in force, after being reevaluated by the Matthews Commission in 1980.

The establishment of the ERC, and the role it played in relationships between teachers and boards of education, has been dealt with by others. This discussion is limited to how respondents evaluated the role of the ERC during the 1980 strike in Sudbury. It should be noted that the parents could not always distinguish the ERC from the Ministry of Education; most thought in broader terms of "government," when referring to jeopardy

hearings or binding arbitration. The teachers often referred to the ERC and Bill 100 as synonymous; the ERC was a tool of Bill 100, and "the threat of legislative action which follows the recommendation of the ERC, inhibits the due process of negotiations in favour of the boards," according to one teacher respondent. Such a possibility stems from a rule allowing the ERC to review a strike by teachers after 21 days and, if jeopardy for the students is considered to be present, the ERC can recommend that the Minister of Education and the Cabinet legislate the teachers back to work.

Throughout negotiations, the ERC was very responsive to requests for expert help with this process, from the SBE and teachers. A Fact Finder was appointed in September 1979. The first mediator arrived in Sudbury soon after both sides requested one. When negotiations resumed during the strike, the ERC appointed another mediator, and, when this did not work, a three-man team was given the task of solving the dispute. All ERC commissioners convened to consider the continuing deadlock in negotiations, calling the three-man team and the two negotiating sides to Toronto for talks under the aegis of the ERC. When these talks failed, the ERC appointed yet another mediator, considered tops in this field. The ERC sent high-calibre mediators, and its Director took a special interest in the proceedings.

The SBE applied twice for jeopardy hearings. On both occasions, the response was negative; the ERC did not publicly admit that the students' education was endangered. It is not certain what the actual view of the ERC was after the first SBE request for jeopardy hearings; it is known that on 27 April 1980, the ERC advised the Minister of Education to legislate the teachers back to work because the students were in jeopardy, but apparently the Cabinet turned down this request. There was also a rather enigmatic statement made by the Minister of Education, "I shall not become a political cripple as a result of the Sudbury teachers' strike." To most parents, and to the SBE people, the ERC was delinquent in its responsibility to students; but to some respondents from the "others" category, the ERC did too much: "The series of mediators only prolonged the strike" ... "the threat of arbitration and back to work legislation made the ERC the bully of the government."

The authors can only speculate that Sudbury was also a special case for the Ontario government, to test the viability of Bill 100. It is apparent that the ERC was "muzzled" in its attempt to hold jeopardy hearings, and told to deny that such a condition existed there. It is strange that, while this measure was denied, there were hints that the government, or the Minister of Education, was thinking about "cracking down" on the strike. It is possible that Ministry of Education people were gauging the attitudes of various public sectors to discover their views on teachers' strikes in general and the Sudbury strike in particular. It was probably disappointing to Ministry of Education officials that the only significant forum of parent concern was the petitions. Under these circumstances, it could have been decided to let the strike run its course for a time, then introduce back-to-work legislation followed by binding arbitration.

Evaluation of the ERC and the Government

The teacher respondents were asked if the government did enough to settle the dispute: 25 per cent said yes; 61.4 per cent no; 13.6 per cent did not answer. With one exception (which saw the government as "trying to keep communications flowing or open between

the two teams"), comments made by the teachers were negative. The government "did too much. We were forced back to work under the threat of legislation," and "too little at the start and too much at the end." One teacher wished that the ERC would get out of the business of inadvertently prolonging strikes. "Public announcements that strike mediation is taking place immediately diffuse pressure on both sides, and the parents relax, pending the outcome of the talks." Few teachers considered the ERC and the government in a positive, objective way. More generally, they were seen as allies of the SBE, working together "to restrain just demands" of the teachers. Many teachers felt that the agreement was reached under duress; if they had not accepted it, they would have been ordered back to work.

The TSS teacher respondents did not think highly of Bill 100, the statute allowing bargaining and strike rights to the teachers' federations. Only 18.2 per cent had a positive opinion; 4.6 per cent expressed neutral views; 15.9 per cent saw both positive and negative aspects; 20.5 per cent expressed negative views; and 40.9 per cent did not answer. Some teachers were ambivalent: "Bill 100 ... pretty progressive for a reactionary government, just the same, gives preference to the Boards and limits the teachers' movements" and "it's workable if both parties are committed to the process" ... "Bill 100 was probably fathered by School Trustees who are unable to deal honestly with the teachers."

Further consideration of the evaluative responses of Bill 100, on the basis of selected characteristics of teachers, shows no clearly discernible pattern in the negative or positive views among teachers. (See table 6.3.) There are minor variations, but because of the small number of respondents within categories, it is not possible to draw further inferences here. However, these data may reinforce the finding that there is no general acceptance of Bill 100 as a benefit to the teachers in Sudbury.

Asked if Bill 100 had inherent conflict or adversary implications for school boards and teachers, 45.5 per cent of teachers said no and 38.6 per cent said yes. "It's

Table 6.3: Teachers' Evaluation of Bill 100
by Selected Variables

	Negative	Mixed	Neutral	Positive	Other	N
	%					
Age						
Between 20 - 29	33.3	33.3	-	33.3	-	3
30 - 39	30.8	30.8	7.7	23.1	7.7	13
40 - 49	50.0	12.5	-	37.5	-	8
50 - 59	-	50.0	-	50.0	-	2
60 +	-	-	-	-	-	-
Salary						
Under \$20 000	100.0	-	-	-	-	1
Between \$20 000 - \$24 999	25.0	-	-	50.0	25.0	4
\$25 000 - \$29 999	-	50.0	-	50.0	-	2
\$30 000 +	36.8	31.6	5.3	26.3	-	19
Location of School						
City	37.5	25.0	6.3	25.0	6.3	16
Region	33.3	22.2	-	44.4	-	9

pretty obvious" ... "gives a chance for both sides to take each other on" ... "all such provisions lead to some conflict" ... "the Board used Bill 100 to play a game instead of negotiating." Those who disagreed thought that "the steps [for negotiations] are very clear cut" ... "it's necessary" ... "everybody should have the right to strike, teachers are like everyone else" ... "no, it is only some people who may make it so."

Further testing shows a clearly discernible pattern in responses, if years of teaching experience are considered. (See table 6.4.) As experience increases, the proportion of respondents who consider Bill 100 to contain conflict implications increases. It can only be surmised that with experience comes the realization that board/teacher negotiations are not carried out by the rules of a gentlemen's agreement but, even with the blueprint of Bill 100, involve confrontation and fighting.

Table 6.4: Bill 100 Contains Conflict/Adversary Implications:
Teacher Respondents by Selected Variables

	No	Yes	Not Certain	N
			%	
Years of Teaching				
5 or Under	100.0	-	-	4
Between 6 - 10	63.6	36.4	-	11
11 - 15	42.9	50.0	7.1	14
16 - 20	28.6	71.4	-	7
21 +	-	100.0	-	1

Commenting on Bill 100, "others" respondents had a broad range of judgment: 27.9 per cent gave a negative evaluation; 26.2 per cent saw both advantages and disadvantages; 18 per cent gave a positive evaluation; 6.6 per cent made various comments; 6.6 per cent did not know; and 14.8 per cent did not answer. Table 6.5 data show that principals and vice-principals had a slightly more positive image of Bill 100 than the other two subcategories of respondents. Interestingly, an almost identical proportion of each subcategory of "others" respondents had a negative evaluation.

Table 6.5: Evaluation of Bill 100: "Others" Respondents
by Selected Variables

	Negative	Not Certain	Negative/ Positive	Positive	Other	N
				%		
SBE Officers/ Trustees	33.3	8.3	29.2	20.8	8.3	24
Principals/Vice- Principals	33.3	-	16.7	33.3	16.7	6
Community Leaders	35.0	-	40.0	20.0	5.0	20

The "others" respondents were also asked if the ERC had carried out its responsibilities during the strike in Sudbury. Of the 61 respondents, 49.2 per cent said no, largely because the ERC had not held jeopardy hearings when requested by the SBE; 16.4 per cent said yes; and 34.5 per cent did not know or did not answer.

Did the provincial government fulfil its role during the strike? Of the "others" respondents, 59 per cent said it was inadequate; 23 per cent, adequate; 3.3 per cent, so-so; and 14.8 per cent did not know or did not answer. The comments illustrate these positions: "Should have legislated them back long before settlement came" ... "didn't want to get involved" ... "no, it was using Sudbury as a testing ground" ... "should have played a stronger role from the beginning." Others were less critical: "It did a good job" ... "it carried out its responsibilities" and "the government was tempted to remove the right of strike for the teachers but that would be political suicide" ... "it used the ERC as its pawn" ... "the ERC was used to protect the Minister from the angry parents."

What role did the Minister of Education play in settling the Sudbury strike? The "others" responded: 47.5 per cent, that the Minister's intervention came too late; 9.8 per cent, that it was timed just right; 1.6 per cent, too soon; 1.6 per cent, no role; 14.8 per cent made various comments; 24.6 per cent did not know or did not answer. Some comments were generally positive: "The Minister maintained a politically astute role" ... "her timing was just right." Other comments were more critical: "She doesn't come to grips with the problem" ... "she is too distant, doesn't appear at OSSTF functions when asked" ... "because of the Minister's position the students lost respect for the system. They said well, the Minister of Education will give them their diplomas anyway so it doesn't matter how many months you lose."

Asked what role the government should play in such disputes, "others" respondents made various suggestions (see table 6.6). Among "other suggestions" were: "The government should classify the teachers as civil servants and negotiate with them province wide" ... "take more control, abolish strikes for the teachers" ... "step in only as a last resort" ... "keep the negotiations at the local level" ... "it holds the purse strings it should provide more leadership" ... "guarantee access to information on boards' spending" ... "provide videotaped, standardized education" when teachers are on strike.

Table 6.6: Role Suggested for the Government in Teachers' Strikes:
"Others" Respondents

	%
Should Not Be Involved	3.3
Should Offer Other Help	6.6
Should Play a Direct Role	16.4
Should Be More Involved	29.5
What They Did Was Satisfactory	1.6
Other Suggestions	37.7
Don't Know/No Answer	4.9
N = 61	

"Others" respondents were asked to evaluate all the mediators assigned to Sudbury by the ERC. (Neither teachers nor parents were asked this question, since it was felt that teachers would have biased opinions and parents were not likely to be well informed.) Table 6.7 shows their views, with data further broken down by subcategories within this group.

Only a minority of the SBE officers/trustees and community leaders evaluated the mediators positively. Surprisingly, no individual or team was considered very useful.

Table 6.7: Evaluation of the Mediators
"Others" Respondents by Selected Variables

	None				Negative				Not Meaningful				Positive				Other			
	Mediator #1	Mediator #2	Mediation Team	Mediators #3	Mediator #1	Mediator #2	Mediation Team	Mediators #3	Mediator #1	Mediator #2	Mediation Team	Mediators #3	Mediator #1	Mediator #2	Mediation Team	Mediators #3	Mediator #1	Mediator #2	Mediation Team	Mediators #3
SBE Officers/ Trustees	8.7	13.6	13.6	14.3	21.7	4.5	9.1	9.5	39.1	45.5	45.5	38.1	21.7	22.7	18.2	28.6	8.7	13.6	13.6	9.5
Principals																				
Vice Princ.'s	20.0	-	-	-	-	-	2.0	-	40.0	20.0	20.0	50.0	20.0	60.0	60.0	50.0	20.0	20.0	-	-
Community Leaders	20.0	20.0	11.1	10.0	10.0	10.0	22.2	10.0	30.0	30.0	33.3	40.0	40.0	40.0	33.3	40.0	-	-	-	-

Only principals/vice-principals saw them (except for the first one) in a more favourable light. A large proportion of all respondents thought their role was not meaningful. Respondents were asked to elaborate on their views.

The explanations varied; some applied to specific mediators, others were more general. Thus, "The first mediator was shafted" ... "he was useless" ... "not his fault that no settlement was achieved because sides were too far apart" ... "the three man team had no clue about the teachers" ... "they prolonged the strike" ... "he had the benefit of a threat of Ministerial intervention to back him up" and "a real let down, he kept shaking his head" ... "he took the friction away from the negotiations." The general comments were: "Obviously they were good otherwise they would not have been chosen" ... "forced both sides to be more honest in their positions" ... "they were able people but not their fault that they could not break the deadlock" ... "normal mediation did not work in Sudbury strike" ... "the mediators did not have any authority, they only played games" ... and "what can I say when the negotiations took place behind closed doors."

It was of special interest to the TSS to inquire into parental reaction to government involvement as a mediating and arbitrating body in the dispute. If the view of Sudbury as a union town was correct, parents should have rejected direct government involvement. The results are shown in table 6.8. "Other" comments included: "Use an arbitrator" ... "lock them up like they do the cardinals when they elect a Pope, until both sides settle" ... arbitration but "only as a last resort" ... "bring in an independent group of teachers and fire the whole present bunch" ... "the Ministry should provide an alternative education during the strike."

Table 6.8: Role of the Government (ERC) in Negotiations:
Parent Respondents

	Should be Involved from the Start	Involved When Strike Begins	Force Both Sides to Continue Negotiations	Order Binding Arbitration
	%			
Strongly Agree	41.5	31.7	43.9	35.4
Agree	30.5	20.7	28.0	30.5
Neutral	1.2	2.4	2.4	2.4
Disagree	13.4	17.1	7.3	9.8
Strongly Disagree	4.9	2.4	2.4	2.4
Other	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
Don't Know	1.2	1.2	3.7	4.9
No Answer	6.1	23.2	11.0	13.4

N = 82

Should the government have stepped in more directly to negotiations between teachers and the SBE in 1980? Only 22 per cent said no; 9.8 per cent were uncertain; 68.3 per cent said yes. Surprisingly, 58.5 per cent felt that intervention, in the form of binding arbitration, should have taken place within the first four weeks of the strike. This suggests that teachers are not necessarily given the same options to exercise bargaining and strike rights as workers in industry. This position indicates that parents consider secondary school education as an essential service: "Don't like to see government interference but don't like to see kids out of school." The obvious explanation might be

that those who advocated government intervention were not themselves, nor their spouses, trade union members. In any case, they had not likely experienced a strike themselves. Responses were considered with these factors in mind. (See table 6.9.)

Table 6.9: Should the Government Be Involved in Negotiations?
Parent Respondents, by Selected Variables

		Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral %	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	Other	N
Union Membership								
Respondent	No	47.1	31.4	2.0	15.7	3.9	-	51
	Is	21.4	35.7	-	21.4	14.3	7.1	14
	Was	70.0	30.0	-	-	-	-	10
Spouse	No	51.9	25.9	3.7	14.8	3.7	-	27
	Is	30.8	42.3	-	11.5	11.5	3.8	26
	Was	50.0	35.7	-	14.3	-	-	14
Experienced Strike or Work to Rule								
Respondent	No	43.6	32.7	1.8	16.4	3.6	1.8	55
	Yes	38.5	30.8	-	15.4	15.4	-	13
Spouse	No	53.6	21.4	3.6	14.3	3.6	3.6	28
	Yes	35.7	39.3	-	14.3	10.7	-	28

Table 6.9 shows a noticeable difference of opinion between union members and those who are not, especially in the "strongly agree" and the "strongly disagree" columns. Union membership influences people's perceptions about the government's role in contract negotiations, but it is more significant that over half the respondents and their spouses who are members of unions agree, or strongly agree, with such government involvement. This result poses an interesting question on the merits of independent bargaining. An overwhelming majority of TSS family respondents thought that the two sides were unlikely to resolve their differences without outside help. This is not altogether startling since over half the wives of INCO workers, who were on strike in 1978-79, believed that the Ontario government should be involved in negotiations between INCO and Local 6500 USWA as well (Radecki 1979; 1981). It would seem that, at least in Sudbury, people do not have much faith in the effectiveness of collective bargaining without third-party involvement (see table 6.10).

While a majority of union members would like to see government involvement in negotiations, this is no longer fully true for the question of government intervention during the strike. The respondents are split on this alternative, while spouses still favour a more direct government role in a strike. Results are similar for those who experienced strikes themselves. Again, because individuals are trade union members, or have been on strike themselves, does not necessarily mean that they would allow this right to Sudbury teachers.

Parents were also asked how they would like to see the government react to possible future strikes by Sudbury teachers. Only 13.4 per cent felt the government should not intervene in SBE/teacher negotiations; 1.2 per cent suggested that teachers be given more money to prevent a strike; 8.5 per cent did not know; 24.4 per cent wanted to

**Table 6.10: Role of the Government during the Strike:
Should the Government Have Stepped In?
Parent Respondents, by Selected Variables**

		<u>No</u>	<u>Yes</u>	<u>Uncertain</u>	<u>N</u>
		<u>%</u>			
Union Membership					
Respondent	No	12.7	72.7	14.5	55
	Yes	50.0	50.0	-	16
Was a member		30.0	70.0	-	10
Spouse	No	25.0	67.9	7.1	28
	Yes	25.0	57.1	17.9	28
Was a member		14.3	85.7	-	14
Experienced Strike or Work to Rule					
Respondent	No	16.9	69.5	13.6	59
	Yes	57.1	42.9	-	14
Spouse	No	20.0	73.3	6.7	30
	Yes	20.7	62.1	17.2	29

abolish the teachers' right to strike; 9.8 per cent wanted binding arbitration instead of strikes; 4.9 per cent wanted the government to order teachers to remain in the schools; 19.5 per cent felt the government "should intervene somehow"; and 18.3 per cent made such comments as, "Set specific time periods for strikes" ... "allow the strikes in July and August" ... "the government should step in before a strike begins" ... "make sure the new contract is settled before the old one expires" ... "fire all the teachers and hire new ones." The responses were cross-tabulated with the respondents' membership in trade unions and their past experience with strikes (see table 6.11).

Union membership, or past experience with strikes, is not a factor which can be used to predict how parents view the role of government in future SBE/teacher negotiations.

**Table 6.11: How Parents Would Like to See the Government React,
By Selected Variables**

		Should Not Interfere	Order Binding Arbitration	Order Teachers to Stay in Schools	Abolish Teachers' Strikes	Give the Teachers More Money	"Just Intervene Somehow"	Other	N
Union Membership									
Respondent	No	6.1	12.2	4.1	28.6	2.0	24.5	22.4	49
	Is	37.5	-	12.5	18.8	-	12.5	18.8	16
	Was	22.2	11.1	-	33.3	-	22.2	11.1	9
Spouse	No	17.9	3.6	14.3	17.9	-	25.0	21.4	28
	Is	16.7	25.0	-	20.8	-	16.7	20.8	24
	Was	-	8.3	-	58.3	-	25.0	8.3	12
Experienced Strike or Work to Rule									
Respondent	No	9.4	13.2	1.9	24.5	1.9	24.5	2.5	53
	Yes	42.9	-	14.3	21.4	-	14.3	7.1	14
Spouse	No	17.2	6.9	3.4	34.5	-	20.7	17.2	29
	Yes	8.0	24.0	-	28.0	-	20.0	20.0	25

Whatever the background, a majority of parents see some form of government intervention as desirable. A surprisingly large proportion advocated sterner measures, such as arbitration and denial of the right to strike for teachers. Teachers are not equated with the other industrial workers in Sudbury.

In conclusion, the ERC was prompt in meeting requests from both sides for a Fact Finder and for a series of mediators. In this sense, the ERC showed proper concern over the lack of agreement in Sudbury. This concern was likely accentuated by the fact that the ERC Director at that time was previously an SBE Director. At least one "others" respondent felt that the ERC Director attempted to maneuver the mediated negotiations beyond his terms of reference. The authors see the role of the ERC Director in a more positive light. His knowledge of the issues, and of the personalities on the two negotiating teams, allowed him to offer some useful advice to the appointed mediators.

On another plane, the ERC, created as an independent body, was often seen as being interfered with by the Ministry of Education. For example, the ERC submitted a recommendation for jeopardy hearings, or binding arbitration, to the Ministry of Education, but its advice was neither acted on nor publicly acknowledged. It might be argued that the ERC is not the fully independent body envisaged at the time it was established.

In the case of the Sudbury strike, the ERC certainly bore the brunt of complaints from irate parents and both sides at the bargaining table. At least one concerned parent unsuccessfully took the matter of the ERC's non-response to demands for jeopardy hearings to the Ontario Ombudsman. Many from the SBE thought the ERC was lax in its responsibilities. Teachers thought the SBE was waiting for the ERC to solve the dispute by declaring binding arbitration. Other teachers thought the ERC was a tool of the Ministry of Education, to counteract or undermine Bill 100. In the case of Sudbury, the ERC certainly served its role of distancing the Minister of Education from the protracted and often bitter negotiations.

Teachers' Reaction to the New Contract

As noted earlier, the agreement reached on 1 May 1980 was recommended for acceptance by the teachers' negotiation team since, they argued, the alternative was binding arbitration. Teacher respondents were asked if they voted for or against acceptance of the two-year package: 36.4 per cent voted against acceptance; 56.8 per cent voted for acceptance; 2.3 per cent did not vote; and 4.6 per cent did not answer. A majority wrote that they could have remained on strike longer; 79.5 per cent believed their colleagues were more concerned with reaching a settlement than they were themselves.

The terms of agreement were evaluated negatively by 59.1 per cent of teachers; 25 per cent saw both good and bad points; 4.3 per cent had no clear opinion; and 9.1 per cent evaluated them positively. Table 6.12 shows teachers' responses to specific issues in the new contract.

Over one-third of evaluations were negative for the three major concerns--salary, workload, and staffing. Surprisingly, the other three issues were evaluated negatively by a small but significant proportion of teachers, despite the fact that the 1980 agreement met teachers' demands in these areas. This poses a question: Were teachers well informed

Table 6.12: Teachers' Evaluation of the 1980 Settlement

	Salary	Workload	Staffing	Just Cause	Sabbaticals	Retirement Gratuity
	%					
Very Positively	4.5	-	-	4.5	2.3	-
Positively	20.5	18.2	13.6	15.9	11.4	9.1
Neutrally	27.3	27.3	18.2	40.9	52.3	54.5
Negatively	22.7	36.4	38.6	18.2	6.8	9.1
Very Negatively	18.2	11.4	22.7	6.8	4.8	9.1
No Opinion	-	-	-	2.3	11.4	6.8
Other	2.3	-	-	-	-	-
No Answer	4.5	6.8	6.8	11.4	11.4	11.4

N = 44

about the terms of their new agreement, or had they forgotten these conditions only one year later?

A majority of teachers found that the strike had various positive implications. Thus, 13.6 per cent said it gained the rights demanded; 11.4 per cent said it was a means of improving work conditions; 6.8 per cent said it unified teachers; and 6.8 per cent said it was a vehicle of information for the public on the teachers' position. On the negative side, 20.5 per cent did not find it at all useful; 4.5 per cent said it was necessary, but no one gains in a strike; 9.1 per cent had mixed comments; and 27.3 per cent did not answer.

Asked to list the important gains in the 1980 agreement, 36.4 per cent said there were none; 6.8 per cent named the improved work conditions; 18.2 per cent did not answer; and 38.6 per cent had various comments: "Promise from the Minister of Education for ten additional special education teachers" ... "the mediators now [1981] are not so pro-Board" ... "no contract stripping" ... "solidarity among the teachers." Of the 20 extended comments from teachers, 12 indicated in various ways that their self-respect was maintained and the SBE was shown very forcefully that they would fight to achieve their demands. Others replied more negatively; for example, "Little gain, much good will lost."

Did teachers feel that the strike was a contest of wills between the federations and the SBE? A minority of TSS respondents, 34.1 per cent, said no; 59.1 per cent said yes; 56.3 per cent of OSSTF members said yes; and 87.5 per cent of AEFO members said yes. Teachers were asked if the two Sudbury teachers' federations, the OSSTF and the AEFO, agreed in principle on negotiation strategies. Teachers using English as the language of instruction answered no or not always (18.4 per cent); teachers using French as the language of instruction answered no (40 per cent).

What were the major unresolved issues? was not answered by 20.5 per cent of teachers; 18.2 per cent named work conditions in general; 13.6 per cent identified job security; and 47.7 per cent listed several, including staffing, PTR, COLE, and salary, in that order. Other issues included class size, communication with the SBE, night and summer school staffing, and input into the decision-making process. In comparing workload before and after the strike, 20.5 per cent claimed it was more demanding at the time of the study than before the strike; 56.8 per cent, about the same; 9.1 per cent, less demanding; 13.6 per cent did not answer; 52.2 per cent believed the new agreement was not being interpreted too strictly; 22.8 per cent thought it was.

The things teachers liked most before the strike were relationships with students (29.5 per cent), with parents (2.3 per cent), and with colleagues (4.5 per cent). The job was specified as most satisfactory by 6.8 per cent of respondents; "no animosity" was stressed by 2.3 per cent; 40.9 per cent listed more than one of the above relationships or conditions as satisfactory, or provided further explanations. "I enjoyed seeing my students grow intellectually" ... "liked the pay and the working conditions" ... "liked the opportunity to pursue my interests." The strike did not change satisfaction with their work for 36.4 per cent; affected it greatly for 31.8 per cent; and had some effect for 20.5 per cent. In all, over half the teachers were not as happy with their work after the strike than before.

Teachers were asked to identify the major problems in their jobs before the strike, and to indicate if the new agreement resolved the problems. Of 44 respondents, 18.2 per cent did not answer; 18.2 per cent had no problems; 34.1 per cent said work conditions in general were unsatisfactory; and 29.5 per cent listed inadequate time resulting in overwork, negative or indifferent student attitudes, administrative incompetence, and poor chances of promotion. Two respondents said the strike improved conditions, since teachers were no longer "forced, harassed, or intimidated" on the job and "the Board will be more concerned with the teachers' conditions." Negative comments were in the majority: "Conditions did not improve" ... "conditions deteriorated" ... "nothing pleased me before or after." The responses of the teachers were related with certain of their background characteristics, as shown in table 6.13.

Table 6.13: Major Problem with the Job before the Strike:
Teacher Respondents, by Selected Variables

	Work Conditions	None %	Other	N
Federation Affiliation				
OSSTF	41.4	20.7	37.9	29
AEFO	50.0	16.7	33.3	6
Age				
Between 20 - 29	50.0	-	50.0	4
30 - 39	43.8	31.3	25.0	16
40 - 49	45.5	18.2	36.4	11
50 - 59	-	25.0	75.0	4
60 +	100.0	-	-	1
Years of Teaching Experience				
Under 5	50.0	-	50.0	2
Between 5 - 10	30.0	20.0	50.0	10
11 - 15	46.7	33.3	20.0	15
16 - 20	75.0	-	25.0	4
21 +	50.0	-	50.0	2
Language of Instruction				
English	43.3	20.0	36.7	30
French	40.0	20.0	40.0	5

The major prestrike complaint was unsatisfactory working conditions, and these conditions did not improve, according to the TSS respondents. Dissatisfaction is general, with two minor variations. Teachers with five to 10 years of experience are less dissatisfied than other categories; and within this group, and the 11 to 15 years of experience group, a proportion of teachers had no problems with their work before the strike.

A majority, 70.5 per cent, claimed that teachers were involved in a broad range of activities for schools and students on a voluntary basis, more than parents and the general public realized. These included dance supervision, organization of assemblies, Christmas assemblies, variety nights, school garden and plants, preparation of audiovisual material for the general public, fund-raising activities, theatre, yearbook, liaison with the community, and many others. For 47.7 per cent, the strike had no effect on their involvement; but 27.3 per cent were "less willing to perform these activities" ... "time spent on them has been reduced" ... "schedule has been cancelled" ... "I don't give a damn anymore."

The "others" respondents were asked if the teachers suffered because of the strike. Only 8.2 per cent did not think so; 9.8 per cent thought teachers' morale suffered; 27.9 per cent thought they suffered financial losses; 13.1 per cent thought the public became hostile towards teachers; and 27.9 per cent named two or three of the above as likely losses for teachers. A majority, 73.8 per cent, felt that students suffered because of the strike; 8.2 per cent believed that both students and parents lost; 9.8 per cent said neither students nor parents were affected. According to 65.6 per cent, no one gained from the strike; 4.9 per cent said the teachers were the winners; 4.9 per cent said the SBE gained the most; 3.2 per cent said parents and students were the winners; and 11.5 per cent said more than one winner emerged from the strike.

Teachers and Organized Labour

The image of Sudbury as a union town was certainly a factor in the teachers' presentation of themselves as unionists on legitimate strike against the hard-nosed bosses at the SBE. The emphasis on contract-stripping was a deliberate policy to elicit the same support from the community at large shown to striking INCO workers one year earlier. There were expectations that striking teachers would receive support from local trade unions as well. On 6 February 1980, radio station CHNO broadcast an interview with the chairman of the teachers' negotiation committee, who claimed support and co-operation from labour organizations in the area, without naming specific ones.

Perhaps these expectations were understandable in the context of how teachers define their own federations: 75 per cent of TSS teacher respondents saw their federations as comparable with trade unions; 22.7 per cent disagreed. These views were generally shared by teachers regardless of affiliation (OSSTF or AEF0), language of instruction, or other background characteristics. There were some exceptions: teachers with under five years of experience; a majority of those residing in Sudbury between two and five years; and one-half of the youngest age group. It is feasible that younger teachers adhere more to the ideals of teaching as a profession and view the federations as professional associations. Older teachers and more experienced teachers see their federations primarily in the context of negotiations or bargaining for improved work conditions for their members (see table 6.14).

Table 6.14: Teachers' Federations Are Comparable with Trade Unions:
Teacher Respondents, By Selected Variables

	No	Yes	N
	%		
Length of Residence			
Years under 2	-	100.0	1
2 - 5	75.0	25.0	4
5 - 10	33.3	66.7	12
11 - 15	-	100.0	5
16 - 20	-	100.0	2
21 - 25	-	100.0	3
26 +	13.8	86.2	15
Age			
Between 20 - 29	50.0	50.0	4
30 - 39	20.0	80.0	20
40 - 49	23.1	76.9	13
50 - 59	20.0	80.0	5
60 +	-	100.0	1
Years of Teaching Experience			
Between 2 - 5	100.0	-	3
6 - 10	25.0	75.0	12
11 - 15	6.3	93.7	16
16 - 20	28.6	71.4	7
21 +	50.0	50.0	2
Language of Instruction			
English	23.5	76.5	34
French	25.0	75.0	8
Native of Northern Ontario			
No	29.4	70.6	17
Yes	19.2	80.8	26
Federation			
OSSTF	23.5	76.5	34
AEFO	25.0	75.0	8

The question, Are the federations comparable with trade unions? elicited many responses. Most argued that the federations and trade unions have to deal with similar problems; both reflect strength in numbers; and both have similar techniques for dealing with the employer. Importantly, both have common objectives in attaining improvement for their members. Teachers who rejected this view pointed out that, because of the nature of work, the federations are professional associations "expressing the necessary concern for the students who are not merely products in a factory or a plant." Also, the mental attitude of the federation members, "the professionalism," makes these organizations distinct. Interestingly, a few teachers argued against the "closed shop" rule for any such professional association: "Many teachers who consider themselves professionals do not like the idea of a closed shop."

Only 6.8 per cent felt that local organized labour did not support their strike in any way; 20.5 per cent were not certain or did not know; 72.7 per cent claimed some support. According to these respondents, the support differed over time, and for different unions, but included moral support, financial help, and the provision of facilities such as halls for meetings. Comments from the teachers also specified public statements of support and funds received from local labour organizations.

The teachers were allowed to use the facilities of Local 6500 USWA for their meetings, but we could not identify any other local unions making their facilities available. A careful review of newspapers and radio transcripts found only one public statement of support for the teachers' position. This was made in late April 1980 by the president of Local 6500 USWA, on behalf of the executive of this local. There were no references in the local press or radio transcripts to local labour organizations providing financial support for the striking teachers. The teachers' publication, Negotiations Bulletin, noted contributions from other teachers, but there were no references to donations from local trade unions.

Financial support for the Sudbury strikers was received only from other branches of the federations and from SBE principals and vice-principals. On 6 February 1980, SBE principals and vice-principals set up a fund of \$10 000 for needy teachers (Negotiations Bulletin no. 6, 7 February 1980). On 18 February 1980, OSSTF District 21 sent \$1800 to the Funds and Loans Committee. Other donations (ranging from \$25 to \$8400) from the OSSTF, Toronto district, totalled \$71 174 by 29 April 1980. There is no information on how much more SBE principals and vice-principals contributed to needy teachers or how the funds were distributed. The strike pay of \$30 daily was well publicized, and it is not likely that INCO workers--who survived their longer strike on much less--or other trade unionists considered teachers in need of financial support. The only other case of support was Laurentian University, which cancelled the open classes for secondary school students, planned for one week in March 1980, in order to avoid any suggestion of strike-breaking.

Teachers and the Community

Only 25 per cent of teachers claimed that Sudbury as a community was supportive of their strike; 13.7 per cent were not certain; 45.5 per cent thought Sudbury non-supportive, more likely hostile to their work stoppage; 11.4 per cent believed the community indifferent; and 4.5 per cent did not answer. These responses were considered further through selective use of teachers' background characteristics. (See table 6.15.)

Table 6.15 shows no clear patterns based on length of residence and nativity. But ethnicity and language of instruction show that French respondents thought Sudbury supportive at nearly twice the rate of Anglo-Celt, English language of instruction teachers. A few francophone respondents commented that they received "encouragement and best wishes from parents and neighbours." An anglophone teacher commented, "Generally, the parents have a low level of education and do not know the value of higher education. They think in terms of lower tax dollars." Similarly, another teacher thought the community considered teachers "too demanding, even greedy."

How did the teachers evaluate their strike experience as compared with other work stoppages in Sudbury, such as the 1978-79 strike at INCO? Despite better strike pay and

Table 6.15: Was Sudbury Supportive of the Strike?
Teacher Respondents, By Selected Variables

	Supportive	Not Supportive	Indifferent %	Not Certain	N
Length of Residence: Years					
Under 2	-	-	100.0	-	1
2 - 5	20.0	40.0	20.0	20.0	5
6 - 10	18.2	45.5	18.2	18.1	11
11 - 15	20.0	80.0	-	-	5
16 - 20	100.0	-	-	-	2
21 - 25	33.3	33.3	-	33.3	3
26 +	21.4	57.1	7.1	14.3	15
Ethnic Background					
Anglo-Celt	22.7	45.5	13.6	18.1	22
French	42.9	42.9	14.3	-	7
Canadian	50.0	50.0	-	-	2
"Other"	20.0	50.0	10.0	20.0	10
Native of Northern Ontario					
No	29.4	47.1	11.8	11.8	17
Yes	24.0	48.0	12.0	16.0	25
Language of Instruction					
English	23.5	47.1	11.8	17.6	34
French	42.9	42.9	14.3	-	7

shorter strike time, 25 per cent claimed it was as difficult as the INCO strike; 27.3 per cent believed it more difficult; 38.6 per cent, less difficult; and 9.1 per cent did not answer. One teacher commented, "There was good strike pay, good cause, good companionship" during the strike, making it a positive experience. Others commented, "The public opinion was definitely against the teacher strikers" ... "less community support" ... "negative editorials" ... "lots of guilt over kids missing their education" ... "I felt humiliated, angry, resigned" ... "what is considered a just fight for wages by other strikers, is considered greed when the teachers strike for the same reason."

The Sudbury strike was the longest in the history of education in Ontario, but it was not exceptional compared with other labour/management disputes in the area. The Sudbury teachers had a well-organized and well-planned strike support structure. They received moral and financial support from other branches of the federations, and they had well-qualified negotiators from the provincial OSSTF team. But they lacked moral support from local labour organizations and from the community at large. They had hoped that their grievances would be accepted like any other labour/management dispute, but were disappointed. They confronted the SBE alone, in almost total isolation from the larger community, from parents, and from organized labour. In addition, the concern over students, and the deterioration of the image of teachers as dedicated professionals, were serious matters to many others. In view of all this, it is not surprising that over half the teacher respondents considered their experience as equal to, or worse than, that of other labour disputes in this community.

Conclusions

There is nothing to indicate that either the SBE or the teachers considered themselves winners in this strike. There were no signs of jubilation among trustees on the agreement, though it fell within their acceptable boundaries. Nor was much publicity given to savings for taxpayers because of unpaid salaries to teachers during the strike. The most common reaction was relief that the confrontation was finally over.

Most parents welcomed the reopening of the secondary schools because there was still opportunity for students to gain necessary credits for college or university admittance. Others were glad that their children would be in school, rather than "hanging around" the house, a shopping plaza, or some undesirable place. There was little public reaction from parents on the settlement. The terms of the agreement were not subjected to public debate, despite the length of time and the amount of effort spent to achieve it. For some parents, the settlement came too late. Their children dropped out, failed the year, or did not get all their grades because of the strike. These parents and their children were the greatest losers from the strike.

To judge by responses to TSS questionnaires, and reports in the local press and on radio, teachers considered the strike "an exercise in futility," an event which demonstrated to them their place among labour organizations and in the larger community. All the information available to the TSS shows that few teachers were fully satisfied with the new contract; the gains achieved were won at too high a cost--weakened or fragmented relationships with others in the educational system, and with students and parents. Many teachers thought their militancy negated their image as dedicated professionals. Their many voluntary activities with students and schools were minimized, unrecognized, or denied. The hoped-for support from organized labour and the community at large was denied them. We suspect that a great many of them would have resigned if work had been available elsewhere. The long-term effects on their morale, and on their teaching performance, may be significant. For many more than before the strike, teaching is merely a job now.

One startling finding of the TSS research was the absence of a clear definition of what constituted jeopardy for students. As noted in earlier discussion, teacher respondents had vague, diverse ideas on this question. They were not aware of any guidelines to define jeopardy, or that such guidelines even existed. We may add here that no such guidelines were ever referred to by any TSS respondents.

Since jeopardy is the key element in bringing the ERC into a dispute between teachers and boards, it is puzzling how boards of education determine when their students are in jeopardy. In turn, we wonder how the ERC decides that students' education is endangered and requests a back-to-work order from the Lieutenant General-in-Council. In the case of Sudbury, the SBE requests for jeopardy hearings were not accepted by the ERC; thus, there was no common agreement on what constituted jeopardy.

Both parents and certain representatives from the larger community expressed concern that the long strike would lead to socially undesirable behaviour among idle students, but this never materialized. About one-third of the parents claimed that their children failed the year, or did not get all necessary credits, because of the strike. Statistics issued by the SBE show that the strike had no detrimental effects on serious

students; there were fewer failures after the strike than in the preceding year. An undetermined number of students dropped out and did not return to school as a direct result of the strike. In that sense, the immediate effect of the strike on SBE students was minimal. But for grade 9 to 11 students who were part of the strike, the long-term effect may be a disillusionment with the educational system and the teachers that may cloud their previous, positive image of the place education has in their lives.

The ERC played a very prominent role throughout the negotiations and the strike, but its formal terms of reference--its power to settle any such dispute--were misinterpreted by all sides in Sudbury. The teachers saw this commission as a willing tool of the SBE, anxious to subvert Bill 100; the trustees thought the ERC, by rejecting the SBE requests for jeopardy hearings, was not fulfilling its duties; the parents thought of the ERC as synonymous with government and felt it should have been more involved in the negotiations and the strike settlement. Directly or indirectly, the ERC was greatly to blame for allowing the strike to continue for so long. In this particular instance, the ERC deserved the negative evaluation and criticism. The dispute might have been resolved more equitably if a succession of new mediators had not been constantly on the scene. The strike might have been shorter if the two sides had been forced to resolve the issues themselves. By its ongoing involvement, the ERC likely gave the impression that it was resolving the differences and, when this did not happen, it was blamed for the failure.

A major finding of the TSS was that, in a labour town, the teachers' strike did not elicit the support of organized labour or of the community at large. It might be argued that this was inevitable, since there is generally little empathy between blue-collar workers (the proletariat) and people in professional occupations (the intelligentsia). Teachers may have seen themselves as employees in conflict with management, but they were not recognized as such by Sudburians at large.

The ethics of labour solidarity, generally observed in Sudbury, did not allow the public to openly criticize teachers and their demands. Their sentiments were perhaps reflected in the Sudbury Star editorials and in the "Open Line" show on radio station CHNO. With one exception, no public support was given to teachers from any segment of the community. There is no indication that parents equated the teachers' position with other labour disputes. In addition, parents were the very people whose children's education and later-life chances were being jeopardized. Also, their purses were being attacked by the likelihood of an increased mill rate to cover the cost of teachers' demands. These perceptions were not likely to create supporters for the teachers' strike. On the contrary, parents felt that the government should have been more involved in the negotiations and the strike, and even union members, who had experienced strikes themselves, would not necessarily allow unimpeded SBE/teacher negotiations. To parents, secondary school education is an essential service.

We can conclude that the strike was a bitter learning experience for the teachers but, unlike other strikes, there were no winners, only lesser or greater losers. The strike did not resolve any major outstanding issues but created much hostility between people who had previously enjoyed harmonious relationships, or at least tolerated each other. There were some immediate and negative repercussions from the strike; the long-term effects are potentially more serious--they may affect the public's perception of the roles and performance of teachers and boards.

The Year Since the Strike

The dust of the strike settled during July and August. There was no public discussion or reference to either the bitter, disillusioned teachers or the weary, embattled SBE. Except for Copper Cliff High School, closed in September 1980 because of a dearth of students,* the 16 public secondary schools resumed classes with a combined enrolment of 12 916. This was an increase of 1215 over enrolment at the close of the year in June 1980, but a decrease of 1251 from September 1979. In part, this was the result of 650 student transfers from the public school sector to the separate school sector between November 1979 and November 1980 (Sudbury Star, 19 November 1980). There were 58 fewer secondary school teachers in 1980 than in 1979.

According to the Sudbury Star (2 September 1980), the three-month strike had "no dramatic impact on the students in terms of marks achieved in the year-end exams." The article noted that similar conditions were found for other teachers' strikes in Ontario recently. Factors affecting the positive outcome were believed to be the nature of final evaluation--term tests were shorter than regular year-end examinations--and greater student motivation to catch up with lost education.

On 8 September 1980, at a closed session, the SBE met to reevaluate its position on future negotiations with teachers. In a report to the Minister of Education, the SBE trustees recommended that future Fact Finders limit their submissions to the actual demands of each side, without further suggestions or recommendations. Also, the SBE advocated that future regular contract talks begin in January rather than in February, and continue throughout the summer months if agreement is stalled and there is a possibility of sanctions. By a vote of 10 to five (with two abstentions), the SBE recommended to the Minister of Education that the teachers' right to strike be retained.

Additional recommendations were in response to the findings of the Matthews Commission. The SBE strongly disagreed with its views that supply, summer, and night school teachers be included in the federations' bargaining units. Also, the SBE was seeking to bar principals and vice-principals, since they were primarily administrators, not teachers. The SBE maintained that there should be no change in the position of principals and vice-principals regarding their right to strike (Sudbury Star, 12 September 1980).

As noted earlier, teachers threatened to defeat at the municipal polls those trustees considered hostile to their position before and during the strike. The local press thought that some parents, who were upset over the closing of their local schools, would join this protest vote. We are not certain if there was a concerted and co-ordinated effort to this effect, but a number of candidates representing Municipal Action Coalition (MAC) ran as trustee candidates in various Sudbury-area districts. They emphasized the

* Enrolment in 1979 was 144.

need for quality education, more teachers, smaller classes, more SBE flexibility, and more communication with teachers and parents. The MAC platform included concern for vocational skill training, parental input into schools, and the financing of education through personal and corporate income tax rather than property tax. The incumbent candidates emphasized the need for a strong board, concern for local taxes, and quality education within SBE budgetary guidelines. One candidate stressed "a need to visit the schools, to get to know the teachers, and to work at improving communications between the teachers and trustees" and for "more consultation with parents on the Board's response to the declining enrolment" (Sudbury Star, 25 October 1980).

Two veteran trustees, including the SBE chairman for 1979-80, did not run for office. Two incumbents were defeated and two MAC candidates elected. This could hardly be termed a resounding victory for the teachers, or censure of the SBE for its position in the 1979-80 negotiations. No strong pro-teacher lobby was created as a result of teachers' threats to elect a pro-federations SBE. The TSS asked teacher respondents if they had voted for the MAC candidates and none admitted that they had. The comments were: "I don't believe in politics at a municipal level" ... "my old candidate was better" ... "there was a better non-MAC candidate" ... "did not know him, seemed an idiot" ... "too socialistic."

During the strike period, both sides in the dispute courted the parents. The SBE projected an image of championing parents and ratepayers against the rapaciousness of the teachers. Big ads informed parents of the true and correct position maintained by the board. In their radio messages, teachers urged parents to become involved, to pressure the SBE in order to ensure that the quality of education was not endangered. The concern for parents' input into education was short-lived. According to a Sudbury Star report (27 November 1980), the governance of schools should not include parents, and should remain centralized. During a meeting of the SBE Education Committee attended by invited principals and teachers, "no one present liked the compulsory nature of the proposals" contained in the June 1980 issue of Issues and Directions, "The Response to the Final Report of the Commission on Declining School Enrolments in Ontario," and saw hazards in their implementation. The SBE trustees, the teachers, and the principals were "especially opposed" to the establishment of school committees of parents and trustees "with powers defined in legislation to share the governance of individual schools." Serious reservations were also expressed about other Ministry of Education proposals contained therein.

Whatever took place behind the scenes between various factions of main actors in the strike, there was little public debate or hostility reported by the local press. The SBE was rebuilding its bridges to teachers and parents. The "new spirit" was illustrated in opening SBE committee meetings to the public in January 1981. In February 1981, the SBE authorized the hiring of three "resource personnel" to work in the area of adoptive physical education, art, French-language immersion, special education, and educational use of computers. In the same month, the SBE approved a project for a workshop on communications and listening skills for trustees, principals, and SBE officers. The workshop, provided by the Pastoral Institute of Northern Ontario, aimed to create better rapport with the teachers, and to facilitate harmonious relations within the school system (Sudbury Star, 11 February 1981). There was only one sour note; during a debate on renewing SBE membership in the Ontario School Trustees' Council, three trustees protested the increased fee and opposed the memorandum of explanation which was to accompany the

renewal application. The local newspaper referred to this altercation as, "Teachers strike ghost haunts board session," since two of the three trustees voting against the OSTC membership renewal were elected on the MAC platform (Sudbury Star, 13 January 1981).

There were no further public reports of unusual activities during regular SBE meetings, or of problems in relations between the SBE and teachers, parents, or students. Outwardly, the school system reverted to normal. There were the usual concerns with declining enrolment and budgetary matters. Early in March 1981, the SBE approved the new budget of \$74 374 450, an increase of \$13 334 136 (21.8 per cent) over the 1980 budget (Sudbury Star, 4 March 1981). In the face of declining enrolment, concern with core programs was prominent on the agenda of the SBE Education Committee. The committee proposed a formula for closing "surplus" high school classes, taking into consideration the needs of basic, modified, and special education students in the affected area. With each closed classroom, estimated savings to the SBE were \$1000 to \$1200 (Sudbury Star, 4 March 1981).

New contract negotiations between the SBE and the OSSTF/AEFO began on 17 March 1981, with both sides agreeing not to divulge any details. Joint press releases briefly announced to the public that a number of "full-day sessions" were to be held in March and April. The negotiations became obviously stalled, and a mediator was requested from the ERC on 27 April 1981. Clearly, neither side wanted another bitter, protracted negotiation so soon after the 1979-80 experience. This is also suggested by the appointment of a Fact Finder in early June 1981, whose job would have been to meet with both sides, to submit a report outlining what was already resolved and what remained in the dispute, and possibly to recommend conditions for a settlement. (It may be remembered that, in September 1980, the SBE voted against a Fact Finder making recommendations.) The services of the Fact Finder were not needed, since on 23 June 1981, bold headlines announced, "High school teachers board reach tentative contract pact" (Sudbury Star, 23 June 1981). According to this newspaper, the 1981 negotiations were "in sharp contrast with the last round of contract talks." The sides maintained a "low profile" from the time active negotiations began in mid-March 1981.

The bargaining teams for both sides recommended acceptance of the proposed pact. On 25 June 1981, the SBE unanimously ratified the new contract and, on 26 June, the teachers "overwhelmingly" accepted the new one-year agreement. No figures were released on how many teachers voted against acceptance. The agreement included a 12 per cent increase in salaries, adjustment to the benefit plan, the restructuring of the grievance procedure, and the hiring of seven new teachers. Summer and night school credit course teaching remained an unresolved issue, again pink listed by the federations.

It should be noted that there was a different person serving as the chief negotiator for the OSSTF/AEFO team, and the SBE had a Sudbury lawyer as its chief negotiator. There was no indication of any involvement in these talks by the provincial federations or the provincial OSTC. The SBE chairman thought that the "end result will be that relations between the Board and the teachers will definitely improve because of this settlement" (Sudbury Star, 27 June 1981).

Parents were asked about the academic progress of their children for the 1980-81 period: 48.8 per cent said their children were not behind because of the strike (1.2 per cent said their children were doing better in 1981 than before the strike); 29.3 per cent were partially behind; and 7.3 per cent were seriously behind. Of the remaining parents, 2.4 per cent were not certain how their children were doing in school; 2.4 per cent said that different children were affected differently; and 8.6 per cent did not know or did not answer.

Of the total, 7.3 per cent said their children were no longer in high school, since they graduated from grade 12 or 13; 13.4 per cent said their children dropped out during the strike. About half the dropouts returned to school by 1981; the other half were working for wages or were unemployed. Only 23.2 per cent of parents whose children dropped out blamed the strike for this development. A number of parents said their youngsters got a job during the strike and did not want to give it up; a few thought their children were influenced by friends not to return to school.

Other comments bearing on decreased performance in school were: too much time was given to sports and not enough to learning "the important things" ... "there was too much free time for the students, poststrike changes in school routines and in teachers, and the assurances that everyone would pass that year." A few parents complained that their youngsters had to turn in their books before the strike, and could not keep up with their education because of this.

Parents were asked how many minutes of homework their children did in 1979 and in 1981, in order to learn if the strike had some direct impact on students' study time. (See table 7.1.)

Table 7.1: Time Spent on Homework Daily: Parent Respondents

	1979	1981
	%	
Under 30 Minutes	17.1	12.2
Between 30 and 45 Minutes	3.7	1.2
Between 46 and 59 Minutes	23.2	20.7
Between 60 and 74 Minutes	11.0	7.3
Between 75 and 99 Minutes	11.0	7.3
100 Minutes or More	14.6	26.8
Different for Different Children	15.9	13.4
Don't Know	1.2	2.4
No Answer	2.4	8.5

N = 82

It was not possible to judge the accuracy of parents' estimations, but if they are accepted at face value, table 7.1 shows that, with the exception of "studious" individuals spending over 100 minutes daily on homework, students allotted less time to their studies in 1981 than in 1979. Possibly teachers assigned less homework; nonetheless, the strike affected the weaker students who now had to devote more time to even the lighter workloads. This must remain a hypothesis, since no students were interviewed to corroborate this information.

By summer 1981, 73.2 per cent of parents believed that education in public secondary schools returned to normal; 17.1 per cent, that conditions were different from 1979; and 9.7 per cent did not know or were uncertain. "Others" respondents did not share these opinions: 44.3 per cent thought that education returned to normal; 18 per cent, partly normal; 16.4 per cent, not normal; 1.6 per cent, never will return to prestrike conditions; 6 per cent had various explanations--"still resentment on all sides" ... "question of getting the teachers to do things voluntarily" ... "there are problems between the teachers and the principals"; 6.6 per cent were not certain; and 8.2 per cent did not know or did not answer.

Table 7.2 shows that principals and vice-principals considered schools back to normal, except for a residue of bitterness among teachers. Fewer than half the SBE officers/trustees or community leaders agreed. Especially interesting is the varied evaluation by the SBE group; their comments indicated that they saw many negative effects of the strike: "The strike disrupted the confidence, now there is a lot of mistrust in the system" ... "the credibility of the Board and of the teachers is not very high now" ... "the strike stunned the people, disappointed the teachers" ... "the effect will be long-felt" ... "there was too much bitterness, the system will never get back to normal."

Table 7.2: Are the Secondary Schools Back to Normal?
"Others" Respondents, by Selected Variables

	No	Yes	Not Sure	Yes in Part %	Never Normal	Other	N
SBE Officers/ Trustees	21.4	46.4	3.6	21.4	3.6	3.6	28
Principals/Vice- Principals	-	83.3	-	-	-	16.7	6
Community Leaders	18.2	40.9	13.6	22.7	-	4.5	22

While only a few parents thought there would be some long-term effects of the teachers' strike, only 4.9 per cent of "others" respondents said there would be no long-term effects; 8.2 per cent, the effects would be generally positive; 54.1 per cent, overall long-term effects would be negative; and 19.6 per cent were uncertain or did not answer.

Views of the Teachers

Teachers were asked to compare their work in 1981 with existing conditions two or three years earlier. From 21 responses to this query, only one was positive: "There is some improvement in students' attitudes since the strike." The rest were negative, pessimistic, and critical of conditions: "Worse, financially as well. The consumer price index rises 11.2 per cent but our salaries increase 8 per cent or so" ... "more paperwork, less free work for schools" ... "more stress, more tensions" ... "disheartening relations between the rank and file and the principals and vice-principals" ... "worse, students lack respect for teachers and for property" ... "students don't care now" ... "loss of confidence in the

Board" ... "challenges are disappearing that once a professional met head on" ... "harder because kids don't care but I don't care either, so... ."

Asked what value they saw in the strike, 16 teacher respondents were noncommittal or negative: "The strike did little to enhance the image of teachers" ... "students, teachers, and the community all suffered. Confidence and credibility are questioned." Other comments were: "Made parents think about education and educators" ... "it unites teachers for a common purpose. We know we are not appreciated" ... "a necessary tool for teachers" ... "necessary to force the Board to act in good faith" and "nothing is gained except pride and self-respect. Have to stand up for what you believe in even if it means financial loss."

Would the teachers strike again if faced with conditions similar to 1979? Of 17 respondents, five said they would not likely choose this sanction: "Little gained, much good will lost" ... "a strike achieves nothing" ... "striking is a futile exercise with no true benefit and much disruption" ... "I am angered at my colleagues who only want money." Other comments were militant: "We are not afraid to do it" ... "this seems to be the only thing the Board understands" ... "why should the teachers accept a loss in actual real income? No other body of workers will" ... "when you work for a living you need the largest trump in the deck" ... "it is not as tough as expected. My colleagues seemed to enjoy the challenge. I heard no complaints but lots of enthusiasm" ... "I did not want to do it then but felt I had no choice. The potential for the same situation still exists."

Teachers had interesting but varied views on what they learned about the educational system during the strike. Of 16 comments, about one-half were generally positive: "The educational system in Ontario is one of the best in the world" ... "an excellent system" ... "it can take these little shocks" ... "it's more sound than the society in general." Other comments were critical: "It's falling apart" ... "it's rigid, formal, and caught up in the interests of different social classes" ... "the Board is insulated by a layer of middle management who do not pass on comments from below. The trustees do not try to question the management; they really don't understand the budget process" ... "it can be changed for better."

Teachers were asked if they would prefer province-wide negotiations rather than the present system of local talks: 59.1 per cent said no; 20.5 per cent said yes. Of 22 respondents, only six favoured such an alternative: "This would assure province-wide uniformity" ... "more strength for the teachers" ... "more even negotiations" ... "the strike showed that this is necessary." Others pointed out: "It was done in Quebec, with chaotic results" ... "one-to-one is better" ... "problems of education are local" ... "provincial negotiations would tend to push teachers into low salary positions over time" ... "local colour is a must" ... "Toronto is too remote."

What did the teachers learn about their own role as a result of the strike? There was little uniformity in the 18 comments. Some reasserted the central role of teachers in the educational system: "Changes made to the system without teachers' input are folly" ... "teachers are very responsible and not appreciated enough" ... "are important to the students" ... "most teachers are dedicated to fulfilling their roles even amidst most stalwart adversaries" ... "they do the best with what they have." A few teachers objected to the nature of their own federations: "Should not have to belong to the OSSTF except by choice" ... "the role of the professional or a unionized employee has

to be decided on first" ... "principals and vice-principals should have their own union." A few other comments were not easily categorized: "Must oppose all illegitimate authority that controls the educational system." Whether comparing working conditions in 1981 with those in earlier years, commenting on the value of the long strike, or defining their own role in the system, teachers tended to be defensive--in evaluating their own position as teachers--or negative--often bordering on bitterness and alienation. The long-term effects of the strike on teachers were generally negative.

Very few teachers responded to the TSS questionnaires; of those who did, not all dealt with every question, and about one-half included additional comments or explanations. To compensate for this shortcoming, the TSS drew on in-depth interviews with a select number of teachers and on existing, if not easily obtainable, information. Because of this, we believe that the views of the TSS teacher respondents reflect the attitudes of the other SBE secondary school teachers as well.

Information from the teachers indicates that they are not in agreement on even such basic issues as the desirability of belonging to a federation, or the necessity of strikes as a sanction against the SBE. The responses suggest that the SBE teachers have become disillusioned with the educational system, and tend to see themselves as workers rather than as dedicated professionals concerned with the students and the intrinsic merits of education. Time and again, the quest for improved conditions and for increased power in relationships with the SBE came through their comments in a variety of ways. The strike likely increased the militancy of teachers whose concerns were power-sharing with the SBE and improved working conditions, rather than the quality of education as such. Though given much publicity during the strike, the quality of education and the fate of students were not paramount in the minds of the TSS respondents.

Parents' Evaluation of Educational Personnel

Parents were asked to comment on teachers, principals, and SBE people, and to evaluate the educational system as a whole. Of 82 respondents, 23.2 per cent thought that teachers' attitudes towards their jobs and education became more negative as a result of the strike; 35.4 per cent admitted that their own attitudes towards teachers became more critical.

How did the parents evaluate the teachers' performance in 1981? Of the total, 4.9 per cent said teachers were doing a very good job; 48.8 per cent, a good job; 4.9 per cent, a poor job; 8.5 per cent, so-so; a small proportion, 2.4 per cent, were uncertain or did not know; and 30.5 per cent had various opinions: "Some of them are totally dedicated and others just punch in the clock and wait for their holidays" ... "sometimes they have duties in the wrong direction. Promotion of sports takes up too much time" ... "good teachers stay good teachers" ... "I don't know what they really have to do, I suppose they do their jobs" ... "they are under constant strain because of behaviour of some students" ... "on the whole, they are trying" ... "they don't maintain enough discipline" ... "I am disappointed in the teachers" ... "now I give them a lot of credit for sticking up for what they believe." Parents' evaluation of the teachers' performance according to selected background characteristics of the parents are given in table 7.3.

Table 7.3 shows that parents with lower levels of education evaluated teacher performance more positively than those with high school or higher education. There are no

**Table 7.3: Parents' Evaluation of Teachers' Performance in 1981
by Selected Variables**

	Very Good	Good	So-So	Poor* %	Other	Uncer- tain	N
Level of Education							
Less than Grade 8	14.3	85.7	-	-	-	-	7
Grade 8	13.3	46.7	-	6.7	33.3	-	15
Some High School	2.8	52.8	11.1	2.8	27.8	2.8	36
Completed High School	-	37.5	25.0	12.5	25.0	-	8
Higher Education	-	30.0	10.0	10.0	50.0	-	10
Special Education	-	66.7	-	-	33.3	-	3
Ethnic Background							
Anglo-Celt	-	48.1	14.8	7.4	29.6	-	27
French	14.3	46.4	3.6	3.6	32.1	-	28
Italian	-	100.0	-	-	-	-	3
Slavic	-	50.0	25.0	-	25.0	-	4
Scandinavian	-	50.0	50.0	-	-	-	2
"Canadian"	-	33.3	-	-	66.7	-	3
Other	-	50.0	-	7.1	35.7	7.1	14
Length of Residence							
Under 5 Years	-	60.0	20.0	-	20.0	-	5
Between 5 and 9 Years	-	25.0	25.0	-	50.0	-	4
Between 10 and 14 Years	5.9	58.8	-	5.9	29.4	-	17
Between 15 and 19 Years	-	45.0	15.0	10.0	30.0	-	20
Between 20 and 24 Years	18.2	54.2	-	-	27.3	-	11
25 Years and Over	4.2	45.8	8.3	4.2	33.3	4.2	24
Religion							
Roman Catholic	7.7	48.1	7.7	1.9	32.7	1.9	52
Protestant	-	43.8	12.5	12.5	31.3	-	16
Other Religions/ No Religion	-	61.5	7.7	7.7	23.1	-	13

* There were no responses in the "Very Poor" category.

clearly observable patterns for the factors of ethnicity and length of residence, but those in the Protestant and other religion categories evaluated teacher performance more negatively than did those in the Roman Catholic category. Despite the length of the strike, the parents held secondary school teachers in high esteem. It is likely that the negative attitudes and the criticisms levelled at teachers during and soon after the strike are already weakened and will diminish further in time.

How well informed were parents about teachers' jobs in Sudbury? The TSS interviewers asked a series of questions on specific matters to ascertain if parents took an interest in the educational system, and how this was translated into concrete awareness of teachers' working conditions. Questioned on the number of students in an average class, 2.4 per cent said 19 or under; 17.1 per cent, between 20 and 24; 28 per cent, between 25 and 29; 37.8 per cent, between 30 and 34; and 6.1 per cent, 35 or more. With regard to the number of hours of daily instruction, 11 per cent said under four; 22 per cent, four; 26.8 per cent, five; 26.8 per cent, six; 2.4 per cent, seven; 2.4 per cent, eight or more; and 8.5 per cent did not know. Teachers' responsibilities, other than actual

classroom instruction, were identified as follows: correct papers (6.1 per cent), guide activities (3.7 per cent), teachers' professional development (1.2 per cent), meetings with parents (1.2 per cent), none (3.7 per cent), don't know (17.1 per cent), more than one or other activities (67.1 per cent). Other activities named were preparing lessons, maintaining discipline, supervision, and counselling students.

With regard to the time spent by teachers weekly in marking papers, 13.4 per cent said under five hours; 30.5 per cent, between five and 10 hours; 3.7 per cent, between 11 and 15 hours; 6.1 per cent, between 16 and 20 hours; 40.2 per cent did not know; and 6.1 per cent said: "Varied greatly" ... "every teacher is different" ... "very little time" ... "depends on the subject." With regard to teachers' school work not called for in the contract, 18.3 per cent said coaching sports teams; 6.1 per cent, school trips; 1.2 per cent, guidance or supervision; 28 per cent, more than one activity; 18.3 per cent did not know; and 28 per cent said: "Helping students in the summer" ... "counsel- ling" ... "tournaments" ... "organizing science fairs" ... "many things."

Questioned whether or not the SBE teachers had the right amount of duties, 56.1 per cent said yes; 4.9 per cent, too much; 13.4 per cent, too little; 18.3 per cent were uncertain or did not know; 1.2 per cent did not answer; and 6.1 per cent commented: "Depends on the teachers and the subject they teach" ... "some have too much to do, others have too little" and

Maybe they are claiming to be overworked. When my son was in school in first term he'd miss a lot of classes. The school didn't notify me until just two weeks before the end of the term. Child used to take the bus to school than not go to school. He'd sometimes sit in the cafeteria, or a doughnut shop, all day than return home without nobody notifying me about him missing so many classes.

Despite the SBE's informative (if controversial) ads on the levels of teachers' salaries, the parents underestimated their actual earnings. (See table 7.4.) "Other" comments included: "Depends on qualifications" ... "some earn over \$40 000" ... "they earn too much."

Table 7.4: Teachers' Earnings for 1981: Parent Respondents

	%
Under \$15 000	-
Between \$15 000 and \$19 999	6.1
Between \$20 000 and \$24 999	28.0
Between \$25 000 and \$29 999	24.4
\$35 000 and Over	13.4
Other	6.1
Don't Know	22.0

N = 82

Only 2.4 per cent thought the SBE teachers earned less than teachers in other Ontario school boards; 26.8 per cent, about the same; 12.2 per cent, the highest paid; 32.9 per cent were uncertain or did not know; and 25.6 per cent did not answer.

In general, a majority of parents thought working conditions for the SBE teachers were good to excellent. (See table 7.5.) "Various" comments included: "It's not easy to

teach children" ... "their work is hectic, so many personalities each day" ... "difficult job but the benefits are good."

Table 7.5: Teachers' Working Conditions in 1981: Parent Respondents

	%
Excellent	13.4
Very Good	18.3
Good	34.1
Poor	8.5
Very Poor	3.7
Various	12.2
Uncertain, Don't Know	9.8
N = 82	

It may be concluded that parents do not have an accurate perception of the work teachers do in public secondary schools; but there is little to show that they consider teachers underworked and overpaid. They realize that teachers do things for students which are not called for in the contract. Most parents thought that teachers were doing a good, or a very good job, and only a small number were unhappy with the teachers in 1981. This does not correspond to earlier predictions by some community leaders that parents would harbour bitter feelings towards teachers long after the strike was settled.

Parents' Satisfaction with the School System

In general, 54.8 per cent of parents see the educational system as working well or very well; 23.2 per cent, so-so; and 22 per cent, not well or poorly. Nearly one-half, 48.8 per cent, approved of the SBE as compared with the previous small local school boards; 15.9 per cent did not know or were ambivalent; and 34.1 per cent preferred the local boards to the SBE.

There was a generally positive evaluation of principals and vice-principals. Trustees and board officers were not evaluated in a similar positive way, but neither were they given poor marks by many parents. (See table 7.6.)

It is likely that parents who did not respond to this question were also uninformed about what trustees and SBE officers do. Together with the "don't knows," they represent a significant proportion of parents who are unaware of, perhaps unconcerned about, the policy-making and administration of their educational system. "Other comments" included: "The principal is the boss, takes care of everything well" ... "the principal should be the one that judges education for children but some teachers take over" ... "the principals have little to do" ... "the trustees don't worry about the costs or money" ... "trustees should have been more flexible" ... "the board [officers] are too secretive."

Only 13.4 per cent became more critical of the public secondary school system as a result of the negotiations and the strike; for 82.9 per cent, there was no change; and 3.7 per cent were uncertain about their feelings. The responses were subjected to further tests, and table 7.7 shows some differences as a result of the strike. Those who changed their opinions more were home owners rather than renters, people of Slavic background,

Table 7.6: Parents' Evaluation of Principals, Vice-Principals,
Trustees, and SBE Officers

Performance	Principals/ Vice-Principals	Trustees %	SBE Officers
Very Good	8.5	4.9	2.4
Good	48.8	29.3	28.0
So-So	15.9	17.1	12.2
Poor*	2.4	4.9	3.6
Other Comments	14.6	7.3	6.1
Uncertain, Don't Know	9.8	28.1	29.3
No Answer	-	8.5	18.3

N = 82

* There were no "Very Poor" responses.

Table 7.7: Opinions about Secondary Schools Changed Because of the Strike:
Parent Respondents, by Selected Variables

	No	Yes %	Not Certain	N
Level of Education				
Less than Grade 8	87.5	-	12.5	8
Grade 8	100.0	-	-	15
Some High School	80.6	16.7	2.8	36
Completed High School	87.5	12.5	-	8
Higher Education	70.0	20.0	10.0	10
Special Education	33.3	66.7	-	3
Ethnic Background				
Anglo-Celt	81.5	11.1	7.4	27
French	82.8	13.8	3.4	29
Italian	100.0	-	-	3
Slavic	75.0	25.0	-	4
Scandinavian	100.0	-	-	2
"Canadian"	66.7	33.3	-	3
Other	85.7	14.3	-	14
Length of Residence				
Under 5 Years	80.0	20.0	-	5
Between 5 and 9 Years	50.0	50.0	-	4
Between 10 and 14 Years	76.5	17.6	5.9	17
Between 15 and 19 Years	90.0	10.0	-	20
Between 20 and 24 Years	83.3	8.3	8.3	12
25 Years and Over	87.5	8.3	4.2	24
Home Ownership				
Own	80.6	16.4	3.0	67
Rent	93.3	-	6.7	15

people with special education backgrounds, and people residing in Sudbury under 10 years. It is tempting to argue that the last factor--length of residence in Sudbury--is the major

variable, since short-term residents may not have developed the same tolerance to strikes as long-term residents. Again, this must remain a hypothesis.

Asked if they were generally satisfied with the whole secondary school system in Sudbury, 24.4 per cent of the parents said no; 13.4 per cent had mixed feelings: "Too much play, not enough work" ... "good, but I hope they go back to discipline and basics" ... "I have been satisfied in the past but not after the strike"; 24.4 per cent said yes; and 37.8 per cent said it was doing a good job.

Only 22 per cent in 1981 went to regular meetings with teachers at their children's schools; 30.5 per cent went to area meetings; 15.9 per cent maintained contact by telephone; 18.3 per cent resorted to all three types of contacts; 9.8 per cent had no contact; 3.1 per cent kept in touch at the registration or through personal interviews with teachers or principals. Over two-thirds of the TSS respondents thought they should be more involved in the secondary school system; over one-quarter felt that no further involvement, or no involvement whatsoever, was necessary.

Almost one-quarter of the parents were dissatisfied with public secondary schools in 1981, but a majority admitted they were only peripherally involved in the educational system. Their comments suggest uneasiness about lax discipline in schools and the basics of education, rather than specific shortcomings of the system or the teachers in particular. Probably their criticisms and general evaluation are not based on adequate background knowledge of the educational system in Sudbury.

Views of "Others" Respondents on Related Matters

It is important to bear in mind that the composition of the "others" category of TSS respondents is diverse. It included SBE officers in various positions, trustees who were in office, and those who were unsuccessful in the 1980 municipal elections. The subcategory of community leaders is especially complex. It includes people who were directly involved in some alternative or complementary educational system, and others who were only peripherally involved and are not well informed about secondary schools in Sudbury. The information and comments are from SBE officers, trustees, principals/vice-principals, and community leaders in some education-related field. Further, the "others" respondents were encouraged to elaborate on their statements in taped interviews. The information gathered by the TSS is voluminous, often informative and detailed, but not easily amenable to simple codification and interpretation. In evaluating relations between specific categories of people, "others" respondents clarified their points of view and these statements are used liberally in appropriate places.

The "others" respondents were asked to state their views on three related questions:

What are the public's major expectations from Sudbury secondary schools?

Of 61 respondents, 6.5 per cent said, "I don't know, or I am not sure"; 8.2 per cent said the public envisaged education as preparation for life in general; 22.9 per cent said training and education for jobs was the major role of the educational system; 57.4 per cent expected the schools to meet a variety of needs for students and parents with some qualifications: "The public expects the schools to convey, teach besides the 3 R's, also discipline, good habits, social and moral values, and the schools can't do that with their

limited resources" ... "public feels that educational systems should be the 'cure-alls' for all society's ills, such as juvenile delinquency and broken homes" ... "their expectations are out of touch with reality" ... "want parenting done by schools yet they cry when schools introduce sex education" ... "baby sitting functions."

Does the public have confidence in the educational system?

Of 61 respondents, 4.9 per cent did not know, or did not answer; 26.2 per cent said yes; 11.5 per cent were not certain; 37.7 per cent said public confidence had diminished since 1980; and 19.7 per cent commented: "The parents have confidence but there is a growing issue of non-parents rate payers" ... "now the Board is going out of its way to develop good relations with parents" ... "confidence was never in doubt" ... "the public is not that knowledgeable about their schools" ... "not as much as before the strike" ... "most of the public doesn't really care" ... "even if dissatisfied, people won't get up and say we are not getting good education for our dollars" ... "the public is apathetic" ... "public was already losing confidence before the strike" ... "public is cynical about education because it's not graduating many scholars, artists, musicians" ... "no, curriculum has lots to do with it. Not preparing the students properly" ... "no, the strike stunned the people, they are disappointed in the teachers" ... "no, the people have a sense that students can't express themselves" ... "the confidence was jeopardized by the strike."

How does the quality of education in Sudbury compare with other Ontario school boards?

Only 4.9 per cent did not answer or make some comment; the judgment of 13.1 per cent was negative; 44.3 per cent, positive; and 36.1 per cent commented: "Generally on par with the rest of Ontario" ... "better than where I went to school" ... "good, but not happy with the costs; there is too much extravagance" ... "good across the region thanks to bussing" ... "better now; before they had 'mickey mouse' courses" ... "has an excellent reputation" ... "Sudbury is a good place to raise kids" ... "special education is very good, French language immersion programme, superior." On the negative side: "Community schools are limited in programmes" ... "don't maintain enthusiasm after grades 7 and 8" ... "varies from school but many areas are not developed, drama, creative writing, political awareness" ... "teachers have not developed new methodologies" ... "elitist, no skills training" ... "poorer than the private schools" ... "not up to par in vocational training" ... "declined in the past seven years" ... "many come out of the system that can't read or write" ... "need more discipline" ... "lousy in all areas because the basics, the 3 R's, are not properly taught" ... "not enough emphasis in the elementary schools to teach kids to learn, how to be self reliant, and the secondary schools are handicapped because of this."

The role of the secondary school system was seen primarily as a means to attain work or higher education. Only a small proportion saw parents and the general public accepting this level of education as adequate preparation for coping with life. Just over one-quarter believed the public had confidence in the educational system in 1981. In the spring of 1982, there was little to indicate that parents or the general public were dissatisfied with their schools and teachers. There is an obvious divergence of opinion here; "others," many of whom are directly involved in education, may perceive more negative public attitudes than do, in fact, exist.

Most "others" respondents evaluated the Sudbury educational system favourably in comparison with other Ontario school boards. At the same time, the comments by "insiders" identify many serious problems. It is likely that the Sudbury educational system is better than some, but not as good as others.

Relations Between Teachers and Others

The TSS asked teachers what type of relations existed in their work place prior to the strike, and if these relations changed following the strike. The questionnaires requested teachers to elaborate on their ticked-off responses but very few did. Their comments illustrate their answers. In general, 61.4 per cent believed the strike created new divisions, or widened existing gaps in relations, between various categories of people in the system; 34.1 per cent said no change; and 4.5 per cent did not answer. Over one-half, 54.5 per cent, said their own relations were not affected; 36.4 per cent were

affected; and 9.1 per cent did not answer. Table 7.8 shows more detailed relations between teachers and others.

The limited number of comments suggests that relations suffered because of the strike. Where previously there was some indifference or hostility, the strike exacerbated the unfriendly situation: "In some schools there is more staff-administration splits" ... "hardened many positions" ... "deep wedge between the teachers and the Board" ... "distance between the parents and the teachers" ... "hostility between the OSSTF and the principals" ... "between the administration and the executive" ... "the strike affected all sides but this year [1981] each side has new negotiators and the talks are moving along well."

With one or two exceptions, teachers commented on their own relations in generally negative terms: "I now mistrust the Board, the administration, and the government" ... "now have contempt for some colleagues who did not measure up to my former opinion of them; a principal without principles, and a retiring teacher who did not retire" ... "less regard for the OSSTF representatives" ... "strains with colleagues" ... "some hostility with my neighbour who thinks we are too demanding" ... "there is more solidarity with the colleagues now" ... "my family and I are closer together now."

Parents were also asked, more specifically, what outcome the strike had on relations between teachers and other directly involved parties. Only 24.4 per cent believed the strike led to animosity between teachers and SBE people, and 6.1 per cent, between principals/vice-principals. (See table 7.9.)

Explanations were varied but did not, on the whole, portray teachers in a negative way. When conflicts, difficulties, or animosities were said to be present, they emerged for a number of reasons, according to parents: "Because of changes in trustees" (following the 1980 municipal elections) ... "because the trustees forced the teachers to accept a poor settlement" ... "there are always some animosities between bosses and employees" ... "some static between the two, likely lack of communication" ... "teachers think the Board doesn't understand their position" ... "principals were not out on strike, crossed picket lines" ... "some teachers felt that the principals didn't support them" ... "the teachers feel that nobody really knows what's happening to them" ... "blame the Board for the cutbacks in staff."

The teachers were asked what they thought the students' attitude towards the teachers was after the strike. (See table 7.10.)

Did the students' attitude towards the teachers change since 1979? A majority of the teachers, 61.4 per cent, said no observable changes; 9.1 per cent did not answer; 29.5 per cent, different, overwhelmingly not as positively oriented towards the teachers or towards education in general: "The change came over time" ... "they were not interested in education and the strike made it more evident" ... "there is less respect for the teachers now" ... "some students became less friendly because they share their parents opinions" ... "many students see us as people who do very little and who are paid too much." Of those teachers who said that changes in students' attitude did take place, 64.3 per cent blamed the strike for this outcome.

Table 7.8: Before and After the Strike: Relations between Teachers
and Others, as Perceived by Teachers

Relations between teachers and:	Other Teachers (Col- leagues)		Princi- pals		Vice- Princi- pals		Federa- tion Executive		Trustees		SBE Officers		Parents		Students	
	%															
In Years:	1979	1981	1979	1981	1979	1981	1979	1981	1979	1981	1979	1981	1979	1981	1979	1981
Very Friendly	61.4	59.1	36.4	34.1	43.2	43.2	38.6	34.1	2.3	-	4.5	2.3	25.0	22.7	54.5	54.5
Formal but																
Friendly	13.6	13.6	29.5	27.3	34.1	34.1	27.3	31.8	22.7	18.2	45.5	31.8	45.5	38.6	27.3	22.7
Generally																
Formal	9.1	9.1	13.6	6.8	13.6	9.1	22.7	9.1	18.2	20.5	22.7	31.8	13.6	13.6	4.5	6.8
Formal and Cool	-	2.3	6.8	13.6	2.3	6.8	2.3	6.8	20.5	27.3	20.5	22.7	4.5	9.1	-	-
Often Hostile	2.3	-	-	4.5	2.3	-	-	2.3	6.8	15.9	-	6.8	2.3	4.5	-	-
Different																
Situations	-	2.3	2.3	2.3	-	-	2.3	9.1	4.5	6.8	-	-	2.3	2.3	-	-
Different																
over Time	-	-	-	-	-	2.3	-	-	-	2.3	-	-	-	-	-	-
Different for																
Individuals	11.4	9.1	6.8	6.8	2.3	-	2.3	2.3	4.5	-	-	-	4.5	4.5	11.4	11.4
No Answer	2.3	4.6	4.5	4.6	2.3	4.6	4.5	4.6	20.4	9.0	6.8	4.6	2.3	4.6	2.3	4.6

N = 44

Table 7.9: Animosity between Teachers and Others as a
Result of the Strike: Parent Respondents

	None	Some	Don't Know
			%
Between Teachers and Trustees	65.9	24.2	9.7
Between Teachers and Principals/Vice-Principals	78.0	6.1	15.9
Between Teachers and Board Officers	58.5	19.5	22.0

N = 82

Table 7.10: Students' Attitude towards Teachers:
Teacher Respondents

	%
Very Positive	11.4
Generally Positive	63.6
Neutral/Indifferent	9.1
Generally Negative	9.1
Very Negative	-
Don't Know/No Answer	6.9

N = 44

There were no comments by teacher respondents that students or their parents were sympathetic to their position. But the overall response to the strike, and to the opportunity of making up some lost education, suggests that perhaps the majority of students saw the strike as a holiday or at least time off from school work. For most students, credits were gained without much additional effort, and for those who passed, there was little reason to resent the teachers.

Poststrike Relations

The long-term effects of the strike were considered through in-depth interviews with "others" respondents. It was assumed that this category was the most knowledgeable of all the TSS respondents on these particular questions, and that their information would produce the most reliable data. Further, the overall credibility of this information would be enhanced, because the view of one subcategory--e.g., board officers--would be balanced by the views of other respondents--e.g., trustees. Thus, the overall results would more likely reflect the accurate view of relations as they were in 1981. (See table 7.11 for statistical data.) The data are illustrated by a selection of quotations on each set of relationships considered by the TSS. It should be noted that fewer than one-fifth of "others" respondents thought the various relations changed over time, and these changes were limited mostly to teachers and principals.

Comments on relations between trustees and board officers showed few areas of dissent--"different trustees and different individuals from the board don't get along; it's a personality matter"--but the two groups were portrayed as co-operative and friendly entities: "The relations were good during the strike and improved further by 1981, with a new Chairman and the newly elected trustees" ... "some of the Board officers did some of

Table 7.11: Relations between Various Groups After the Strike
as Perceived by "Others" Respondents

Relations between:	Trustees and SBE Officers	SBE Officers and Teachers	Teachers and Trustees	Principals and Teachers	Principals and Students; Parents	Trustees and Students; Parents	SBE Officers and Principals	Teachers and Students; Parents	Trustees and Principals	SBE Officers and Parents
	%									
Largely Negative	18.0	23.0	32.8	21.3	6.6	13.1	19.7	14.8	21.3	9.8
Neutral	-	-	4.9	1.6	-	8.2	-	-	1.6	11.5
Largely Positive	23.0	8.2	4.9	9.8	19.7	21.3	21.3	6.6	13.1	4.9
Mixed	4.9	9.8	6.6	14.8	8.2	4.9	1.6	9.8	3.3	3.3
Changed over Time	4.9	11.5	8.2	3.3	8.2	3.3	11.5	16.4	6.6	6.6
No Change	4.9	4.9	4.9	8.2	9.8	4.9	3.3	4.9	8.2	4.9
Other	6.6	4.9	3.3	1.6	1.6	8.2	1.6	8.2	8.2	6.6
Don't Know	6.6	4.9	4.9	6.6	9.8	4.9	6.6	6.6	4.9	3.3
No Answer	31.1	32.8	29.5	32.8	36.1	31.2	34.4	32.8	32.8	49.1

N = 61

the work for the trustees during the strike" ... "first class relations." Undoubtedly there were, and continue to be, misunderstandings and personality clashes, but trustees and SBE officers share the same general concerns, and this inevitably leads to co-operation.

Evaluation of relations between SBE officers and teachers was more negative: "Lack of trust" ... "the teachers think that the Board officers contributed a great deal to the length of the strike" ... "they are to blame for the Board's ad" ... "no great love from teachers for 200 Brady [the SBE offices]" ... "deteriorated badly during the strike, will never likely return to normal." There are indications that noneducation-involved community leaders thought of trustees and SBE officers as a single group, so the negative teachers/trustees relations may have been transferred to the SBE officers as well.

Some views were less critical: "The Board officers are the 'bosses' but there is minimal contact with the teachers; some officers have good relations with the teachers" ... "they are making efforts to build bridges with the teachers" ... "the new accommodation may have gone too far" ... "never a major problem, now more openness" ... "reasonably good, everyone is very careful because no one wants another strike" ... "not much hostility since the officers are not as active in the negotiations as the trustees." It may be concluded that teachers see SBE officers as allied to trustees, but that there are attempts to build bridges and establish positive relations.

The largest percentage of "others" respondents evaluated teachers/trustees relations in negative terms but recognized that changes have taken place since the end of the strike. Many TSS informants expressed the attitude of one or the other side forcefully: "The trustees are engaged in teacher bashing" ... "teachers see the trustees as an enemy" ... "disdain, no respect for trustees" ... "continuing hostility" ... "some teachers have not forgotten the strike" ... "a deep rift exists" ... "most of the teachers are against the trustees for not giving in to their demands" ... "there is NO relations between the teachers and trustees." The changes that have taken place since the end of the

strike were expressed: "Mistrust is still there but the confrontations are more restrained" ... "since a change in senior personnel, the teachers are less bitter" ... "better rapport now because of new faces on the Board" ... "the Board lost power and the teachers are more smug now" ... "still much resentment but the teachers, as professionals, are glad to get back to work" ... "relations are starting to improve" ... "difficult to talk about relations here since there is no structure for contact" and "must distinguish teachers from the Federations." In sum, there is a growing improvement in relations between trustees and teachers, but animosity is likely to be present in the foreseeable future.

A significant proportion of the "others" respondents, 21.3 per cent, thought relations between principals/vice-principals and teachers were mostly negative. The distance between these two groups has two bases: first, the principals/vice-principals remained on duty, drawing full pay during the strike, yet benefiting from whatever gains were achieved by the striking teachers; second, some teachers felt principals/vice-principals were not supportive enough during the strike, either morally or financially, and voiced these views in their publication ROCK in May 1980. The article caused much friction between teachers and principals/vice-principals and led to charges being laid against the teachers in court.

The matter of ROCK accusations is not generally known to the public, but many "others" respondents were aware of these developments, as their comments showed: "Some militants among the teachers created lasting divisions with their article in the ROCK" ... "the militants set up the principals as 'bad guys' in the ROCK issues" ... "uneasy; teachers are unhappy with what money the principals put into the strike fund" ... "tense now; a move to get the principals out of the Federation" ... "the teachers felt that the principals sold them out" ... "strains remain" ... "deteriorated because of the strike, harmony may be lost forever" ... "cooperation now below par" ... "strained, the teachers felt that they were not fully or properly supported during the strike" ... "it varies, it's very good in some schools," and "about half are relatively tolerant but the other half are resentful at each other." It may be that the major and lasting negative effect of the strike is the threat to harmony and co-operation between teachers and principals/vice-principals. It must be emphasized that this information was drawn from informants who were well aware of the internal dynamics of the educational system in Sudbury, but these opinions considered the situation in 1981. The lasting effects of the strike on these or other relations need to be reexamined at some future time.

Only a small proportion thought relations between principals and parents/students were negative. The comments suggest that the worsening relations stemmed primarily from the strike and were improving or back to normal by 1981: "Because of pressure to get credits, some parents blamed the principals for the failure of their children" ... "I know of some parents who tried during the strike to collect books and got a 'cold shoulder' from principals. The parents became resentful" ... "some parents became hostile because of the strike but the principals are sympathetic and understanding; they realize the damage" ... "deteriorated during the strike, now returning to normal" ... "things settled down" ... "good in most cases."

Relations between parents/students and trustees were seen in a more positive light. The major development was that parents were more ready in 1981 to let trustees know

their concerns: "There seem to be more pressure groups" ... "lots of noise on some issues like bussing, French immersion" ... "more parents are interested in what's going on. They speak up" ... "have greater awareness of trustees' role" ... "no communication unless the parents want to discuss specific problems" ... "relations vary with the situation at hand" ... "not much communication since the end of the strike."

There is little here to suggest that parents no longer trust their elected representatives to look after educational matters. But the SBE chairman believed the public "has lost confidence in our Board" and "it is our responsibility to work and co-operate with the public so that we can regain their trust" (Sudbury Star, 24 April 1981). We can only hypothesize that the strike created a precedent for future establishment of parents' organizations to influence certain SBE decisions. Perhaps parents will be more ready to mobilize into protest groups should the need arise. Meanwhile, parents' involvement in the day-to-day affairs of the educational system is at a very minimal level.

"Others" respondents deemed relations between SBE officers and principals/vice-principals equally as positive or negative. Most comments indicated changes--either improved communications, or deterioration of previously good relations--"more decision sharing now" ... "our relations improved because of frequent regular communications during the strike" ... "they [principals/vice-principals] fear the Board less now than before the strike" ... "deteriorated. The principals saw the Board officers representing the trustees' position during the negotiations" ... "more distant on the part of the principals" ... "not much trust between the two sides."

Only a small percentage considered relations between teachers and parents/students good in 1981. Most comments suggested that the strike created further potential problems: "Parents now have some reservations about the teachers" ... "cynicism set in among the students" ... "students lost a lot of respect for the teachers" ... "respect is not the same for the teachers" ... "parents are not as easily satisfied now" ... "some parents became more demanding" ... "teachers did not win parents' support" ... "not bitterness, but some feel let down by the teachers" ... "parents saw the teachers as 'bad boys' but the students thanked the teachers for their holidays" ... "students went back to school as if nothing happened" ... "parents already forgot the strike and are not holding a grudge against the teachers." Because of the strike, perhaps students see the role of secondary school and teachers in a less positive light at present, but it may be only a temporary situation. Just as likely, relations between teachers/parents and students will return to normal, if the next two or three contract settlements are achieved quickly and peacefully (like the one in 1981), and if the "bridge-building" between all factions, begun after the strike, continues unimpeded.

Relations between trustees and principals/vice-principals were not clearly identified by "others" respondents, although there was a tendency to envisage them in broadly negative terms: "Principals don't like the school system management" ... "principals are executive officers of the system. Since the trustees have an 'artificial feeling' about what the educational system is, and what it can achieve, they give certain instructions to the principals which are not realistic. Principals have to convey these unrealistic, and unpopular instructions to the teachers. They are in the middle" ... "principals felt that they were left alone to cope with the teachers' hostilities during

the strike" ... "relations deteriorated" ... "the Board is building bridges; for example the seminar on effective listening for the people in the Board" and "the strike made no difference here" ... "they have limited relations or contact at best."

Relations between SBE officers and parents were also described vaguely, or in general terms: "There are no real relations; no reason to have them" ... "they inform the public through news releases about what takes place." Nearly one-half did not respond; others had mixed comments: "Parents are allies" ... "they are more 'gun shy' of the phone now. More aggressive parents are ready to phone in their complaints."

A few respondents said there were no real changes in any relations because of the strike, or, whatever changes emerged after the strike, "things were back to normal" by 1981, and "some individuals are vindictive, but people tend to forget quickly." One or two were "not able to judge the relations."

Asked if they thought parents wanted to be more informed about the details of contract negotiations, only a few said yes. A majority said: "The parents' main concern is to avoid, or terminate the strike" ... "some issues are too complex for parents to understand" ... "the parents are too apathetic" ... "no, we have publicly elected representatives to look after the negotiations." The general consensus was that parents were not really interested in these matters as long as there were people responsible for, and concerned with, these issues.

To summarize briefly, it would seem that relations most affected by the strike were between teachers and trustees--an obvious residue from strike-period negotiations. There are other problem areas--between principals/vice-principals and teachers, and between the SBE and principals/vice-principals. A tentative hypothesis is that, if these relations are not improved, the quality of education may well be negatively affected in the foreseeable future. The signs are that the bridge-building is continuing and, in time, the SBE system should return to generally amiable relations.

Teachers' Right to Strike

The question of higher education as a public and essential service has been a subject of much public debate in the last few years. Many parents, associations, and various interest groups advocate removal of the teachers' right to strike under Bill 100; others accept the legitimacy of this sanction for teachers' grievances. Some people feel that though teachers should have some means of having their demands met, even the legitimate use of strike action, it is also necessary to protect the students' right to an uninterrupted education. Education is esteemed by Canadians as an important resource for desirable life-chances.

The TSS asked all respondents to outline their views on the teachers' right to strike. Nearly two-thirds of parents, one-fifth of teachers, and over one-third of "others" said teachers should not have the right to strike. (See table 7.12 for parent respondents.) (Additional statistical data are included in Appendix 1, tables A6 to A9.)

Of the parents, 86.6 per cent said that grade 9 to 13 education should not be interrupted, since it is a vital public service. They were asked to explain their views:

Table 7.12: Teachers Should Have the Right to Strike:
Parent Respondents

	%
Strongly Agree	9.8
Agree	22.0
Neutral/Don't Care	6.1
Disagree	25.6
Strongly Disagree	35.4
Don't Know	1.2
No Answer	-

N = 82

"It is the future of Canada" ... "there is a tendency to drop out if education is interrupted" ... "students get discouraged, lose interest" ... "it's the developmental stage of our young people" ... "strikes demoralize students."

While a majority rejected the teachers' right to strike, 48.8 per cent saw a need for some protection for teachers: "A strong bargaining unit but anything 'shy' of going on strike" ... "an arbitration board as soon as a dispute is not resolved" ... "intensive negotiations in the summer months, before the contract expires" and "more skilled negotiators on both sides."

Nearly three-quarters of the teachers, 72.7 per cent, said they should have the right to strike; 22.7 per cent said no; and 4.5 per cent did not answer. Their responses are related with their background characteristics (see Appendix 1, table A7). Asked if there were any alternatives to strikes for the teachers, 36.4 per cent said no; 2.3 per cent were not certain; 15 per cent did not answer; and 45.5 per cent said yes, naming some non-strike resolutions: "Mediation" ... "work-to-rule" ... "impartial third parties" ... "compulsory negotiations until an agreement is reached" ... "arbitration."

The opinions of "others" respondents fell between the views of parents and teachers. Of the 61 respondents, 4.9 per cent did not answer; 3.3 per cent were uncertain; 36.1 per cent said no; and 50.8 per cent said yes. Their responses were considered further (see Appendix 1, table A9). Their pro and con comments are used selectively as illustrations: "Yes, the only ammunition they have" ... "yes, but rotating strikes should be more effective" ... "yes, but reduce the scope" ... "yes, but compulsory arbitration after certain time" ... "yes, under specific guidelines. Teaching is not work in uranium mines" ... "yes, but consider other solutions" and "no, all public servants (including teachers) should not have the right to strike" ... "no, a strike contradicts education--everyone is compelled to go to school if 16 or under, yet education is not available" ... "no, the teachers should have the right to quit if they don't like it" ... "no, set up some kind of a tribunal; would not have said no before the strike" ... "no, need a mechanism of some kind."

The teachers' right to strike will remain a contentious issue for more than one reason. Bill 100 does not give teachers an unlimited right to strike, since the ERC can declare students to be in jeopardy and the government can order teachers back to school. All sides in these disputes are aware of the real or potential danger of a prolonged strike to students' prospects of gaining all the necessary credits for acceptance at college or university. Also, strikes often create lasting divisions within the system involved, and

within the larger community. Few strikes are not costly for one or both sides. Meanwhile, there are no generally accepted alternatives to teacher strikes and, barring redefinition of this occupation as an essential service, it is unlikely that this question will ever be resolved.

Summary/Conclusions

In dealing with the long-term effects of the 1980 strike, we were most concerned with the relations between the various components of the SBE as perceived by the TSS respondents themselves. Included are references to education-related events as noted in the local press. After the settlement of the strike, little attention was given to the terms of settlement and to the new school year beginning in 1981. Whatever problems remained, they were not a subject of public debate.

One long-term effect on home study time was an increase in the proportion of students who spend over 100 minutes daily on homework. Two explanations are possible. On the one hand, the 56 days of strike perhaps forced "weaker" students to spend more time studying to keep up with the regular expectations of the teachers. On the other hand, the teachers may have assigned additional work during the 1980-81 academic year to make up for the material not covered because of the strike.

There was a lack of consensus on the question, Were the schools back to normal in 1981? A majority of parents said yes, but "others" respondents disagreed. We favour the view of the "others," since many were directly involved in the educational system and often had detailed knowledge of its workings. In addition, comments received from teachers corroborated the claims made by "others" respondents that there were serious problems in relations between teachers and principals/vice-principals, and between teachers and trustees. But there seems to be a concerted effort at bridge-building, which should eventually eradicate these problems.

For teachers, the year 1981 did not compare favourably with previous years. Most TSS respondents felt that the strike did not resolve many issues but created new difficulties, especially in relations between principals/vice-principals and themselves. There was little to suggest, one year after the strike was settled, a lessening of negative feelings towards the SBE, and especially trustees. Disillusionment with the strike experience and the unsatisfactory settlement may well have dampened their professional dedication, made more militant "unionists" of some, and forced others to redefine themselves as "workers earning a living." The unfriendly atmosphere between teachers and the SBE will likely be affected by the next two or three negotiations. The atmosphere will be improved significantly if settlement is reached quickly, as in 1981. There are also deliberate efforts by the SBE to establish more amiable relations with teachers. Teachers did not think highly of the SBE but it is the "lesser of two evils" to a majority of teachers, who would much rather negotiate locally than have province-wide talks and agreements. Little can be said about future relations between teachers and principals/vice-principals. Perhaps only time will be the healer in this case.

Though teachers thought parents were indifferent or hostile to their strike activities, and to their teaching efforts in general, this view was not borne out by the TSS parents. In evaluating the teachers' jobs, most parents did not consider teachers

underworked and overpaid. In fact, there was a tendency to underestimate average teachers' salaries. The perception of what teachers do at school was not fully accurate, but most parents recognized that teachers did other work besides classroom instruction, and that some of it was done on their own time. In general, the majority of parents were satisfied with their educational system.

The poststrike relations between the various categories of people directly involved were based on the views of the "others" respondents--a group informed about the internal dynamics of the Sudbury educational system. No specific combination of groups was seen as having overall positive relations. In each case, smaller or larger proportions were deemed hostile or indifferent to each other. In no case was there general harmony or co-operation. While the levels of projected hostility were low, they were more pronounced for teachers/principals and vice-principals and for teachers/SBE groups. There is little reason to doubt these views and the hostilities impede the most effective education. They may have long-lasting effects on the quality of teaching in Sudbury unless steps are taken to eliminate these problems. As noted earlier, such measures were planned; some were already executed in 1981.

It was argued that a strike of any duration is often more costly than expected for one side or both sides in the dispute. In the case of the teachers' strike, there were, in addition to the SBE and the federations, the students and their parents and the larger community.

Time and again, the teachers claimed they were forced to accept a settlement which did not meet many of their demands. An unforeseen outcome of the strike was the emergence of hostile relations with principals and vice-principals, because of the strike fund and the article in the teachers' publication ROCK. Also, their attitude towards trustees became more hostile, creating a communications gap between two important components of the educational system. In all, no strike gains were claimed by the teachers' federations.

The SBE may have won a Pyrrhic victory. Some of its stipulated conditions for a settlement were written into the new contract. It saved over \$6.5 million in unpaid wages for the striking teachers, yet there was a 15 per cent increase in the cost of education for 1981. The strike was not beneficial to the ratepayers. Few parents questioned the SBE's position during the strike, and many more indicated their support for the SBE's stand during the strike. Yet, the negative effects may outweigh any victories; the teachers likely became seriously alienated and hostile, jeopardizing their effectiveness as communicators with students, parents, and others. Parents could be less easy to cope with in future. The strike-period experiences showed them that only through mobilization and concerted activity could they sway educational decisions, and such organizational activity has subsequently taken place.* In sum, the strike left the SBE with bitter, alienated teachers and parents who may demand far greater accountability from the SBE than prior to the strike.

* A community organization People Against Climbing Taxes (PACT) was formed early in 1982, in response to rising school costs and the SBE's secrecy on plans for French-immersion classes.

The Sudbury teachers' strike did not lead to masses of students dropping out, or to large increases in social and family problems for the idle young people. Inevitably, the 56 days of strike affected some students and most likely the academically weak or the least committed individuals quit, not to return in 1981. It is possible that the present cohort of secondary school students emerged from the strike with increased cynicism towards teachers and education in general. At least a proportion of these young people enjoyed the three months of free time, reassured that consideration would be given to allow them to get all their credits. The strike, and its terms of settlement, did not produce specific benefits or improvements in their educational aspirations.

The image of Sudbury as a community characterized by frequent, long, and bitter strikes received another boost from the longest teachers' strike in the history of education in Ontario. There were no winners in the 1980 teachers' strike.

Introduction

This report deals with the 1980 strike of the public secondary school teachers in Sudbury. In terms of the actual days the schools were closed (56), it was the longest strike in the history of education in Ontario. The community had witnessed many labour/management disputes before but the teachers' strike did not seem to fit the general pattern. Sudbury reacted differently to the closure of its secondary schools than it did to past labour disputes.

Drawing on available resources, the TSS set out to learn in great detail about the teachers' strike. The field research produced masses of data and extensive other information, which expanded the scope of the TSS beyond the originally planned parameters. In addition to concerns with causal factors and actual strike experiences, the TSS dealt with the overall background to this dispute and considered the long-term effects of the strike.

While the scope of this inquiry was broad and often detailed, the TSS did not consider one key component of the strike--the students themselves. The exclusion was deliberate, based on the rationalization that a number of studies had already dealt with this subject. The TSS was concerned with the teachers, the parents of students affected by the strike, and the various "others" category, which included trustees, SBE officers, principals/vice-principals, and individuals termed community leaders.

The TSS would have liked greater involvement from principals and vice-principals since they, more than other actors in this drama, were able to observe and evaluate conditions prior to, and subsequent to, the strike and comment with authority on the attitudes of teachers and students before and after the strike. Nonetheless, this group of respondents did provide the TSS with many valuable insights into the dynamics of the strike.

It was also disappointing that relatively few teachers were willing to answer the questionnaires despite assurances of confidentiality and objectivity. Not unusual, however, since other researchers met similar situations in the past. The reluctance of teachers to take part in such research is not altogether surprising.

Despite repeated assurances of confidentiality in the findings of this study, they feared that the results, or specific bits of information, would be used by unscrupulous people to the detriment of teachers as a whole or specific individuals within the system. The teachers may rest assured that this report has scrupulously observed the requirements of anonymity and objective neutrality in dealing with and presenting information derived from all TSS respondents.

The teachers might have been reluctant to participate in such research since they believed that, whatever the results, they were in a no win situation. Should the study discover negative effects--e.g., unsuccessful completion of studies for the pupils, or

fragmented relations with others directly involved in the system (SBE people, principals, parents)--the teachers might well fear that they would bear the brunt of the blame for starting the strike, jeopardizing the students, and creating conflicts and animosities. Conversely, if the strike did not result in any long-lasting negative effects, if the students managed to catch up and do as well after missing about one-third of their school year, questions could be raised: How important is the role of teachers? Do they really merit the high remuneration? Should they demand and get additional teachers and better working conditions to improve the quality of education?

These dual concerns would be sufficient reason for many teachers to reject participating in this research. Responses to lengthy questionnaires from 44 teachers and information from a few others in pretests or in more informed discussions provide a very useful glimpse on how teachers see various education-related matters. It can be added here that no judgment was passed favouring one or another interpretation of the teachers' reluctance to respond to the TSS.

The TSS was fortunate in acquiring a complete list of parents with children in the secondary schools during the strike. The list served to draw a systematically selected sample of parents, who provided much interesting and important information on the questions of education, their views of the strike, and the place of various people in this event. Equally important was the information gained from trustees, SBE officers, and community leaders. The TSS also acquired documentation bearing on the negotiations and the strike period. Though incomplete, these sources added significantly to the information given by over 200 TSS respondents. Because of limitations in the size and selection of the samples, it is not claimed that the TSS data meet the desirable standards of validity and reliability.

In order to come to meaningful conclusions about human emotions as exhibited in attitudes and beliefs, the TSS had to probe deeply into what lay behind the issues that influenced these attitudes and beliefs. The range and complexity of human responses to problem situations are not easily transferable to computer programs, however sophisticated. Also, public opinion ranges from sentimental hearsay to astute criticism, depending on the speaker. "Often it can be erroneous and misinformed. Yet, it contains an element of self-fulfilling prophecy because it is based on the same emotions that decide the outcome of an election" (CEA Task Force, Results of a Gallup Poll of Public Opinion in Canada about Public Involvement in Educational Decisions, 1979; 7). The TSS was faced with interpreting information which was often subjective and subject to selective memories of each subject. But the range and depth of our information, together with the efforts made to corroborate it, assure an acceptable degree of accuracy. On these bases, we claim that the report approximates very closely the conditions and situations as they existed in Sudbury prior to, during, and after the 1980 strike.

Concluding Comments

The Teachers' Strike Study examined and interpreted a great deal of information related to the 1980 strike. Throughout this report, discussion was summarized and evaluated, with conclusions given in many chapters. In this final section we comment further on the four substantive areas: the overall sociohistorical background of Sudbury; the reasons why the strike took place; the reasons why it became a record-breaker in the history of education

in Ontario; and its after-effects on the educational system in this community. Some discussion remains speculative, or at the level of hypotheses, and we hope that the possible relationships indicated here may encourage other researchers to pursue them more fully in the future.

In chapter 2, detailed attention was given to the establishment of Sudbury, its economic base, its population, and its physical/cultural environment. The discussion was intentionally carried out to suggest that specific conditions within the total environment very likely had a bearing on the 1980 teachers' strike. We will consider two such areas to illustrate the hypothetical relationships.

The occupational structure of Sudbury reflects primarily blue-collar and service-industry jobs which, traditionally, did not demand higher educational qualifications. While parents in these occupations may see the benefit of high school education for their children, it is likely that they are not overly interested or concerned with the curriculum, methodology, or other dynamics of the educational system, expecting teachers, principals, and elected representatives to look after these matters. It is very doubtful whether the concept "quality of education" is at all understood by them and their major concerns could be limited to having their children occupied rather than idle and completing their grades/years to whatever level they deem adequate and desirable. To these parents, secondary school teachers are experts, beyond the parents' ability to evaluate their qualifications or performance. Given this attitude, it is easier to see why parents were uninvolved in any organized effort to curtail the lengthy strike, why they gave free rein to the SBE to deal with all such matters, and why SBE regular meetings are attended only by a few reporters, as a rule.

It is unlikely that there was much informal contact or communication between secondary school teachers and parents, either at school or in the community (although this has not been considered by the TSS). Because of occupational distinctions, there is social distance between teachers and parents. Teachers, as members of the middle class, are seen as "them" by blue-collar, working-class parents. It is probable that teachers also refer to workers as "them." This distance was aggravated by the teachers during the early stages of the strike, when they claimed that miners earned more than teachers and that teachers should earn more. The image of Sudbury as a place where workers were frequently in conflict with management, in quest of improved conditions and better rewards for dangerous and dirty work, is well justified. It would be extremely difficult for parents to accept teachers' arguments for improved conditions in their work. Class differences and social distance may account almost fully for the lack of public support for the striking teachers--little sympathy in any form and only one supportive public statement from the local labour organization.

The physical/cultural environment of the area had some less obvious implications for the teachers' general attitude and morale, which affected their prestrike and poststrike self-awareness. Even today, Sudbury does not offer the same amount of cultural enrichment--theatres, galleries, museums, bookshops, or other specialized services--available in many other Ontario cities. The distance and the costs of travel preclude easy access to places like Toronto or Ottawa. The physical environment of the city is improving annually, but many other localities offer more attractive surroundings and a fuller cultural life, important to many people in the field of education.

It was noted earlier that in the 1960s and early 1970s, teachers enjoyed a seller's market. It was difficult to persuade new teachers needed to work in a community whose negative, if largely inaccurate, reputation was well-known. It was not possible to learn what special incentives were offered to teachers to settle in Sudbury; but in the heyday of school expansion, many teachers looked for positions elsewhere, according to one TSS informant. Since the late 1970s, the seller's market for teachers has become a buyer's market for boards. With fewer teaching vacancies available, it is difficult to be hired by a desirable community. (In fact, a major concern now for teachers is keeping their jobs without being declared redundant.)

Thus, the SBE teachers were forced to accept the fact that alternatives to teaching in Sudbury were few and far between, so they remained in a place where cultural resources were limited and the physical environment could be better. In some undetermined measure, this was reflected in their demands for improvements in a number of areas of their work, to compensate in part for these limitations. The TSS data and other information clearly indicate that teachers' morale in 1981 was low. The question must remain: Will it improve fully as long as they are forced by economic and other constraints to remain in Sudbury?

We reiterate that the preceding discussion is hypothetical and supported by fragmentary information. Possibly a great many teachers would argue that they are happy in Sudbury but we wonder how truthful that would be. These two examples were raised to show that the factual contractual issues, the actual process of negotiations, and the people involved in any such bargaining should maintain a broader understanding of what is involved. Also, any research concerned with such disputes as the 1980 teachers' strike should be aware of the larger background conditions which contribute to strike actions.

The overall past experiences of the community, its people, and the physical/cultural environment, all had some undetermined bearing on the eventual closing of secondary schools in Sudbury in 1980. A number of identifiable factors had a more direct effect on the teachers' decision to strike. The issues were varied and complex, not possible to categorize systematically into major and minor contributors to the strike action. No attempts were made to apply the available and sophisticated measures to determine this, since information was drawn only partially from concrete evidence, and was based largely on the subjective interpretation of conditions and events from informed, but undoubtedly biased, respondents. Two sets of problems can account for the major part of the question: Why did the strike take place?

The SBE maintained a firm position on what it was willing to offer the teachers throughout 1979. The SBE negotiators based their stand on two major considerations: the declining enrolment and the rising costs of education in the context of economic problems stemming from the long strike at INCO. There was much additional explanation and justification for maintaining the hard line, but these were the main arguments used to reject many of the teachers' proposals. These two major considerations resulted in only small and reluctant concessions to the teachers' demands during successive negotiations. As a measure of the budgetary restraints, the SBE proposed the removal of an existing clause in the contract, quickly labelled as contract-stripping by the teachers. In general, the SBE was convinced, rightly or wrongly, that ratepayers would be strongly opposed to a significant increase in the educational portion of their property taxes, and

argued that the teachers' demands in such areas as COLE, staffing, and PTR were unreasonable.

The TSS was unable to determine the position of the teachers prior to September 1979. There was some suggestion that the two sides were close to settlement in June or July 1979, but this changed in September 1979. At that time, about 12 issues, identified by the teachers as major concerns, required significant changes before settlement. The hardening of the teachers' position reflected a number of concerns. They were seriously worried by the erosion of previous financial gains because of inflation, and wished to protect their earnings through the COLE provisions. They were deeply concerned with declining enrolment and the loss of teaching positions, and wished to protect as many jobs as was logically and economically feasible. On these fundamental concerns, teachers were unwilling to compromise too greatly. Possibly, teachers' demands became more inflexible after a member of the provincial OSSTF unofficially joined their negotiation team.

Even with the presence of the Fact Finder and a mediator, appointed by the ERC, the two sides did not move significantly from their respective positions prior to the strike. In monetary matters alone, the gap was over \$3 million, and this was not narrowed down measurably in 1979. In sum, neither side was willing to budge on the crucial issues of money and staffing.

The other difficulties contributing to the 1980 strike were the absence of proper communication between the disputants and lack of proper understanding of each other's concerns. For the SBE, the 1979 negotiations were merely another set of talks on issues which would be resolved sooner or later. The TSS found little awareness among SBE people of the depth of dissatisfaction among teachers and the degree of resolve to effect significant changes in the existing contract. Not until the strike vote did the SBE realize that a strike was possible and, even then, many trustees did not believe that the teachers would strike. As for the teachers, there was little realization that the SBE's position was very firm, and that the budget set for 1979-80 left little room for maneuvering.

Likely, the communications gap was emphasized by the negotiations which, on the one hand, represented face-to-face talks at the bargaining table but, on the other hand, involved pressures, influences, and decisions by behind-the-scenes people. It can be concluded that neither side was aware of the depth of the other's resolve. There is little to show that the strike was deliberately provoked by either side; rather, it became inevitable as a result of unplanned conditions and lack of proper understanding of important issues.

The reasons why the strike dragged on for 56 school days are varied and complex. It is not possible to distinguish major from minor contributing factors to the duration of the strike. According to the ERC Director, both sides had ample opportunity to settle the dispute before and during the early stages of the strike, but both sides remained obdurate.

An earlier, emotionally disruptive factor to settlement was the ad published by the SBE, which claimed that the teachers were well paid, had very good working conditions, were being offered substantial increases and improvements, yet wanted more. As a generalization, the ad was not completely accurate, and generated greater resolve among the

teachers to fight for their demands. This ad also resulted in new levels of enmity between the teachers and the SBE, clouded successive negotiation talks, and precluded a more amiable final settlement.

A situation clearly evident in Sudbury was the absence of organized pressure from parents (or students, until later stages of the strike) to force a settlement. Parents expected their elected representatives to deal with such matters, and they trusted the SBE to keep the best interests of the students and themselves, as ratepayers, in mind during the negotiations. Also, until the advertising campaigns to inform the public of the respective positions, few parents were even vaguely aware of the strike issues. Many parents, though concerned with the strike's effect on their children, did not sympathize with the teachers, and did not exert pressure on the SBE to modify its stand and resolve the dispute sooner.

A contributing factor to the absence of pressure groups for an early settlement was the succession of mediators, whose presence was interpreted by the media as a chance for a quick settlement. Parents were likely misguided by these predictions, and saw no need to intervene in the negotiations. Also, the presence of the mediators unavoidably removed some pressure from each side to deal with the issues quickly and directly; each side hoped the mediators could pressure the other side. Especially in the early stages of the strike, the two negotiation teams did not talk face to face but through the mediators. This type of negotiation is cumbersome and ineffective. Additional minor factors contributed to the length of the strike but, in the final analysis, the inflexible positions of each side led the Minister of Education to summon both teams to Toronto and threaten them "to settle or else."

Bitterness and hostility were clearly evident among the teachers in the immediate weeks after the strike. Further, new and lasting animosities emerged between teachers and principals/vice-principals, as the result of an article in ROCK, a teachers' publication of May 1980. The teachers threatened to vote out those trustees unfriendly to their cause. The issue of summer and night school remained unresolved. Yet, by the end of 1980, only six months after the long and bitter strike, outward indications were that the Sudbury school system was back to normal, that is, reflecting the situation that existed prior to the strike. But the strike had affected both relations within the system and attitudes towards education, among all the SBE components.

We do not believe that the teachers were successful in persuading parents, students, or the community at large that their demands regarding staffing, PTR, and better working conditions were for the benefit of the students. Most parents were satisfied with the educational system in Sudbury but the TSS discovered a significant proportion who became cynical towards the teachers as a result of the strike. Likely, the social distance between the two widened.

Relations between SBE people and teachers remained strained in 1981, but the SBE took specific steps to improve the relations. A modified form of contract negotiations--the presence of professional negotiators--and a speedy and generally acceptable settlement in 1981 helped to decrease hostility. Only time will tell if co-operative, amiable relations will replace the present coolness between teachers and the SBE. It would be naïve to believe that teachers are now motivated mainly by professional concern for their pupils:

the 1979 negotiations and the 1980 strike showed that they see themselves as workers, concerned first and foremost with their work conditions and job security.

In examining the masses of statements, documents, and other information gathered during the TSS research, we must conclude that the Sudbury strike had little consideration for the welfare of the students and the quality of education. The strike was about the sharing of power and authority. It emphasized the dollars-and-cents issues and job security. To quote one TSS respondent: "The system, as it is now, is not concerned primarily with education. It is concerned with saving its own hide." This sentiment has been amply supported by opinion polls, which found a sharp decrease in the public's confidence in their educational systems, and the well-documented shortcomings of secondary school graduates applying for entry into universities.

There were many arguments in favour of local contract negotiations and the teachers' right to strike. In the first case, it is extremely difficult to support this position if there is not a clearly stipulated definition on the purpose of secondary school education, and if the contract disputes revolve mostly around salaries, benefits, and working conditions. A province-wide, relatively uniform scale of salaries and working conditions for teachers would eliminate the need for any branch of the teachers' federations to catch up to one which had been successful in squeezing some extras from its board. Province-wide negotiations would:

1. Eliminate the need for costly Fact Finders and mediators;
2. Allow the Ministry of Education to plan more rationally and consistently;
3. Permit the establishment and maintenance of amiable relations between teachers and local school representatives and administrators.

Despite certain drawbacks, such an alternative offers many more benefits to the whole educational system than the present practice of local negotiations.

Under Bill 100, the teachers have the right to strike to press their demands, but this right can be easily abrogated. Thus, it is already severely limited. A strike is an effective weapon if it can create discomfort or create a loss for management, as in an industrial strike. But against whom do teachers strike? Boards of education are not companies, standing to suffer financial losses. On the contrary, they gain by not paying striking teachers' salaries. By confronting boards of education, teachers strike against students, by threatening the successful completion of their education and, through students, against parents. The concerned parents are then expected to pressure the boards to settle and prevent jeopardizing their children's education. This is a cumbersome, disruptive, conflict-creating, misdirected form of sanction.

The Sudbury-area parents did not react in a predictable way, and this strike did not produce desirable results for the teachers. It is fully accepted that teachers must have some means of gaining their justifiable demands. There must be some way to assure that students' education is not jeopardized, if it is accepted as important by society. Other ways and means must be found to settle disputes between teachers and boards, for, as the Sudbury strike showed so clearly, no one benefited from this form of confrontation.

Appendix 1: Additional Tables

Table A1

Selection of Parent Samples

	Enrolment Totals	Enrolment % of Total	Sample 1	Sample 2
1. Capreol	277	2.43	2.67	3.6
2. Chelmsford	573	5.06	5.56	7.6
3. Confederation	726	6.42	7.06	9.6
4. Franco-Jeunesse	638	5.64	5.64	8.5
5. French River	198	1.73	1.90	2.6
6. Garson	882	7.81	8.59	11.7
7. Hanmer	792	7.01	7.71	10.5
8. Lasalle	975	8.64	9.50	13.0
9. Levac	267	2.80	3.08	4.2
10. Lively	522	4.61	5.07	6.9
11. Lo-Ellen	714	6.32	6.95	9.5
12. Lockerby	882	7.81	8.59	11.7
13. McDonald	734	6.49	7.14	9.7
14. Nickel District	759	6.72	7.39	10.1
15. Rayside	661	5.84	6.42	8.8
16. Sudbury Secondary	1 642	14.57	16.03	21.9
	<u>11 242</u>	<u>99.40</u>	<u>109.30</u>	<u>149.9</u>
			N = 113	N = 150

Based on the 1980-81 academic year.

Table A2

Perceived Causes of the Strike: Teacher Responses
By Selected Variables

	Causes						
	Financial	Job Security	Work Conditions	Position of Board	More Than One	Other	N
	%						
Affiliation							
OSSTF	26.5	5.9	5.9	41.2	8.8	11.8	34
AEFO	11.1	22.2	22.2	33.3	11.1	-	9
Language of Instruction							
English	25.7	5.7	5.7	42.9	8.6	11.4	35
French	12.5	25.0	25.0	25.0	12.5	-	8
Years of Teaching Experience							
2 - 5	25.0	-	25.0	25.0	-	25.0	4
6 - 10	16.7	25.0	16.7	33.3	8.3	-	12
11 - 15	25.0	6.3	-	50.0	12.5	6.3	16
16 - 20	28.6	-	-	28.6	14.3	28.6	7
21 +	-	-	50.0	50.0	-	-	2
Income							
Under \$20 000	-	33.3	33.3	33.3	-	-	3
\$20 000 - 24 999	37.5	-	12.5	37.5	-	12.5	8
\$25 000 - 29 999	33.3	-	33.3	-	-	33.3	3
\$30 000 +	20.0	10.0	6.7	43.3	13.3	6.7	30
Age							
20 - 29	-	-	40.0	40.0	-	20.0	5
30 - 39	15.0	15.0	5.0	40.0	15.0	10.0	20
40 - 49	30.8	7.7	7.7	46.2	7.7	-	13
50 - 59	60.0	-	-	40.0	-	-	5
60 +	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1
Marital Status							
Single	-	-	25.0	50.0	-	25.0	4
Married	26.3	7.9	7.9	39.5	10.5	7.9	38
Other	-	50.0	-	50.0	-	-	2
Years of Residence							
Under 2	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1
2 - 5	-	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	5
6 - 10	25.0	16.7	25.0	25.0	-	8.3	12
11 - 15	-	-	-	100.0	-	-	5
16 - 20	-	-	-	100.0	-	-	2
21 - 24	33.3	-	-	33.3	33.3	-	3
25 +	40.0	6.7	-	33.3	6.7	13.3	15

Table A3

Perceived Major Contributing Factors to the Strike:
Teacher Responses, by Selected Variables

Contributing Factors							
	Attitude of Board	Fault of Trustees	COLE %	Declining Enrolment	Poor Offer	Other	N
Affiliation							
OSSTF	23.3	3.3	-	3.3	23.3	46.7	30
AEFO	33.3	-	16.7	-	16.7	33.7	6
Language of Instruction							
English	25.8	3.2	-	3.2	22.6	45.2	31
French	20.0	-	20.0	-	20.0	40.0	5
Years of Teaching Experience							
2 - 5	25.0	-	-	-	25.0	50.0	4
6 - 10	40.0	-	10.0	-	10.0	40.0	10
11 - 15	25.0	-	-	8.3	16.7	50.0	12
16 - 20	-	14.3	-	-	42.9	42.9	7
21 +	-	-	-	-	50.0	50.0	2
Income							
Under \$20 000	-	-	-	-	50.0	50.0	2
\$20 000 - 24 999	16.7	16.7	-	16.7	16.7	33.3	6
\$25 000 - 29 999	-	-	-	-	100.0	-	3
\$30 000 +	30.8	-	3.8	-	11.5	53.8	26
Age							
20 - 29	20.0	-	20.0	-	20.0	40.0	5
30 - 39	35.3	-	-	-	17.6	47.1	17
40 - 49	-	10.0	-	10.0	10.0	70.0	10
50 - 59	50.0	-	-	-	50.0	-	4
60 +	-	-	-	-	100.0	-	1
Marital Status							
Single	25.0	-	-	-	-	75.0	4
Married	25.0	3.1	3.1	3.1	25.0	40.6	38
Other	-	-	-	-	-	100.0	1

Table A4

Evaluation of the Positions Taken by the Two Sides during the Strike:
Parent Respondents, by Selected Variables

	% Negative		% Neutral		% Mixed		% Positive		% Uncertain, Other		
	SBE	OSSTF AEFO	SBE	OSSTF AEFO	SBE	OSSTF AEFO	SBE	OSSTF AEFO	SBE	OSSTF AEFO	N
Family Income											
Under \$10 000	88.0	50.0	-	-	11.1	20.0	-	30.0	-	-	9
\$10 000 - \$14 999	50.0	37.5	12.5	12.5	25.0	50.0	12.5	-	-	-	8
\$15 000 - \$19 999	25.0	44.4	-	11.1	25.0	22.2	50.0	22.2	-	-	9
\$20 000 - \$24 999	57.1	68.8	7.1	12.5	7.1	6.3	21.4	12.5	7.1	-	16
\$25 000 - \$29 999	63.6	54.5	-	9.1	18.2	27.3	18.2	9.1	-	-	11
\$30 000 +	42.9	64.3	-	7.1	7.1	7.1	50.0	21.4	-	-	14
Education											
Less Than Grade 8	80.0	16.7	20.0	33.3	-	16.7	-	33.3	-	-	6
Grade 8	41.7	69.2	8.3	-	25.0	15.4	25.0	15.4	25.0	15.4	13
Some High School	54.5	59.9	3.0	11.8	18.2	29.4	21.2	5.9	3.0	-	33
Completed High School	50.0	67.5	-	-	-	-	33.3	37.5	16.7	-	8
Higher Education	60.0	80.0	-	-	-	10.0	40.0	10.0	-	-	10
Special Education	-	100.0	-	-	50.0	-	50.0	-	-	-	2
Years of Residence											
Under 5	20.0	60.0	-	-	-	-	60.0	40.0	20.0	-	5
6 - 10	75.0	100.0	-	-	-	-	25.0	-	-	-	4
11 - 19	56.3	58.8	-	-	18.8	23.5	18.8	17.6	6.3	-	17
20 - 29	56.3	52.9	6.3	17.6	18.8	11.8	18.8	11.8	-	5.9	16
30 - 39	60.0	36.0	-	8.0	30.0	28.0	10.0	28.0	-	-	10
40 +	56.6	63.6	10.5	9.1	5.3	32.7	31.6	4.5	-	-	21
Home Ownership											
Own	52.6	61.3	3.5	9.7	14.0	16.1	26.3	12.9	3.5	-	62
Rent	61.5	42.9	7.7	-	15.4	28.6	15.4	21.4	-	7.1	14

Table A5

Comparison of Selected Offences
February 1979 to May 1979,
Secondary School Teachers' Strike
2 February 1980 to 2 May 1980,
and February 1981 to May 1981

	Month	Occurrences			Average
		1979	1980	1981	
Break Enter and Theft	Feb.	99	81	133	
	Mar.	146	116	167	
	Apr.	<u>130</u>	<u>128</u>	<u>192</u>	
	Sub-Total	375	325	492	397
Theft over \$200	Feb.	30	41	76	
	Mar.	59	52	103	
	Apr.	<u>55</u>	<u>61</u>	<u>114</u>	
	Sub-Total	144	154	293	197
Theft under \$200 (excluding shoplifters)	Feb.	93	121	156	
	Mar.	166	144	199	
	Apr.	<u>235</u>	<u>280</u>	<u>308</u>	
	Sub-Total	494	545	663	567
Willful Damage Mischief	Feb.	67	74	90	
	Mar.	136	82	167	
	Apr.	<u>164</u>	<u>168</u>	<u>154</u>	
	Sub-Total	367	324	411	367
Under Age L.L.A. Offences	Feb.	1	13	-	
	Mar.	3	5	4	
	Apr.	<u>9</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>13</u>	
	Sub-Total	13	20	17	17
Shoplifting	Feb.	50	70	84	
	Mar.	87	93	84	
	Apr.	<u>75</u>	<u>69</u>	<u>75</u>	
	Sub-Total	212	232	243	229
TOTAL		1605	1600	2119	1775

Source: Mr. Robin Hale, Director of Research, Sudbury Regional Police.

Table A6

Teachers Should Have the Right to Strike:
Parent Respondents, by Selected Variable

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral %	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N
Ethnic Background						
Respondent						
Anglo-Celt	7.4	25.9	-	25.9	40.7	27
French	13.8	20.7	13.8	22.6	24.1	29
Italian	-	66.7	-	-	33.3	3
Slavic	25.0	25.0	-	25.0	25.0	4
Scandinavian	-	-	50.0	-	50.0	2
"Canadian"	-	33.3	-	66.7	-	3
Other	7.7	7.7	-	23.1	61.5	13
Spouse						
Anglo-Celt	14.8	25.9	-	25.9	33.3	27
French	9.5	28.6	14.3	28.6	19.0	21
Italian	-	66.7	-	-	33.3	3
Slavic	20.0	20.0	-	-	60.0	5
Scandinavian	25.0	-	25.0	-	50.0	4
"Canadian"	-	-	-	100.0	-	2
Other	-	-	-	33.3	66.7	9
Religion (Respondent)						
Roman Catholic	11.5	23.1	7.7	26.9	30.8	52
Protestant	12.5	12.5	6.3	31.3	37.5	16
Other Religion/ No Religion	-	25.0	-	16.6	58.3	12

Table A7

Teachers Should Have the Right to Strike:
Parent Respondents, by Selected Variables

	Strongly Agree	Agree	Neutral %	Disagree	Strongly Disagree	N
Union Membership						
Respondent, No	5.6	20.4	9.3	29.6	35.2	54
Is a Member	31.3	12.5	-	25.0	31.3	16
Was a Member	-	40.0	-	10.0	50.0	10
Spouse, No	10.7	17.9	-	35.7	35.7	28
Is a Member	17.9	28.6	10.7	21.4	21.4	28
Was a Member	-	21.4	7.1	14.3	57.1	14
Family Income						
Under \$10 000	9.1	36.4	9.1	18.2	27.3	11
\$10 000 - \$14 999	-	50.0	-	12.5	37.5	8
\$15 000 - \$19 999	-	22.2	-	33.3	44.4	9
\$20 000 - \$24 999	16.7	16.7	16.7	22.2	27.8	18
\$25 000 - \$29 999	16.7	8.3	-	50.0	25.0	12
\$30 000 +	14.3	14.3	-	21.4	50.0	14
Experienced Work to Rule/ Strike						
Respondent, No	8.6	22.4	8.6	25.9	34.5	58
Yes	21.4	28.6	-	21.4	28.6	14
Spouse, No	10.0	20.0	3.3	33.3	33.3	30
Yes	13.8	20.7	10.3	20.7	34.5	29
Home Ownership						
Own	12.1	19.7	6.1	24.2	37.9	66
Rent	-	33.3	6.7	33.3	26.7	15

Table A8

Teachers Should Have the Right to Strike:
Teacher Respondents, by Selected Variables

	No	Yes	N
	%		
Salary			
Under \$20 000	-	100.0	3
Between \$20 000 - \$24 999	14.3	85.7	7
\$25 000 - \$29 999	-	100.0	3
\$30 000 +	31.0	69.0	29
Years of Teaching Experience			
5 Years or Less	50.0	50.0	4
Between 6 - 10	18.2	81.8	11
11 - 15	12.5	87.5	16
16 - 20	28.6	71.4	7
21 +	-	100.0	1
Age			
Between 20 - 29	20.0	80.0	5
30 - 39	26.3	73.7	19
40 - 49	25.0	75.0	12
50 - 59	20.0	80.0	5
60 +	-	100.0	1
Language of Instruction			
English	25.7	74.3	35
French	-	100.0	6

Table A9

Teachers Should Have the Right to Strike:
"Others" Respondents, by Selected Variables

	No	Not Certain	Yes	Other	N
	%				
SBE Officers/Trustees	44.8	3.4	48.3	3.4	29
Principals/Vice-Principals	33.3	-	66.7	-	6
Community Leaders	30.4	4.3	56.5	8.7	23

Appendix 2: Charts

Chart 1

Original Positions of the SBE and the Teachers on Major Issues Reflecting Differences of Principle


Issue	Board's Position	Teachers' Position	Questions of Difference on Principles
Salary* and Administrative Allowances*	i) Increase of approximately 5 per cent at each level on salary grid ii) Increase of \$1800 in each of two years	COLE: i) Maintenance of 1978 grid with increases tied to those in the CPI ii) 10 per cent increase plus COLE adjustment	"fairness": relevance of inflation, local economy, settlement in rest of the province to determining a fair salary?
Retirement Gratuity* and Sabbaticals**	i) Grandfather the retirement gratuity as of Aug. 31/79 ii) Cutback on paid sabbaticals from 3 to 1	i) <u>Status quo</u> and increase number of days on which this based ii) <u>Status quo</u> and increase salary from 2/3 to 3/4	"cutbacks": validity of board's desire to "take" as well as "give" at the negotiating table?
Pupil/Teacher Ratio**	Increase at general level in PTR, resulting in a reduction of 19 positions over 2 years	Decrease at all levels in PTR resulting in an increase of 52 positions over 2 years	"quality of education": the effect of PTR on this?
Positions of Responsibility**	i) <u>competency</u> : "in the opinion of the board" ii) two sections taught simultaneously = 1 credit count iii) cutback from 145 to 180 periods for determining positions for assistantships	i) any qualified applicant ii) two sections taught simultaneously = 2 credit counts iii) <u>status quo</u>	<u>quality of education and staff morale</u> : effect of reduction of positions, procedures of transfer on these? <u>competency</u> : possibility of judging competency of staff objectively
Redundancy Procedures**	i) viability of program before seniority ii) bumping procedure in positions of responsibility	i) seniority as primary criterion ii) principal and vice-principal positions & salaries to be maintained	
Workload**	not agreed	new: workload for a teacher in a general program consists of 6 credit courses and 180 pupil period contacts in 1 year	<u>quality of education and administrative flexibility</u> : need & effects of specifying workload in the collective agreement? and need for teacher protection?
Just Cause	not agreed	new: the right of a teacher to grieve that a disciplinary demotion on transfer is without just cause	<u>administrative flexibility</u> : the nature of productive board/teacher relations? and need for <u>teacher protection</u> ?

Issue	Board's Position	Teacher's Position	Questions of Difference on Principles
Board Policy and Practice	not agreed	<u>new</u> : right of consultation on changes in standard board practice affecting teachers	<u>administrative flexibility</u> : value of ad hoc decision-making, free of formal policy for the system? and need for <u>teacher protection</u>
Teacher Evaluation	not agreed	<u>new</u> : present procedures to be written into the collective agreement	<u>role of the agreement</u> : value of regulating administrative procedures affecting professional matters by the C.A. & need for <u>teacher protection</u> ? The nature of the relationship between the staff and administration?
Summer School**	not agreed	<u>new</u> : the C.A. should include summer and night school salaries; positions to redundant teachers first	<u>scope of Bill 100</u> : validity of including matters related to summer and night school in the C.A.

Almost all of these issues have implications in terms of salary* and/or jobs,** and reflect a specific dollar figure. Nevertheless, implicit are differences of principle which, as long as they were unaddressed, made bargaining very difficult.

Chart 2

Teacher and Board Positions: Maximum 4 Salary
Prestrike



B-1 - Board offer for 1979-80

T-1 - Teacher proposal equivalent to COLE 1979-80

B-2 - Board offer for 1980-81

T-2 - Teacher proposal equivalent to COLE 1980-81

F - Fact Finder Recommendation

Chart 3

Abbreviated Prestrike History

1979

January 10	request by the teachers to negotiate a new contract.
26	notice of intent to negotiate a 1979-80 contract to the ERC.
February 13	first meeting between the OSSTF/AEFO and SBE bargaining teams; articles concerning procedures for teacher transfer and redundancy discussed.
March 9	the SBE announces its 1979-80 budget.
29	the teams meet to discuss procedures for negotiations.
April (early)	exchange of initial positions.
24	meeting to clarify positions.
May-June	a number of meetings between the teams.
May 22	meeting of the teams with an OSSTF representative, to discuss possible solutions to the problem of teacher redundancy.
29	the SBE responds to the teachers' position concerning remuneration, the just cause and board policy clauses, and positions of responsibility.
June 5	informal agreement on the fringe carrier and some aspects of maternity and adoption leave.
26	other minor clauses agreed to.
July: three meetings	the teams agree to negotiate on a non-offer basis and changes are made by both sides on salary and PTR.
26	negotiations adjourned until September.
August 21	both sides indicate their progress to the ERC.
September 11	both sides revert to their original positions; approximately 50-60 articles and parts of articles are outstanding. Agree to request a Fact Finder.
October 16	meeting of the two sides with the Fact Finder.
24	progress made on some minor clauses.
31	Fact Finder's report.
November 8	mutual request for a Mediator.
13 - 15	mediation 1; the SBE increases its salary offer to 6.0 per cent across the grid; other clauses resolved.
21	Fact Finder's report made public.
22	OSSTF District 31 Fall Assembly.
December 6	formal offers on all outstanding items.
12	ERC supervised vote on board offer.
19	ERC supervised vote giving the teachers' team the power to call a strike; formal request by the teachers for provincial OSSTF assistance.

1980

January 14	the teachers approve the takeover team.
17	the takeover team meets with the SBE.
29 - 31	mediation 2; the SBE reaches a non-offer for settlement, increasing the grid to 7.5 per cent and 7.3 per cent in the two years, and the principals' salaries approximately 7.3 per cent; the teachers reject this.
30	the teachers file notice of strike if the next talks fail.
February 3	mediation 3; for settlement only, sabbatical, gratuity, and the SBE policy clauses agreed.
6	the teachers go on strike.

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- b) 1977-09-01 - 1978-08-31
- c) 1978-09-01 - 1979-08-31
- d) 1979-09-01 - 1981-08-31
- e) 1981-09-01 - 1982-08-31

CORRESPONDENCE

The TSS received a significant amount of official correspondence in 1979-80 regarding the Sudbury teachers' strike. This includes letters or copies of letters, and telegrams:

- a) from various community and parent groups to the ombudsman, regarding a possible termination of the strike,
- b) between the SBE and the ERC, the MOED, Ministers of provincial parliament, and government officials, regarding a possible jeopardy hearing, resumption of school, credits, and summer school,
- c) from the SBE to the MOED, postsecondary institutions and community groups, regarding students affected by the strike,
- d) from the OSSTF/AEFO to the SBE concerning the strike,
- e) from and to the SSSPA regarding the complaint of the SSSPA against the OSSTF, District 31.

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- c) 26 July 1979, Non-offer on outstanding items

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- b) September 1979, Board Report to the Fact Finder: Exhibits

- c) October 1979, OSSTF/AEFO Report to the Fact Finder
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Formal Offers no. 1 on Outstanding Items: 6 December 1979

- a) 6 December 1979, Formal offers by board and teachers
- b) December 1979, OSSTF position re negotiations

Second Mediation Documents: 27-29 January 1980

- a) 29 January 1980, Board non-offer for settlement

Third Mediation Documents: 3 February 1980

- a) 4 February 1980, Outstanding items with non-offers during mediation for total settlement
- b) 4 February 1980, Outstanding items postmediation

Strike: 6 February to 4 May 1980

Fourth Mediation Documents: 18-20 February 1980

- a) 19 February 1980, Teachers' proposal of split grid

Notice of Lockout Documents: 26 February 1980

- a) 29 February 1980, Teachers' position (formal no. 2)
- b) February 1980, Teachers' position

Fifth Mediation Documents: 6-8 March 1980

- a) 10 March 1980, Lacroix report to the board

Sixth Mediation Documents: 28-30 March 1980

- a) 29 March 1980, Teacher non-offer reflected in 12 April 1980 document

Seventh Mediation Documents: 10-12 April 1980

- a) 12 April 1980, Board non-offer for settlement
- b) 12 April 1980, Outstanding items

Eighth Mediation Documents: 18-19 April 1980

- a) 19 April 1980, Teacher proposal

Resumption of Face-to-Face Negotiations: 21-30 April 1980

21 April - Board request "3 on 3" negotiations

- a) 21 April 1980, Board's position
- b) 21 April 1980, Board's official offer no. 2
- c) 23 April 1980, Teachers' position #3
- d) 23 April 1980, Board comparison of formal positions
- e) 28 April 1980, OSSTF comparison of formal positions

Face-to-Face Negotiations: 24-27 April 1980

- a) 30 April 1980, Board proposal

Ninth Mediation Documents: 30 April, 1 May 1980

- a) 30 April 1980, Board proposal worked into memorandum of agreement
- b) 1979-1981, Collective Agreement

PERSONAL NOTES

The TSS received personal notes related to the strike which may be identified only in a general way because they represent private communications to the TSS.

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